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DIALECTICS OF POWER IN THE MAORI CREATION MYTH

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There are many different versions of the Maori creation myth. Yet those preserved probably represent only a small sample of the variety that must have existed at the time of European contact. Like many other rich collections of myth, the Maori corpus is both inspiring and formidable due to its intricate concentration of symbolic meaning. It is perhaps inevitable that no single study or analytical approach can honestly claim to be exhaustive. There will probably never be any absolute, correct interpretation that finally closes the door to future inquiry. Instead, there are likely to be a number of alternative approaches that should be evaluated according to their articulation with the material and the quantity and quality of insights they offer.

Just as there will likely be no ultimate interpretation of the Maori creation myth, there is probably also no single true version. Variants of the myth are typically divided into exoteric and esoteric accounts. The exoteric versions—collected by Grey (1855), Shortland (1882), Taylor (1855), Wohlers (1874), and White (1887)—may be relatively free of obvious European influences, yet they were elicited by the questions of foreigners outside of their traditional context. They tend to be fragmentary and sketchy in details since the Maoris were often reluctant to betray their sacred knowledge. As a Mamari priest told John White, "Our gods are not annihilated—they are only silenced by the superior influence of the European God. We are still in the power of our Maori gods, and if we divulge the sacred lore of our ancestors the gods will punish us with death" (White 1887:iv).

Variants of the myth apparently proliferated in proportion to the his-

torical differentiation of Maori social groups, with the result that each house of learning seemingly preserved lore that was, at least to some extent, at variance with its neighbors in spite of mutual knowledge of the differences. As Te Matorohanga explained to a group of highborn novices of the Ngati Kahungunu house of learning in 1865:

> There was no one universal system of teaching in the Whare-wananga. Each tribe had its own priests, its own college, and its own methods. From each tribe this was so: the teaching was diverted from the true teaching by the self-conceit of the priests which allowed departure from their own doctrines to those of the other Whare-wananga. My word to you is: Hold steadfastly to our teaching: leave out of consideration that of other [tribes]. Let their descendents adhere to their teaching, and you to ours. (Smith 1913:84)

The sage implies that the sacred lore is continuously modified through the motivated praxis ("self-conceit") of priests. Although any divergence from the received sacred lore is considered to be a serious violation of *tapu*, such violations are sometimes deliberately committed in order to express and augment an individual's *mana* (Johansen 1958:7).

The esoteric version is by far the most complete and detailed of surviving accounts. It was recorded in the 1860s by a Maori scribe from the teachings of two old Ngati Kahungunu *tohungas*,[1] Te Matorohanga and Nepia Pohuhu, in the traditional context of a *whare-wananga* (house of learning). S. Percy Smith (1913) and Elsdon Best (1924) eagerly promoted this version as the superior and true Maori account of creation, which had presumably been jealously guarded from common knowledge since ancient times by an elite class of *tohungas*. However, Schwimmer (1966) and Johansen (1958) indicate that it is actually the result of two long meetings held around 1860 by a group of Maori scholars to establish a standardized metaphysical and historical doctrine. Te Matorohanga and Nepia Pohuhu, both ex-Christian converts, were senior scholars at the meetings. The most controversial product of this council was the revelation of an ancient Polynesian supreme god named Io. Te Rangi Hiroa (1949) and Johansen (1958) express the doubts of many regarding Io, implying that he is more likely a Polynesian response to the apparently superior *mana* of the Christian God than an indigenous concept.

Neither the exoteric nor esoteric accounts can be safely considered pristine, pre-European Maori mythology. However, surviving variants do not simply diverge randomly; rather, they collectively reveal a dis-

tinctive logical integrity. Different versions tend to be mutually comple-
mentary, shedding light on each other, amplifying certain themes, or
exploring alternative symbolic combinations while preserving a com-
mon, underlying generative structure. This investigation can therefore
be more profitably addressed to the system of symbols and generative
logic that may account for the production and range of variants, rather
than a misguided positivist search for the true reading of the true ver-
sion of the myth.

Different accounts of the Maori creation myth can be understood as
partial explorations of the dialectical tension produced by two opposing
structural dimensions of power: the natural, vital power of organic
growth versus the ascribed cultural power of fixed hierarchical status
based on genealogical position. The natural power of growth is in-
formed by a transformational, analogical structure in which opposi-
tions are mediated by gradual distinctions along a continuum, such as
the transformations of young to old, high tide to low tide, new moon to
full moon, and so on. The two poles of such developmental continua
may be generally described as potentiality (or fertility) at one end and
its realization at the other. Since the final realization of most natural
processes of this nature consists of a new state of potentiality, its tempo-
ral form is best described as cyclical. This contrasts with the linear
dimension of genealogical distinctions that are formed by digital,
binary oppositions such as senior-junior or male-female. Birth order and
gender are matters of discontinuous logical opposition—A versus not-A
—rather than the natural oppositions of the phenomenal world of sense
experience. The relationship of these two dimensions of contrast as they
appear in the myth is summarized diagrammatically in figure 1. The
horizontal axis represents the paradigmatic dimension of binary opposi-
tions while the vertical axis stands for the encompassing syntagmatic
organization of the narrative.

Different episodes and versions of the myth represent alternative
models that explore and experiment with the relationship of these two
structural dimensions of power through a rich code of reiterative sym-
bols. Successive phases of the myth describe the production and repro-
duction of asymmetrical relations of power as one generation replaces
another: as children are transformed into parents, and juniors into
seniors. This process is represented as a focus of social ambiguity, con-
tradiction, and conflict in the myth.

The dialectical opposition of the digital and analogical dimensions of
power constitutes two sides of the Maori concept of *mana*. On the one
hand, *mana* is a fixed, ascribed power inherent in the structural value

Potentiality
(e.g., feminine fertility)

analogical, natural transformation
(e.g., growth)

realization
(e.g., masculine power)

senior . . . ⟵————— digital, sociocultural ————⟶ . . . junior
female . . . ⟵———— relationships ————⟶ . . . male
etc.   etc.

FIGURE 1. The relation of the digital and analogical dimensions of contrast that respectively inform the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of the structure of Maori creation myths.

of birth order in which seniors are intrinsically superior to juniors both within the family and between senior and junior lines of descent from common ancestors. On the other hand, *mana* is also an acquired power that may analogically grow through successful actions or decrease with failures.

> The first-born son inherited the power to rule and direct his tribe, but this *mana* lay dormant within him, so to speak, until it was given active expression on his father's death or retirement through age or some other disability [hence the potential for intergenerational conflict of interests] . . . besides the inherited *mana*, a new *ariki* could acquire additional *mana* by the wise administration of his tribe at home and by successful military campaigns abroad. . . . On the other hand, poor administration and defeats in war might lead to a loss of power and prestige. (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949:346)

The father may possess superior *mana* according to the digital genealogical principle; however, the natural vitality of the son may represent superior *mana* based on the analogical principle. Similarly, Te Rangi Hiroa observes that if an eldest son proves to lack vigor and competence in leadership, his position may be taken over by a younger brother who could "supply the energy and administrative ability which his senior brother lacked" (1949:345). Thus, the contradictory structure of *mana* expressed in the natural vitality of youth and the cultural prestige of

seniority defines an arena of social contradiction and conflict that is endemic to the reproduction of the Maori social order. Generation after generation, juniors displace seniors in the ongoing social process. The outcome of the conflict between these two relativized dimensions of *mana* is control over the forces of natural and social reproduction, pre-eminently symbolized by the female sex. It is precisely the social conflicts and contradictions structured into this process that give order and meaning to the Maori creation myth.

The Primordial Ages

Maori cosmogony typically begins with a recitation of the vast, personified ages of Te Po (The Night),[2] Te Ao (The Light), and Te Kore (The Emptiness), listed in genealogical form as original ancestors. This corresponds to the fact that each ancestor in a Maori genealogy represents a temporal unit. The esoteric version omits the ages of Ao and Kore, listing only the ages of Po:

Te Po-Tamaku (The Age Smoothed Off)
Te Po-Kararauri (The Age of Extreme Darkness)
Te Po-Aoao-nui (The Great Age of Dawn)
Te Po-Uriuri (The Age of Deep Black Darkness)
Te Po-Kerikeri (The Age of Darkness)
Te Po-Tiwhatiwha (The Age of Gloom)

Te Matorohanga explains that these six ages of Po are assigned to the entrance of Rarohenga (the underworld); some are additionally assigned to women's menstrual cycles. He includes a list of seven names corresponding to the ancient division of the lunar month into seven four-day periods, and then he recites six more ages of Po that divide the month according to the light of the moon:

Te Po-Taruaitu (The Night with Light Faintly Seen)
Te Po-Whatuao (The Night with the Eye of Light)
Te Po-Atarau (The Night of Moonlight)
Te Po-Para-uriuri (The Night with Fragments of Darkness)
Te Po-Turu (The Night Confirmed)
Te Po-Whiro (The Night of Darkness before the New Moon)

In this account the creation begins with Te Po-Tamaku (The Age Smoothed Off), suggesting an original darkness undisturbed by the stirrings of any differentiating activity. "The Age of Extreme Darkness" is followed by Te Po-Aoao-nui (The Great Age of Dawn), bringing the

series to the very threshold of light followed by a plunge back into Te
Po-Uriuri (The Age of Deep Black Darkness). The names of the fifth
and sixth ages, "The Age of Darkness" and "The Age of Gloom," hint at
slight decreases in the intensity of the darkness. These subtle distinctions
represent a gradual waxing and waning of darkness, isomorphic to the
second series of six Po, which describes the waxing and waning of moon-
light. It begins with "The Night with Light Faintly Seen," climaxing in
"The Night of Moonlight," and concluding with "The Night of Darkness
before the New Moon." This cyclical continuum (or more precisely, a
spiral), which delineates the gradual emergence of light from darkness,
suggests a metaphoric parallel between the primordial ages of Po and
the monthly lunar cycle, as if the phenomenological Po of daily life
were personified and magnified into great aeons of time.

Creation is shown to proceed according to the analogical principle of
continuous growth; however, the digital genealogical implications
already forecast contradiction. Maori culture ascribes social status on
the basis of primogeniture, granting superior position and personal
power to the male (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949:343–345). In contrast, nature is
shown to give genealogical priority to the female, since Te Po and the
moon are symbolically feminine. The birth of man presupposes the
prior existence of woman as mother.

The cosmogonic genealogy discussed by Schwimmer (1966) is partic-
ularly interesting since it condenses symbols found in many different
versions into one chant:

1) Te Kore	'The Nothing'
2) Te Kore-Tuatahi	'The First Nothing'
3) Te Kore-Tuarua	'The Second Nothing'
4) Te Kore-Nui	'The Large Nothing'
5) Te Kore-Roa	'The Wide Spread Nothing'
6) Te Kore-Para	'The Yellow Leaf Nothing'
7) Te Kore-Whiwhia	'The Bounded, Entangled Nothing'
8) Te Kore-Rawea	'The Snared Nothing'
9) Te Kore-Te-Temana	'The Fast-Bound Nothing'
10) Te Po	'The Night'
11) Te Po-Teki	'The Night Adrift with Anchor Grazing'
12) Te Po-Terea	'The Night Fully Adrift'
13) Te Po-Whawha	'The Night of Sheathing Leaves'
14) Hine-make-moe	'Maiden Go-to-Sleep'
15) Te Ata	'The Dawn'

16) Te Ao-Turoa   'The Light of Day'
17) Te Ao-Marama   'The Fullest Light of Day'
18) Whaitua   'Space'
19) Maku ('Moisture')   =   Mahora nui a Rangi ('Great
                             Expanse of Sky')

Rangi (Sky Father) = Papa (Earth Mother)

Kore is usually translated as "void" or "emptiness." Its everyday usage signifies different types of negation. Kore, like Po, is also a metonym of the lunar month. Three consecutive nights of each month are named *korekore* (Williams 1844:141). During this period it is *tapu* to take food from either land or sea (Reed 1963:18), suggesting a monthly recognition of the barrenness of the first cosmic ages.

The philosophical problem of creating something from nothing is solved by having nothing reproduce itself, a small but significant step that sets time in motion and demonstrates a preexisting feminine fertility in the universe. The second and third ages are simply called the First Kore and the Second Kore, just as two of the *korekore* nights of the month are known as the first and second *korekore*. Enumeration is perhaps the most direct method of indicating a process of gradual increase. It is one of the most common modes of representation for the original ages of Po and Kore. For example, Grey's account begins with the standard *karakia* (incantation): "There was darkness from the first division of time [Po] unto the tenth, to the hundredth, to the thousandth" (Grey 1855:1; see also Best 1924:34).

Te Kore-Nui (The Large Nothing) is followed by "The Wide Spread" and "The Yellow Leaf" Kore, indicating a vegetative growth cycle.[3] These are followed by a third set of three ages describing the incremental steps of a snaring process. Schwimmer notes that the season of bird-snaring immediately follows the agricultural harvest, and so these six ages associated with plant growth and snaring echo the annual economic cycle of the Maori. He further points out the symbolic significance of snaring in Maori mythology: something is snared in order to force it to yield a potential it otherwise would not have expressed, as in the myth of the trickster Maui who snares the sun (Schwimmer 1966: 13–15). Here the snared Kore yields Te Po, a different but closely related entity.

The ebb and flow of the tides is another natural phenomenon well known to the Maori that demonstrates an analogic process similar to the waxing and waning of the moon and the growth and decay of plants.

The eleventh Po, Te Po-Teki, presents an image of "The Night Adrift with Anchor Grazing," followed by Te Po-Terea (The Night Fully Adrift). Together they designate the movement of the tides.

Te Po-Whawha (The Night of Sheathing Leaves) repeats the vegetative motif of the Kore series. The term *whawha* is used for leaves with a sheathing base, specifically the cultivated taro and flax (Williams 1844:484). The combined concepts of domesticated plant growth and enwrapping suggest a symbolic synthesis of snaring and agricultural themes, thus providing a cyclical memory of the preceding ages of Kore.

The next age, Hine-make-moe (Maiden Go-to-Sleep), links this series with other cosmogonies that feature mental and physiological states. For example, a cosmogonic genealogy collected by Taylor begins:

> From the conception the increase
> From the increase the thought
> From the thought the remembrance
> From the remembrance the consciousness
> From the consciousness the desire (1855:14)

The first two phases, conception and increase, are physiological in nature, suggesting the origin and development of the body in the womb. They are followed by thought and remembrance, a logical sequence since the faculty of remembrance can only function with prior thought as its object. This reflexive process automatically differentiates subject and object, producing the next moment in the series: consciousness. Out of consciousness arises the awareness of self-interest and desire, which is, in turn, the primary impulse of human life and procreation. This completes the cycle since it is desire that leads again to conception and increase. This recital is actually a very subtle philosophical reflection upon psychophysiological reproduction and development symbolically projected onto the origin of the world in the form of primal ancestors. A similar recital begins with Te Kune (The Pregnancy) and Te Pupuke (The Swelling), followed by desire, thought, mind, and longing (Best 1924:32).

In Schwimmer's genealogy, the ages of Night and Hine-make-moe are followed by Te Ata (The Dawn) and a gradual increase of light, with Te Ao-Turoa (The Light of Day) and Te Ao-Marama (The Fullest Light of Day). These ages are logical metaphors of daily experience, as the existence of night automatically implies dawn and ultimately the full light of day. The gradual waxing and waning of moonlight characteristic of the ages of Po is followed by a more intense expression of light in the ages of the symbolically masculine Ao. The contradiction between the

natural priority of the female and the cultural primacy of the male is here given sharper definition: the younger brother (Ao) possesses greater strength and vitality than the elder sister (Po). The female possesses the passive, inherent power of digital birth-order, whereas the masculine power expresses the dynamic force gradually achieved through the fullness of growth and evolution: it develops later, but is therefore more mature and vigorous.

The eighteenth and nineteenth ages, Whaitua (Space) and Maku (Moisture), foreshadow the birth of Rangi, the Sky Father. He is a synthesis of these two qualities. The origins of Papa, the Earth Mother, are rarely specified genealogically. Like the inherent fertility of the Po, she is simply a preexisting manifestation of the prior feminine principle. She is the unformed ground from which all else differentiates. The list of the great primordial ages comes to a close with the appearance of Rangi and Papa.

Similar cosmogonies collected by White (1887) and Shortland (1882) begin with the ages of Po followed by those of Ao and then Kore. This sequence follows a classic dialectical pattern of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The feminine ages of the Night produce the masculine ages of the Day followed by the neutral ages of the Nothing. The last age before the appearance of Rangi in Shortland's account is Te Mangu (The Black), forming a cyclical memory of the earliest ages of Po. Similarly, White's version ends with Te Kore-te-Matua (The Nothing without Parent), who should be the first member of the series according to a unidirectional logic. But this is a logic that connects beginnings with endings in a development best described as a spiral, since start and finish are similar but not identical.

Very few cosmogonic chants are known that include Io, the alleged Maori Supreme God. One was collected by Gudgeon "some years" prior to 1907 from an Ngati Maru scholar named Tiwai Paraone (Gudgeon 1907:109–119). Te Rangi Hiroa and Johansen both note the strong similarities between Paraone's text and the biblical account of Genesis. Johansen (1958:56) lists these as follows: "An original darkness. An original water. Both Io and God create by words. The creation of Ao and Po, Day and Night, may be paralleled to the statement that God divided the light from the darkness." He goes on to indicate that in spite of the probable Christian influence, Io is represented in terms of Polynesian categories. Thus, when Io creates by uttering words, they are not imperative commands but *karakias*; he acts in the manner of a great Maori *tohunga* (ibid.: 56–57).[4]

Another cosmogony initiated with Io was recorded by Best from the

Ngati-Maniapoto (1924:40). Here Io appears to be inserted at the top of a traditional cosmogony (see figure 2). The stars logically precede the moon and the sun according to their weaker luminosity. The opposition between male and female, as symbolized by the moon and the sun, Po and Ao, which was implicit in preceding versions, is here explicitly accentuated.

An exhaustive study of all known cosmogonic genealogies is beyond the scope of this investigation; however, the foregoing examples represent a fair sampling of the major themes and symbols that occur in different combinations in other variants. Common symbols such as the waxing and waning of the moon, the growth and decay of vegetation, the annual cycle of gardening and bird-snaring, the ebb and flow of the tides, the evolution of physiological and psychological states, and the gradual emergence of light from darkness all point toward a continuous, natural process of development that slowly achieves its maximum expression, followed by a measured recession. Paradoxically, this analogical process is given in a digital, genealogical format that advances by symbolic nuances. The overlapping of these two dimensions estab-

Io

Whetu (Stars)

Female Line		Male Line
1) Te Marama (The Moon)		1) Te Ra (The Sun)
2) Te Po-Nui		2) Te Ao-Nui
•		•
•		•
•		•
•		•
(Ages of Po)		(Ages of Ao)
•		•
•		•
•		•
•		•
20) Te Po-i-Maui		20) Te Ao-i-Maui
21) Papa-Tuanuku	=	21) Rangi-Nui

FIGURE 2. **One of the rare cosmogonic genealogies beginning with the god Io.** (Abstracted from Best 1924:40.)

lishes the contradictory structural foundation for the mythical drama about to unfold.

Rangi and Papa

The series of great ages is concluded with the embrace of Rangi, the Sky Father, and Papa, the Earth Mother. In the esoteric version, Te Matorohanga portrays the ages of Po as the nights of Papa's labor preceding the birth of the gods, leaving the origins of Rangi and Papa unspecified. In Shortland's account, Rangi is the youngest child of the union of Te Mangu (The Black) and Mahorahora-nui-a-Rangi (The Great Expanse of Rangi). His three elder brothers are simply named Toko-Mua, (Elder Prop), Toko-Roto (Middle Prop), and Toko-Pa (Last Prop), indicating the props that hold up their younger brother Rangi, the Sky. Long genealogical descents from the three elder brothers are listed. They include various minor personifications of nature and, eventually, human beings. However, the important cosmogonic and theogonic events center around the youngest brother, Rangi.[5] All of the major Polynesian gods are born to Rangi's three successive wives, the most important of which is also last: the Earth Mother, Papa. In many versions Papa is originally the wife of Rangi's uncle, Tangaroa (a personification of the sea), but is illegitimately claimed by Rangi during his absence.[6] Tangaroa also typically appears as one of Rangi and Papa's children. In Shortland's account, Tangaroa is Rangi's son by his second wife and is accused of adultery with his stepmother, Papa. Invariably there is a generational difference between the two male competitors, the younger of whom wrongfully seizes the feminine fertility of the Earth Mother. In all cases, Rangi represents a differentiating force determined to separate Tangaroa and Papa, sea and earth. As Rangi arrives armed with his spear to do battle with Tangaroa, he recites the following *karakia:*

Tangaroa, Tangaroa,
Tangaroa, unravel;
Unravel the tangle,
Unravel, untwist.
Though Rangi is distant,
He is to be reached.
Some darkness for above,
Some light for below
Freely give
For bright day

Shortland describes this as a very ancient invocation that is applied in everyday life to mediate quarrels (1882:19). The first four lines indicate Rangi's intention to break up the union defended by Tangaroa, exhorting him to unravel and untwist. The next four lines refer to the mediation of below and above, indicating that the differentiation to be effected is not absolute, rather, that each term in the relation must contain something of its opposite. Thus, the sky above, which is mostly light, will also contain darkness, while the earth (Papa) and sea (Tangaroa) below are not to be exclusively in darkness, but will also possess light. The last two lines of the *karakia* specify that the object of this mediated separation is to yield "bright Day," which denotes what the Maori refer to as "the day making all things distinct" (Taylor 1855:123). Here Rangi is related to Tangaroa as Ao is to Po.

Rangi confronts Tangaroa in the doorway of his house (Shortland 1882:18) or on the sea beach (White 1887:22), both of which are structurally intermediate locations (inside-outside or land-sea boundaries), consistent with the fact that this conflict is to be a pivotal event. All accounts agree that Rangi, a "self-extolling" last-born, is the initiator of the fight. He delivers the first spear-thrust unsuccessfully, then Tangaroa counters by piercing Rangi's thigh (or both thighs), causing him to fall severely wounded upon the Earth Mother.

Thighs are an important symbol to the Maori. They are frequently tattooed and are thus comparable to the tattooed head, which is the focal point of an individual's concentrated *mana* (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949:347–348).[7] Thighs also play a significant part in some rituals and are said to be the most delicious part of the human body (White 1887:10, 42). This incident offers a clue to their symbolic significance: Rangi's thighs are apparently the original props separating him from the earth; he unites with the Earth Mother when they are pierced by Tangaroa's spear.

This episode offers a symbolic paradigm of Rangi as a youngest son, an agent of light, a bold usurper, and a differentiating force. He is transformed through a pivotal battle in which he loses his props (thighs), symbols of his differentiating role, and becomes a father. Thereafter, he represents a reactionary force in his union with Papa, a union that produces the forces of its own contradiction in the form of a generation of sons who resolve to separate their parents by force.

Rangi's battle with Tangaroa produces a paradoxical result in which his seeming defeat leads to the achievement of his purpose, control over the fertility of the female. Although Tangaroa apparently wins the fight, he abandons Papa to the wounded Rangi. They produce a series

of sons, the elder of which are weak and crippled due to the wound.
Thus, when Rangi is able to stretch his legs, Tane-Tuturi (Straight-Leg-
Tane) is born; when he can sit up with knees bent, Tane-Pepeki (Bent-
Leg-Tane) is born; when he can hold up his head, he begets Tane-ua-
Tika (Straight-Neck-Tane). As his recovery advances the younger sons
become increasingly healthy and vigorous: Tane-ua-Ha (Strong-Neck-
Tane) is followed by Tane-te-Waiora (Lively-Tane) and, finally, by the
famous Tane-nui-a-Rangi (Tane-the-Great-Son-of-Rangi), who per-
forms the great mythical deeds of separating the earth and sky and
creating the first human being. The last child is named Paia (Closed;
alternatively, Paea or Tupai). Shortland's version is unusual in that Paia
is said to be a daughter. Paia is virtually Tane's shadow throughout the
mythical episodes that follow. They form a complementary pair; Tane
is the active partner who consistently takes the initiative and gives the
orders, whereas Paia is the passive member who supports Tane with rit-
uals and *karakias*. Their relationship is analogous to that between a
great chief and his *tohunga*. The elder brothers are weak and their
mobility is impaired because they occur early in the series and are thus
inadequately differentiated from their mother, the Earth. The sequence
is modeled after another natural, analogical process: the slow healing of
an injury in which a maximum state of vigor is reached toward the end
of the recovery. Again, the last member of the series (like those of the
beginning) displays the passive, feminine qualities of the mother, indic-
ative of a stage beyond physical maturity. The end is once more linked
to the beginning along a spiral movement. Paia's passive, feminine
quality is due to the fact that he appears so late in the development.
Both Tane and Paia represent the acquired analogical dimension of
power. While Tane signifies the maximum degree of physical differen-
tiation and vigor, Paia exemplifies the slowly acquired knowledge of the
venerable *tohunga*, which reaches its peak in old age when vitality is on
the wane.

There are many different listings of gods born from the union of
Rangi and Papa, but six are prominently featured in most versions.
These are: Tawhiri (winds, storms), Tangaroa (sea, fish), Rongo (sweet
potato, cultivated food plants), Haumia (fern root, wild food plants),
Tu (fierce Man), and Tane (forest, birds). There is little agreement on
the birth order, except that Tane tends to appear among the youngest,
although not as *the* youngest. The gods range from Tawhiri, who lives
in the sky, to Haumia and Rongo, who live underground. Tane occupies
a special, intermediate position since his branches reach into the sky,
while his roots sink deep into the earth. As a natural mediator, it is logi-

cal that he should perform the awesome task of separating the earth and sky.

Rangi and Papa produce seventy sons according to the esoteric version of the myth. Schwimmer points out that seventy is a traditional number for a small Maori war party (1966:15), which accurately characterizes the intentions and activities of the sons. Tane and Paia are sixty-eighth and sixty-ninth in the birth order, consistent with the serial symbolism discussed above. The youngest son, Ru, is described as immature. As a personification of volcanic activity and earthquakes he is closely allied with the feminine principle. The volcano is an apt symbol of one who is forever attempting to differentiate himself from his mother, the Earth.

The Separation of Rangi and Papa

Te Matorohanga explains that for many ages of Po the seventy sons lived in darkness, cramped between the bodies of their parents in excessively warm, damp conditions. Nepia Pohuhu adds that "the growth of all things could not mature, nor could anything bear fruit" (Smith 1913:117). The only light they knew was the feeble, phosphorescent glimmer of the glowworm. Tane (son no. 68) proposed that they seek escape, but this idea was rejected by the elder brothers, especially Uru (no. 1) and Whiro (no. 6). One day an intermediate brother, Uepoto (no. 28), was accidentally carried outside on the current of his mother's urine. He found conditions there to be more desirable than between his parents, and called on his brothers to come out also. Tane and twenty-five others then emerged with Papa's menstrual blood.[8] The rest came forth in two successive groups, ultimately leaving only Whiro (no. 6) behind. Whiro finally emerged unintentionally in an enraged pursuit of two brothers, Rangahua (no. 30) and Paerangi (no. 56), who had been sent by Tane to coax him out. He captured Rangahua, angrily stripped the hair from his head, and tied it around his waist as an apron.

In this passage the younger brothers, represented by Tane, take an activist position in opposition to the reactionary stance of the elders, represented by Whiro. The parents' union is characterized as excessive, since it frustrates the growth of their offspring. Thus, the younger brothers, who most strongly embody the principles of natural vitality and differentiation, seek to remedy the situation, whereas the elder brother, Whiro, defends the status quo and is thus antagonistic to the analogical principle of growth. In common usage the name Whiro is used to denote the first night of the lunar month, indicating the dark-

ness of the new moon; he is thus symbolically linked to beginnings, the legitimacy of priority, Po, and the feminine principle. As an adjective *whiro* means "lean, unproductive, especially of poor soil" (Williams 1971:497). By removing the hair from his brother's head (the seat of his *mana*), Whiro symbolically appropriates his procreative power and places it in contact with his own reproductive center by tying it around his waist. In various other passages fertility, vegetation, and hair are metaphorically connected.[9] The fact that Rangahua becomes simultaneously bald and infertile is clarified by the fact that he is a personification of rocks and stones, from which nothing will grow.

Outside their parents' embrace the gods were confronted with the problem of dampness and an extreme, piercing cold. Tane proposed that the problem be solved by separating Rangi and Papa, and again, Whiro rejected the idea, explicitly objecting to the presumptuous attitude of the younger brothers. Tane then dispatched Paia (no. 69) and Uruao (no. 51) to obtain four poles to prop up their father. Paia secured two *tapu* adzes from Uru (no. 1). Nepia Pohuhu adds that they were taken from under the eldest brother's pillow, implying that they were metonymically imbued with his hereditary *mana* through contact with his head. Kaupeka (no. 32), whose name means "offering to an *atua*" (supernatural being), was then sacrificed by the fierce brother Tu (no. 11) to provide fittings for the adzes. This ritual fratricide is said to be the first act of "human" sacrifice. The four wind children (corresponding to the four directions) were also sacrificed to be the props. As Rangi was pushed upward, Paia recited a long *karakia* in his role as *tohunga;* however, the parents resisted, clinging to each other wherever they could find a handhold. So Tane sent Tu and two others with the adzes to cut off the parents' arms, allowing Rangi to be fixed in place. The parents' blood is seen today in the red ochre of the earth and the red glow of the sky. As the separation proceeded, Paia cut off the instruments for producing fire that had been suspended from Rangi's neck. These were to be used in subsequent rituals.

After their separation Rangi and Papa filled the atmosphere with ceaseless rain and mist, weeping over their separation. Therefore the sons decided to overturn the Earth Mother to face toward Rarohenga (the underworld) so that the parents would no longer be forced to endure the grief of gazing upon each other. The youngest brother, Ru (volcanoes), was still at his mother's breast at the time and was therefore overturned with her. In compensation he was presented with fire by Tane and Paia. Te Matorohanga reports that Rangi then suggested to Papa, "Let us dispose of our offspring between our bodies," but Papa

replied, "Not so, leave them to me. Let them return to rest within me. Though they rebelled against us, yet they are still my children. Enough for me is the company of the dead" (Best 1924:53).

By taking the two adzes from under the eldest brother's pillow, the younger brothers counterbalance the scalping of Rangahua: the *tapu* of both brothers' heads is violated. The theme of balanced exchange is repeated in the blood sacrifice of Kaupeka by the younger generation, which parallels the blood sacrifice of the parents.

In exoteric versions of the myth, Tu originally proposes that the parents be slain, but the idea is rejected in favor of separation, an intermediate proposal presented appropriately by the mediator, Tane. Each brother in turn attempts to force Rangi and Papa apart without success. Tane finally succeeds by turning himself upside down and pressing the sky up with his feet (Grey 1855:2–3; Taylor 1855:20; Buller 1878:198). In variants collected by Wohlers and White, Tane also inverts the trees so that their legs and feet (branches) press against the sky while their heads and hair (roots) are buried in the earth. These themes of reversal and overturning indicate that this is another pivotal moment in the story. Here the fertility of the parents is sacrificed for that of the children, and the problems of excessive unity are replaced with problems of differentiation and conflict.

The appropriation of the fire-generating implements from Rangi's neck indicates a forceful seizing of power by the younger generation. One of the most potent symbols of ancestral fertility, the *hei tiki*, was worn around the neck by both men and women according to early accounts (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949:296). Under normal conditions it was willingly transmitted to the younger generation. The removal of the fire-producing implements from Rangi's neck is like a forcible seizure of the parents' fertility (as symbolized by the *hei tiki*) and an appropriation of the ritual potency of the *tapu* fire, associated with the differentiating masculine power of light (Ao).

In popular versions of the story, Tawhiri (wind) identifies with the interests of the parents and opposes the separation (Grey 1855; Wohlers 1874; Taylor 1855). As a resident of the sky he is a natural ally of the Sky Father. He wages a war of revenge against his brothers, defeating all of them except the great warrior Tu. After observing the humiliation and cowardice of his brothers, Tu shows his contempt by devouring them: Tane's birds, Tangaroa's fish, and Haumia and Rongo in the forms of fern-root and sweet potato. Just as the gods sacrificed their parents so that they might thrive and develop, so also does Tu, the fierce spirit of Man, derive sustenance through the sacrifice of the other gods.

The Further Labors of Tane

According to Te Matorohanga, after the parents' separation Io sent two messengers, Rehua and Ruatau, from the highest heaven to an interme- diate location on top of a great mountain in order to perform the *pure* and *tohi* rituals over Tane and Paia. At this time they were given the names Tane-nui-a-Rangi and Tupai. Best describes the *tohi* ritual as a baptism since it is conducted standing in sacred water. The *pure* cere- mony is designed to reinforce and consolidate the child's *mana*, finaliz- ing his state of *tapu* (Best 1929:38). These ceremonies are normally per- formed for newborn infants.

The physical birth of the gods occurs as they pass between their mother's legs along with her urine and menstrual blood. The separation and reversal themes are followed by birth rituals indicating a cultural ratification. While the natural birth is characterized by pollution and disorder, the cultural birth imposes order. These symbols reiterate the establishment of order effected by the separation of Rangi and Papa.

Tane next undertook the task of increasing light in the world. He obtained light in gradual increments from Tangotango, whose name lit- erally means "intensely dark" (Williams 1844:380; Best 1924:32–33).[10] The light children of Tangotango were acquired in sequence, first a sin- gle star, then phosphorescent light, next all the stars, then the moon, and finally, the sun. Tane's final demand of the sun so angered Tango- tango that he sent it with a blazing heat to destroy Tane and his com- panions. According to Bay of Plenty natives, Tane solved the problem by pushing the sky up further (Best 1924:54). In two other variants, Tane separated the sun from the moon and stars, thus creating day and night in order to regulate the life-threatening heat and dryness pro- duced by the sun (Best 1924:55–56).

This episode recapitulates the gradual emergence of light from dark- ness, of Ao from Po, described in the cosmogonic genealogies, which culminates in a regulated universe.[11] Prior to the separation of Rangi and Papa, growth and fertility were threatened by the cold, damp darkness of Po. Afterward the problem became the excessively hot, dry light of Ao. Tane achieves a characteristically intermediate solution. By separating day and night he productively balances light and darkness in a cyclical, daily alternation.

Tane next resolved to ascend to the twelfth heaven, residence of Io, to obtain the three baskets of sacred knowledge and the two stones of power. But first he and some companions had to build a house, the Whare-kura, in which to live and preserve the sacred lore. Previously

all the brothers had lived in natural shelters underground, within the bosom of the Earth Mother. Tane's further acculturation and separation from Papa reinforces his identity with the masculine characteristics of Ao in preparation for his ascent. According to Te Matorohanga, the design of the house was acquired from a divine prototype in the third heaven. It had four doors facing the cardinal directions signifying the manner in which the seventy brothers and their descendants dispersed in the four directions. As Tane and his group abandoned their subterranean dwellings to live in houses, the knowledge of which was obtained from above, Whiro continued to live underground, maintaining his close feminine ties with the Earth Mother.

Whiro was deeply offended upon hearing of Tane's plan to acquire the baskets of knowledge. Nepia Pohuhu reports his reaction: "I intend to go and fetch the *wananga* (knowledge) at Te Toi-o-nga-rangi. . . . Who, indeed, has said that he, a younger son, will ascend above through all the heavens?" (Smith 1913:126). Whiro decided to depart before Tane and rise by way of the "edge of the sky" (the horizon) while Tane and his companions planned to ascend by way of the "middle of space" with the help of certain whirlwinds (twenty-three various wind-children of Tawhiri's family are specified). Tane quickly passed Whiro, who angrily dispatched a war party, including hordes of various insects and flying creatures, to kill Tane and his company. Yet before they could even approach the travelers, they were defeated by the gales and tempests of the wind-children. After observing ceremonies to remove all *tapu* pertaining to the Earth Mother, Tane at last entered the house of Io at Matangi-reia (the sun's path in the heavens). Io then presented Tane with the three baskets of knowledge and the two stones of power. Te Matorohanga gives the contents of the baskets as: (1) all ritual chants and procedures pertaining to Rangi, Papa, and their offspring; (2) knowledge of all evil existing in nature, including dissentions among men and the gods; and (3) knowledge of peace, compassion, and all beneficial skills and techniques. The two stones were said to possess enormous inherent *mana*, and physical contact with them served to enhance and secure acquired knowledge and powers.

During Tane's descent Whiro launched another unsuccessful attack. As the baskets and stones were being deposited in the earthly Wharekura, Whiro arrived to demand that they be surrendered to him. Tane initially refused, citing Whiro's evil deeds. Nevertheless, he was finally given custody of the two stones.

Tane becomes increasingly differentiated from Whiro and Papa in this episode, until he is finally identified with the sun itself in the house

of Io. The two power principles they represent, active and reactive, masculine and feminine, light and dark, acquired and inherent, younger and elder, analogical and digital, have now polarized to the extent of incipient warfare. The younger brother's successes amplify his influence in proportion to the elder brother's failures. Tane soars to heaven by a centripetal route in contrast to Whiro's unsuccessful attempt to ascend by a centrifugal path, signifying that Tane's differentiating power is as focused as the unity represented by Whiro is diffuse and enveloping. It is fitting that Whiro finally acquires the two stones, since, as the elder brother, he represents the digital, genealogical principle of inherited *mana* corresponding to the fixed, inherent *mana* of the stones. On the other hand, Tane, as a younger brother, retains possession of the baskets, symbolizing the analogical *mana* of knowledge that is gradually accumulated with experience and maturity.

According to Te Matorohanga, Tane's next achievement was to establish order in the world by assigning eleven sets of supernatural beings called *poutiriao*s to regulate the affairs of different classes of phenomena. These include the souls of the dead, celestial movements, tides, currents, sea creatures, winds, weather, diseases, seasons, occult knowledge, the gods, growth of vegetation, and the laws of religious observances and *tapu*. One group of *poutiriao*s was assigned to govern the *poutiriao*s themselves, to insure that they would not quarrel or infringe upon the rights of others. These were in turn regulated by the higher authority of Io's attendants, the *whatukura*s. Io is not directly involved with the administration of the cosmos, but remains aloof.

This organization bears a strong resemblance to the hierarchical political administration developed by the Maoris in the mid-nineteenth century at about the same time that Te Matorohanga dictated this account of creation. In the 1850s the tribes of the central North Island elected a king who was installed in a ceremony possessing "a highly Old Testament flavor," according to Schwimmer (1966:111). Both the Maori king and Io were symbols of unity and were thus supposed to remain above the factional disputes of lower administrative officers and chiefs. They could be regarded as inspired by the prototypes of the European monarch and the Christian God; however, implicit within the hierarchical structure of traditional Maori society was a theoretical apex of genealogical seniority, which existed at least in principle, if not in practice. Io and the Maori king were, in a sense, a realization of the traditional social structure in which European prototypes were transformed into Maori categories. However, Io's position within the creation myth is totally superficial. The entire episode of Tane's ascent to the heaven of

Io is a variant of another set of myths involving the heroes Rupe or Tawhaki (or sometimes even Tane, e.g. White 1887:133–136), who acquire knowledge and power through an ascent to the heaven of Rehua (White 1887:55–136). Here Io is inserted in place of Rehua, with Tane playing the role of mediator.

Whiro refused to accept Tane's authority to appoint the *poutiriao*s and decided to wage war against his brothers. Before doing so, he alienated his brother Uru (no. 1) by taking away his wife, who also happened to be Whiro's granddaughter.[12] Whiro's union with her was thus simultaneously an act of adultery and incest.

Many furious battles were subsequently fought in which Whiro and Tu distinguished themselves as great warriors; however, Tu proved to be the most fierce and courageous of all. Paia and two others successfully controlled the rituals and *tapu* fires contributing to Whiro's defeat. Ultimately, Whiro retreated to the underworld, from where he has continued to wage war, along with Ru (no. 70) and Hine-nui-te-Po (goddess of Death, whose origins will be discussed later), against the offspring of Tane to avenge the separation of Rangi and Papa.

Whiro represents a reactionary power serving the principle of unity, and, as such, is naturally opposed to the differentiated cosmic/political system represented by Tane's appointment of the *poutiriao*s. The adultery/incest incident is symbolically complex and subtle. The incest component is simple enough since it is a potent symbol of the unity represented by Whiro. However, the adultery motif is associated with the active appropriation of fertility by a younger brother. Whiro, therefore, brings together contradictory principles in this episode. In this context it is important to recall that although Whiro represents the interests of the elder brother, he is not *the* eldest, just as Tane is not the youngest. In relation to Uru, Whiro is a younger brother who logically seizes his fertility in the form of his wife. Uru's passive response is consistent with the cyclical nature of the series: the eldest son is too old (or occurs too early in the series) to wield the reactive powers just as the youngest son is too immature (or too late in the series) to take the activist role. Through this act, Whiro shifts his identity from the younger generation of Rangi's sons to the senior generation of married men. This represents a complete realization of Whiro's nature and foreshadows his final defeat, just as it did for Rangi before him and as it will for Tane when he, in turn, unites with Hina-ahu-one (the Earth-formed Maid) to become the father of humankind.

Whiro's failure and descent to the underworld complements Tane's ascent to the heaven of Io. His rise is inversely correlated to Whiro's fall,

expressing the complementarity of the two dimensions of power they represent. Even though Whiro's cause possesses the legitimacy of seniority, he is deposed by Tane just as naturally as the ages of Po were displaced by those of Ao, just as inevitably as parents are replaced by their children.

Anthropogeny

Rangi's seizure and control over the fertility of the female (Papa) is realized in the masculine power of their sons and the violent conflict between senior and junior dimensions of that power. The outcome of the struggle is transformation, taking the cyclical form of renewed control over female reproductivity—that is, Tane is transformed from a son to a father. Tane first expresses the desire to unite with his mother, Papa, but he is repulsed (Shortland 1882:20). Eventually, he turns his power of manifestation and differentiation to creating the first woman out of the body of the Earth Mother. Just as Po precedes Ao in the cosmos, so the first humans created by Tane are all female. The masculine forces of Ao expressed by Tane here regenerate those of Po. The result, however, is not perfectly cyclical. Whereas the earlier Po held a womb-like potentiality, the Po created in this episode represents the realm of the dead in the person of Tane's daughter and wife, Hine-Titama, who becomes Hine-nui-te-Po, the goddess of Death.

Disjointed fragments of various traditions survive that attribute the creation of humans to an original god named Tiki. Others say that Tiki was the first man, and still others claim that he was a woman created by Tane.[13] The most complete and detailed account is that of Te Matorohanga, which omits Tiki[14] and follows the typical pattern in which Tane creates the first woman.

After the defeat of Whiro, the sons of Rangi and Papa began an extensive quest for a suitable female to bring forth human offspring. All natural and supernatural beings were examined to no avail. In popular versions, Tane mates with various natural phenomena producing myriads of nonhuman progeny. Te Matorohanga explains that ultimately Tane and his brothers decided to form a human image from the earth at Kurawaka, the mons veneris of the Earth Mother. Tane breathed into the nose, mouth, and ears of the figure, bringing forth the first sneeze of life. Tane first attempted to mate with various bodily orifices and joints, producing perspiration, tears, saliva, mucus, and other excretions reminiscent of the moisture generated by the union of Rangi and Papa. The elder brothers at last called to Tane, "Act in the water-way of Hine!"

and as Paia recited a ritual *karakia,* Tane successfully impregnated the first woman, Hine-ahu-one (the Earth-formed Maid). Tane and Hine-ahu-one had seven daughters. The eldest, Hine-Titama, became Tane's second wife. One day Hine-Titama asked Tane about the identity of her father. Tane deflected the question in a traditional manner, telling her to ask the houseposts. By his answer she understood that he was in fact her father, and in shame over their incestuous union she fled to the underworld to become Hine-nui-te-Po, the goddess of Death. During her descent she turned back to see Tane following her in grief over their separation. She called to him, "O Tane! Return to our offspring. The region of the upper world shall be allotted by me to you; to myself, the region of Po." In another version she says, "Remain here to bring forth progeny to the world of life, while I will ever draw them down to Po." Hine-Titama then placed the Adam's apple in Tane's neck as a parting token.

This anthropogenic passage is an inversion of the earlier theogonic episode. While the divine children of Rangi and Papa are all males (seventy in number), the human offspring of Tane and Hine-ahu-one consist of seven females. Whereas the rebellious male offspring, specifically the younger sons, violently destroy their parents' union, bringing forth differentiation and life into the world, the female offspring, specifically the elder daughter, passively and unwittingly become involved in an incestuous union with the older generation, producing the origin of death. The parting of Tane and Hine-Titama echoes the earlier propping-apart of heaven and earth. At the moment of separation both Papa and Hine-Titama make almost identical comments regarding their place in the underworld among the dead as opposed to their husbands' place among the living. Whereas Paia (on Tane's behalf) *removes* a cultural symbol of power from Rangi's neck as he is being propped up, Hine-Titama *installs* a natural, distinguishing symbol in Tane's neck at the time of their separation. Theogony and anthropogeny are thus related like two sides of a balanced algebraic equation, while a complex story of masculine differentiation and conflict is sandwiched between these two moments of unity. The narrative may be observed to advance through a dialectical process, alternating through episodes of union and differentiation. The result of masculine conflict is union with the female, which in turn produces its own antithesis in the form of a junior generation and a new round of conflict as juniors are gradually transformed into seniors. The respective dimensions of power involved (digital and analogical) each generate their opposite. As in Rangi's *karakia*— "some darkness for above, some light for below"—the success of either power-principle contains the seeds of its own negation.

The Maori creation myth essentially represents an indigenous, dynamic model of social processes. The long-term production and reproduction of nature and society are depicted in the form of immediate kinship relations among parents and children, elders and juniors, projected back to the origins of the world. The myth specifically explores the formal structure of genealogy in Maori terms, that is, through relations of power or *mana*. The more inclusive, unifying symbols are those that appear earlier in a genealogy. They represent the principles of seniority, parenthood, and the legitimacy of priority. Later genealogical positions represent the differences among social groups and individual descendants. The ancestors have all entered the Po and are now more or less passive. Those who are toward the end of a genealogical chain are the ones actively wielding power today; however, like Tane, they are usually not the youngest members since the most recent additions to the lineage are likely to be still immature. They have emerged too recently from the other side of Po: the womb.

The invariant structure of the Maori creation myth can be seen to consist of the irresolvable dynamic contradiction between two concomitant dimensions of power. One is derived from the digital, discrete kinship relations of culture in which the eldest son possesses greater inherent power by virtue of an arbitrary value placed on birth order. The other is motivated by the continuous analogical cycles observed in nature, in which full maturity, vitality, and differentiation come at the later stages of development. When this natural process is projected upon kinship relations it implies that the younger offspring would be more fully differentiated and vigorous than their elders.[15] Therefore, even though the feminine principle, symbolized by darkness (Po), Whiro, and the moon, has genealogical priority over the male principle, represented by light (Ao), Tane, and the sun, the latter is more vigorous by virtue of its position on the analogical scale. Some of the major paradigmatic oppositions appearing in the myth are summarized in figure 3.

These symbols are syntagmatically arranged in a cyclical narrative that laminates two complementary structures of development, the digital, discrete form of a cultural genealogy and the analogical, continuous cycle of natural growth and decay. These processes are expressed as two opposing forces of action and power wielded by the protagonists of the story. The three episodes of creation (cosmogony, theogony, and anthropogeny) follow a cyclical course of development alternating between phases of fertile unity and contentious differentiation reflecting the continuous social production and reproduction of succeeding generations. The masculine power and fertility acquired through competition among senior and junior lineages, or even among brothers, is trans-

Darkness (Po) : Light (Ao)

Female (Moon) : Male (Sun)

Earth (Papa) : Sky (Rangi)

Senior (Whiro) : Junior (Tane)

Legitimate, reactive,   . Appropriated, active,
inherent power (stones) . acquired power (baskets)

FIGURE 3. Paradigmatic relations of major symbols appearing in the "esoteric" version of the Maori creation myth.

formed through marital union into the inherent power of the next generation and another round of differentiation and conflict.

The tension between these two complementary dimensions of power not only informs the myth itself, but also constitutes a dynamic mechanism that stimulates the generation of additional symbols and variations exploring the relationship from slightly different perspectives. Since its contradictory structure leads to no final solution, redundant symbols and motifs can proliferate within a particular version of the myth, or they may be reassembled into new variants in a continuous process of transformation. So long as the central generative contradiction is preserved along with a substantial vocabulary of traditional symbols, the myth system may continue to be reproduced generation after generation; and it is this fundamental dialectical system that must be finally acknowledged as the true form of the myth rather than any one of its particular manifestations.

NOTES

1. Williams (1844:432) translates *tohunga* as "priest." The term is applied to individuals who were knowledgeable and skilled in traditional lore.

2. Williams (1844:285) indicates that Po, which means "night" in everyday speech, is used like the English word "day" to denote the passage of time.

3. Best (1924:35, 39, 40) includes three genealogies that focus upon the symbol of vegetative growth cycles.

4. Pei Te Hurinui (1960:246) reports that according to Tainui tradition, Io himself evolved from Te Kore through eight stages. This notion widely departs from the Christian concept of God, although it is quite consistent with the Maori understanding of cosmogony and theogony.

5. The last-born is popularly referred to as *pekepoho*, or "self-extolling" child (Best 1924:46).

6. White gives fragments of seven such accounts. Rangi and Tangaroa's relationship is left unspecified in all but one, the Ngati Kahungunu account (White 1887:137), in which Tangaroa is described as Rangi's uncle.

7. The approach being developed in this investigation suggests that thighs represent the acquired, analogical dimension of *mana*, the differentiating force of juniors, while the head signifies the genealogical, digital dimension of *mana* culturally ascribed by seniority.

8. Urine and menstrual blood are considered highly polluting substances; however, great Maori warriors would ritually utilize such materials to enhance their *mana*. A great Maori warrior is proverbially said to possess *mahawa kai tutai* (the courage to consume excrement). See Johansen 1958:7; Smith 1913: vol. 3, 90.

9. The roots of Haumia, Rongo, and Tane are frequently described as hair, as, for example, in Andersen 1907:139, and White 1887:27. In another common myth (White 1887:135, Grey 1855:65, among others), birds are produced from the fertile hair of Rehua (personification of the star Antares), which signals the season of bird-snaring.

10. Tangotango (or alternatively, Tongatonga) also occurs as a son of Whiro, whose name refers to the dark night of the new moon and who is the personification of darkness (Best 1924:53).

11. White (1887:44) reports that, according to Nga-i-tahu informants, Tane also formulated the laws of *tapu* as he arranged the celestial bodies.

12. The fact that women had not yet been created is one of many such inconsistencies that have been observed in the myth by Best, Smith, and others. These episodes must be read according to the logic of structure and symbol rather than that of history.

13. See Buller 1878:199; Taylor 1855:23; Best 1924:81–82; White 1887:149–158.

14. Although Tiki as a separate individual does not appear in the esoteric version, Tiki is the emblematic name given to Tane's phallus (Smith 1913:141). The name is an anthropogenic metonym, which may occur in the role of creator, created, instrument of creation, male, or female.

15. This contradiction is sharply focused in the Maori attitude toward twins. "The general view was that the one born first was the more important [on the basis of seniority] and he was marked in some way to avoid subsequent confusion. The later child was believed to be stronger and more virile" (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949:354).

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LOST MELANESIAN BROTHERS:
THE IRIAN JAYA PROBLEM
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA

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Introduction

New tensions have arisen in recent years to disturb the rather stable and secure environment of the South Pacific. Some of the most disruptive of these are associated with the border between Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya.[1] The immediate source of tension is the presence in Papua New Guinea of more than ten thousand Irianese refugees, most of whom crossed the border in 1984 as a result of clashes between Indonesian forces and Irianese insurgents within Irian Jaya. These problems are not new. Indeed, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), or "Free Papua Movement," has been actively opposing the Indonesians ever since they took over this Melanesian territory from the Dutch in 1963, and there has always been an eastward movement of people, including OPM members, across the long and poorly marked border.

What is new is the intensity of conflict in Irian Jaya and the scale of the exodus, with as many people seeking refuge in Papua New Guinea during 1984 as had done so over the previous two decades. Furthermore, events in Irian Jaya and their dramatic spillover into Papua New Guinea have put unprecedented strains on Indonesia–Papua New Guinea relations and led to fears that Indonesia would extend its coun-

terinsurgency operations into Papua New Guinea if OPM fighters continued to find sanctuary and support in the refugee camps there. Australia's geographical proximity as well as military, economic, and political ties to both of its northern neighbors insure Canberra's interest in all of this and make its involvement in any conflict inevitable.

Decision makers tend to be primarily concerned with the implications of the situation in Irian Jaya for the stability and security of Papua New Guinea and, ultimately, of Australia and the rest of the South Pacific region. But this emphasis can easily serve to divert attention from other, equally important, aspects, most notably the welfare of the Irianese themselves. There has been increasing concern about political oppression, economic exploitation, and human rights abuses in the province. Particularly worrying is Jakarta's transmigration policy that may see the Irianese displaced and even outnumbered by settlers from other provinces in the next few decades.

Papua New Guinea's border management policy, which receives active support from Australia, has been to regard the crisis in Irian Jaya as a domestic problem for Indonesia, outside its legitimate purview, and to cooperate with Indonesia in curbing OPM activities. Given the sensitivity of Jakarta to any suggestion of external interference in its internal affairs, and its demonstrated ability to act militarily in defense of its perceived interests, this policy is understandable.

Nevertheless, Papua New Guinea clearly has an interest in what goes on inside Irian Jaya. Certainly many citizens are concerned for the welfare of their 1.2 million "Melanesian brothers" across the border.[2] And even if ethnic or humanitarian sentiments are discounted, policymakers have a pragmatic interest insofar as they must deal with refugee flows, military activity in the border region, and all the other tangible consequences of deteriorating conditions in Irian Jaya. But a fundamental commitment to cooperation with Indonesia means, in effect, that the initiative in the bilateral relationship rests firmly with Jakarta, and Papua New Guinea's policy is almost always reactive. Port Moresby is placed in the unenviable position of only being able to react to events if and when they spill over the border, and even then often on terms set by Indonesia. In effect, this means that the Port Moresby government must attempt to deal with the symptoms of problems without even the possibility of influencing their causes.

The major purpose of this article is to explore some dimensions of one of the South Pacific's most threatening situations. In particular, I assess the nature of the threats faced by Papua New Guinea and identify some key factors influencing possible outcomes. With these in mind, I con-

clude by arguing that Papua New Guinea in concert with Australia and other South Pacific states might attempt to develop more assertive foreign policies toward Indonesia and that these policies could further both security and humanitarian goals.

This article includes two major sections, as well as a conclusion. In the following section the nature of the current problem in Irian Jaya is outlined with particular attention to the roles of enclave development, transmigration, and the OPM. Then I analyze the problem from Papua New Guinea's perspective and explore how Australia and the United States are, or might be, involved.

The Problem in Irian Jaya

The flood of refugees into Papua New Guinea in 1984 included groups from both urban and rural Irian Jaya. Most came from communities near the border and all of them left as a result of violent clashes between Indonesian security forces and OPM guerrilla units (Smith and Hewison 1985).[3] In this section I will identify briefly some of the factors that have allowed such a situation to develop.

Political Incorporation

Irian Jaya's political fate was effectively sealed in 1962 with the signing of the so-called New York Agreement. This agreement marked the end of a lengthy, bitter and, in the end, violent dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the future of the territory.[4] But, if the agreement itself served to avert a messy colonial war, its terms left no doubt as to which of the protagonists had emerged victorious from the thirteen-year-old conflict. The terms provided for the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia under United Nations supervision. The sole significant concession to Dutch interests was a provision that the people of the territory be allowed to express their views on integration with Indonesia. However, by 1969 when the stipulated Act of Free Choice was conducted, the Indonesians were firmly entrenched in the territory, and there is no doubt that the poll was carefully engineered to yield a favorable result.[5]

The outcome of the West New Guinea dispute owed more to realpolitik than to the intrinsic merit of the cases that Indonesia and the Netherlands presented to the international community.[6] Indeed, the decisive factor was the intervention of the United States, and the important terms of the New York Agreement were those proposed by the US medi-

ator, Ellsworth Bunker, to reflect US interests.[7] The US position was based on a perceived need to counter a growing communist influence in Indonesian politics, coupled with an assessment that the longer the dispute was allowed to continue, the greater that influence was likely to get (Henderson 1977; Osborne 1985).[8] In the end, the interests and desires of the Irianese people, always peripheral but often cited to justify a particular position,[9] were ignored or overridden as the larger powers maneuvered for position.[10]

The Development Crisis

The mere fact of Indonesian sovereignty over Irian Jaya is not sufficient to explain the growing dissent there. The evidence suggests that the initial reaction to the takeover was mixed (Hastings 1969). Indeed, a significant portion of the rural population was probably not immediately aware of any change at all. Some Irianese who had been groomed by the Dutch for positions of power chose to flee the country, but many more of the small number of the urbanized and the educated preferred to wait and see what the new circumstances would bring. Since that time, there have been concerted efforts (some none too subtle) to integrate Irian Jaya into wider political and cultural systems and this process of "Indonesianization"[11] has undoubtedly served to stimulate Irianese nationalism and in some cases to foment dissent.

But the more fundamental forces at work are those associated with Irian Jaya's integration into a wider economic system. Indeed, the crisis is best regarded as one of development. For the role that Irian Jaya now plays in a wider economic system engenders a rather distorted type of local development. In particular, this is the sort of development that is profoundly disruptive of traditional systems of production, even though local people are only marginally involved either as producers or beneficiaries.

As recently as the early 1960s, the lives of most Irianese were still governed by the imperatives of traditional modes of production. Agricultural systems, more or less intensive, and based on relatively little specialization, still met most of the material requirements of a plethora of minute, self-sufficient communities. Little land had been alienated for European use during more than a century of Dutch rule and few Melanesians were engaged in cash-crop production (Brookfield with Hart 1971:139; van der Veur 1963:55). The demand for local labor had been slight and only some two percent of the Melanesian population were in wage employment in the 1960s (Brookfield with Hart 1971:

290). Since that time the situation has changed rapidly under the influence of two sets of forces, one associated with the development of large-scale extractive industries and the other involving attempts to utilize agricultural resources as part of a centrally controlled program of transmigration. I will look at each of these in turn.

Extractive Industries

Irian Jaya has not escaped the "rush of foreign business interest which quickly gathered Klondike overtones" after the passage of Indonesia's new foreign investment law in 1967 (McDonald 1980:68–86). Attention has centered on the mineral, petroleum, and timber resources of the province and has resulted in a massive infusion of capital in the 1970s and 1980s.[12] The new extractive industries have generated huge revenues and caused a two-hundredfold increase in the value of the province's exports between 1971 and 1976 (Carter 1984:220).

However, a significant proportion of the wealth flows directly to overseas investors and little of the state's share finds its way back to Irian Jaya.[13] Furthermore, since these industries are capital intensive and operate as enclaves, there are very few linkages with the local economy. The business and job opportunities that are created tend to be captured by migrant workers from other parts of Indonesia. Irianese tend to participate in this bonanza development as laborers and donators of land, roles for which they receive little compensation.

Transmigration

Enclave development makes very few demands on indigenous systems of production and hence is not necessarily a catalyst for internal structural change. Transmigration, on the other hand, does make considerable demands on such systems and triggers widespread change. Unfortunately, it is not change that has proven advantageous to most Irianese.

Government-sponsored resettlement programs have been a feature of Indonesian policy since the birth of the Republic. But they have become considerably more ambitious over the years and the latest development plan, Repelita IV, calls for at least three million people to be resettled within Indonesia before the end of the decade. Irian Jaya has been allocated a progressively larger share of the total.[14] Indeed, if all the 138,000 families arrive as planned, they will swell the present population of Irian Jaya by more than fifty percent (Blowfield 1985a). Even if past trends continue under this plan and only half the families actually

arrive, the impact on the province is likely to be considerable. Furthermore, these figures do not include the so-called spontaneous migrants, who arrive independently of government programs and who represent more than fifty percent of all the migrants presently in Irian Jaya (Blowfield 1985b:51).

Although Irian Jaya has a very low population density, it is not the case that there are large areas of potentially productive land lying idle. In the first place, only about one third of the territory is habitable, and only a small fraction of that is considered suitable for agricultural development (Carter 1984:216; Blowfield 1985a:7). Second, most Melanesian societies practice extensive, shifting forms of agriculture, often supplemented by hunting-and-gathering activities, and must rely on relatively large areas of bush land for these systems to be viable.[15] Since there is little land that can be described as "waste and vacant," land used for transmigration sites and projects is often land that can no longer be used for traditional agriculture.

Most government-sponsored transmigrants are destined to work in agricultural projects. As sites for these projects are developed, land moves from the village economy to the "modern" economy. One result of this is to put considerable pressure on traditional agricultural systems already feeling the effects of rapid population increase.[16] An increasing number of Irianese have no choice but to seek alternative production opportunities. In the rural areas this has not proved to be an easy transition to make and existing programs designed to turn shifting cultivators into settled farmers through resettlement have not met with much success. In particular, Melanesians have had difficulty competing with migrants from other provinces in the new environment (Blowfield 1985b).

Irianese find the same sort of competition when they turn to the urban sector for employment opportunities. Here many positions are filled by spontaneous transmigrants. In the public service, only twenty percent of the positions were occupied by Irianese in 1978 (Carter 1984:214) and, according to Blowfield (1985a:3), other transmigrants "have taken control of the middle ground, having a monopoly on small-scale business." Only in unskilled positions do Irianese outnumber workers from other provinces and even in this segment of the job market there are industries that employ very few Irianese (TAPOL 1983:35–37; Osborne 1985:124–125). In general, we can identify a process here whereby the activities of one category of transmigrant tends to push rural Irianese out of the village economy, while the other, spontaneous, category tends to frustrate their entry into the "modern" economy.

For many rural Irianese, dislocation and sometimes dispossession are

the tangible results of "development." Educated and urban-based Irianese fare somewhat better. However, this is the group that was effectively displaced when Indonesians unexpectedly replaced Dutch in the pinnacles of the state apparatus. It is members of this "educated elite" that have spearheaded attempts to dislodge the Indonesians since the 1960s.

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)

Resistance to the intrusions and excesses of the Indonesian state commenced almost immediately after the Dutch withdrew in 1962. But attempts to organize that resistance, which have centered on a loose-knit structure known as the Free Papua Movement or OPM, have not been very successful.

The OPM does not have a coherent structure embracing the whole province nor does it control or coordinate all subversive activity against the state. In fact, inside Irian Jaya it amounts to a series of perhaps half-a-dozen localized and largely autonomous networks, each with its own leaders. Not only do these networks lack any effective overarching structure to coordinate their activities, but they have sometimes put their energies into opposing each other rather than the Indonesians. Thus the two most active units, the Victoria group formed by Seth Rumkorem and the Pemka group founded by Jacob Prai, have been at loggerheads for most of the period since about 1972.

Similar factionalism is evident in the overseas component of the OPM, which consists mainly of exiled leaders. Although these leaders are usually allied with one or the other of the internal factions, the internal-external linkages have tended to be quite tenuous. In particular, there does not seem to be a viable command structure and the guerrilla units seem to operate more or less on their own initiative. Few arms or other supplies reach the guerrilla fighters from the outside.

As a direct result of this lack of organization, most of the OPM's military activities have consisted of low-level raids against isolated army posts or small acts of sabotage. On occasion, an action has proved quite disruptive. For example, the kidnapping of the province's security chief in 1978 and the holding for ransom of a group of migrant timber workers for eight months of 1981 proved that the OPM was a force to be reckoned with. However, for most of its history, the OPM has been perceived as a relatively low-level threat by the Indonesian security forces.

Nevertheless, the OPM does have some notable strengths. The leadership, which has always consisted of members of the educated elite, has successfully forged links with groups in both the "modern" and village

sectors (Savage 1978). Thus many of the first wave of refugees to arrive in Papua New Guinea in 1984 were urban dwellers who had been targeted by security forces because they were "articulate and politically-conscious Melanesian nationalists" (Smith and Hewison 1985:91). Also of great importance are the links with the rural population. While it is likely that the number of committed guerrilla fighters active at any one time has never exceeded one hundred, most units enjoy mass local support, allowing them to operate behind what a security report called a "curtain of the masses" (Osborne 1985:77–79).

Perhaps the most important of the OPM's strengths is provided to them by the Indonesian authorities. The military forces have consistently reacted to small acts of insurrection with large-scale counter attacks, sometimes involving large numbers of soldiers, counterinsurgency aircraft, helicopter gunships, and even jet aircraft. Ordinary villagers inevitably get caught in the cross fire and take to the bush (ibid.:114–154). To them the OPM members are not insurgents, but protectors. The death of prominent Irianese nationalist Arnold Ap at the hands of Indonesian security forces in April 1984 did much to engender support for the cause at home and abroad (ibid.:148–153).

In recent times, the OPM seems to have improved its organizational capacity. Thus the two main factions have attempted to work together in the last few years. Even if the "uprising" of early 1984 proved abortive, there were indications that it was to be a coordinated effort involving units throughout the province (Smith and Hewison 1985). This event was also significant because it represented a much more ambitious strategy than has been common in the past. Finally, the exiles, especially Rumkorem, seem to be in closer touch with events in Irian Jaya than at any time in the past and they now have a large pool of potential supporters in the refugee camps in Papua New Guinea.

If efforts to transform Irian Jaya's economy continue to disadvantage and displace Irianese, the number of dissidents is likely to grow. Undoubtedly this will provide an environment conducive to the growth of the OPM or any other organization that can articulate the growing discontent and offer some sort of alternative. Meanwhile, as the cycle of attack and counterattack continues or escalates, there will always be those who will decide to flee their homeland for Papua New Guinea.

The Problem in Papua New Guinea

The most obvious manifestation of Irian Jaya's problem in Papua New Guinea is the ten thousand Irianese refugees. Compared to other con-

temporary refugee flows—for example out of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, or Indochina—this is not a large number (Ferris 1985:7). But it is significant in context since it represents nearly one percent of the total Melanesian population of Irian Jaya and about half the population of the border area. The problem is not so much that this number of people will be extremely difficult to absorb into Papua New Guinea's population of 3.5 million, although this is certainly the case. Rather, the major problems arise from the fact that the refugee camps inside Papua New Guinea have become centers of anti-Indonesian activity. In this section I will assess the threat that this situation poses to Papua New Guinea's security and stability.

The Threat to Security

Hastings noted in February 1985 that the fourteen refugee camps in Papua New Guinea were becoming bases for OPM operations in Irian Jaya and that the OPM "must now be recognized as an increasingly effective political organization" (*Indonesia Reports* 1985:29). These developments threaten Papua New Guinea's security in several ways. First, there is the threat of military action by Indonesian forces against insurgent strongholds within Papua New Guinea. In Hastings's view, an "armed attack, by helicopter transport, on one or several of the camps is a future possibility. More likely is the incursion of armed Indonesian foot patrols into the camps in hot pursuit of OPM rebels" (ibid.). This is a plausible assessment given the numerous border violations, including air and ground raids on border villages, that have occurred since the middle 1970s (Osborne 1985:156–189). To date, clashes with Papua New Guinea forces have been avoided, albeit narrowly, but such a confrontation seems inevitable if incursions continue.

Second, some observers suspect that Indonesia has designs on Papua New Guinea's territory and fear that Jakarta will use the existence of the OPM strongholds east of the border to justify a general take-over. An Indonesian document outlining a plan to incorporate Papua New Guinea into Indonesia by 1984 seemed to provide evidence of Jakarta's expansionist ambitions when it was reported in 1977 and published in full in Australia in 1979 (Southwood 1980). Although the document turned out to have been part of a 1975 training exercise at a military academy in Jakarta rather than an official blueprint for intervention, considerable suspicion about Jakarta's long-term intentions remains in some circles (Osborne 1985:163–164).[17]

The identification of some expansionary imperative underpinning

Indonesian foreign policy is perhaps understandable in light of Jakarta's annexation of West New Guinea and East Timor. But there is little evidence to suggest that such an internal dynamic exists or that Papua New Guinea (or, for that matter, Australia) will inevitably fall victim to it one day. More plausible is the argument that Indonesia has mounted armed excursions across its boundaries and acquired territory only when its vital interests are deemed to be at stake (Hastings 1979; Mackie 1979). However, since it is not difficult to construct scenarios in which Jakarta finds it necessary to press such a claim in relation to developments in Papua New Guinea, this is cold comfort for Indonphobes there. Nevertheless, the costs of any attempt at outright annexation would certainly be high and such action seems unlikely under most conceivable circumstances.

A third threat to Papua New Guinea's security arises from the tension between the OPM and the Papua New Guinea government and the possibility of armed conflict between them. The Port Moresby government has adopted what Premdas calls an "aggressive posture against the OPM" in recent years (1985:1072). As well as arresting leaders and monitoring the activities of known sympathizers, the government has conducted its own military operations against the OPM. For example, in early May 1985, soldiers and police moved against an OPM group that had harassed the occupants of a Department of Posts and Telecommunications helicopter south of Vanimo (*Indonesia Reports* 1985:31). At the end of the same month, armed forces reportedly crossed into Irian Jaya to destroy an OPM camp (*Indonesia Reports* 1985:55). With this aggressive posture comes the possibility of the OPM moving against targets such as the massive OK Tedi copper and gold mine within Papua New Guinea (Glanville 1984:14; Palou 1984:3) and the addition of a new and ominous dimension to the conflict.

Finally, Papua New Guinea's security is threatened by the activities of external agents seeking to use Papua New Guinea as a conduit for support for the OPM. Much of the external support for the OPM has been channeled through Papua New Guinea. It has also come almost exclusively from sources within "friendly" countries, such as the Netherlands, Australia, and Vanuatu and has been relatively easy to monitor and contain. But the challenge would be significantly greater if the OPM were successful in its attempts to get more substantial materiel support from overseas, and particularly if such arms and equipment were to come from potentially hostile extraregional powers. Linkages between OPM sympathizers in Papua New Guinea and the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea have been alleged at various times (Osborne 1985:168, 171), although these "plots" seem not to have had

much substance.[18] Nevertheless, if a foreign power were to make a significant commitment to the OPM cause, the threat to Papua New Guinea's security would undoubtedly increase as a result.

The potential for some form of armed conflict on Papua New Guinea soil certainly exists. The aggressors could be either Indonesian security forces or OPM guerrillas, or both, although the former seems the more likely protagonist at this stage. However, it seems highly unlikely that Indonesia intends to mount any sort of military invasion. If it does act, it would probably limit itself to search-and-destroy missions against particular targets. Subversive activities may well increase if the level of external interest in the OPM's cause increases.

Threats to Stability

It is clear that the spillover effects of the situation in Irian Jaya include some significant threats to Papua New Guinea's security. An equally important if somewhat less tangible threat arises from the divisiveness of Irian Jaya-related issues in Papua New Guinea's domestic politics.

In 1979, Nyamekye and Premdas identified in Papua New Guinea a "formidable body of opinion, well placed and highly regarded" whose support for the OPM was "emotional and uncompromising" (1979:940). Popular sympathy for the plight of "Melanesian brothers" in Irian Jaya has undoubtedly increased since that time, as the flood of refugees in 1984 attracted considerable media attention. Comprising mainly educated Papua New Guineans, students, resident Irianese, villagers in the border region, and some parliamentarians, this group has not hesitated to make its views known (Osborne 1985:169).

Government policies relating to Irian Jaya since Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975 have not always reflected this body of domestic opinion and the discrepancy has led to conflict. For example, the 1981 Human Rights Tribunal that mounted an unofficial trial of Indonesia for alleged human rights abuses attracted the wrath of the Chan government, which was seriously embarrassed by the event. Similarly, the Somare government was severely criticized for its seemingly deliberate policy of denying food and medical aid as a deterrent to "illegal border crossers" in 1984 and for its general posture toward this group (Osborne 1985:183–184; Joku and Togarewa 1984:1).

This is not to say that there has always been agreement within the government regarding border problems. On the contrary, successive governments in Papua New Guinea have been fragile coalitions of disparate interests and especially vulnerable to internal dissent on these highly charged issues. For example, the Chan government's strong anti-

OPM policy was put in jeopardy in 1981 when Deputy Prime Minister Iambakey Okuk embarked on his own anti-Indonesian campaign. The subsequent Somare government had similar problems when its deputy prime minister, Father John Momis, made it clear that his sympathies lay with the people of Irian Jaya and not the government of Indonesia. Furthermore, leaders sometimes receive conflicting advice on these matters from their departmental and private advisers.

The implementation of policy on Irian Jaya-related issues has also been difficult at times. Senior public servants have sometimes appeared to defy their political masters and some measures have foundered as a result (Osborne 1985:173). Such resistance has usually been to attempts to move away from established policies, so the effect has been conservative. However, sympathy toward the OPM and the refugees is widespread in the public service and there remains the possibility that unpopular policies will prove impossible to implement under certain circumstances.

Clearly of central importance in this context is the attitude of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and the police. There have been signs of unrest in the three-thousand-person PNGDF at various times. For example, in 1977 it became apparent that the Defence Force commander, Ted Diro,[19] was preparing to take direct action against the Port Moresby government in order to safeguard what he perceived to be the national interest (ibid.:62–63). Even though the Diro "coup" was defused with relative ease, and tension has not reached these heights since that time, it must be recognized that the government remains vulnerable to such pressure. The police force, on the other hand, has shown little inclination to get involved in politics, and its present state of disarray makes such involvement unlikely in the near future (Clifford, Marauta, and Stuart 1984).

Early in 1986, the incoming prime minister of Papua New Guinea, Paias Wingti, identified achieving "political stability" as his government's first priority and the refugee situation as one of the prime destabilizing factors (Reinhardt 1986b:76). Certainly the threats from the border situation to both security and stability are real. They are also interrelated insofar as any signs that the Port Moresby government is not in effective control of events within its territorial jurisdiction increases the likelihood of Indonesian armed incursions.

Australia's Role

Papua New Guinea's 1981 White Paper on foreign policy identified the capacity of the PNGDF, whose core is two army regiments, to defend

the territory against armed attack as "comparatively modest" (Papua New Guinea 1982a:46). Indeed, when there have been "hot pursuit" incursions by Indonesian troops, it seems that Port Moresby has deliberately avoided putting this capacity to the test.[20] Furthermore, the White Paper notes that Papua New Guinea's independence and security are not guaranteed by any foreign government (ibid.). Nevertheless, it seems likely that Australia would find it expedient to defend Papua New Guinea's sovereignty should it be threatened by Indonesia.

In the first place, Australia is already heavily and directly involved in Papua New Guinea's security arrangements. The 1977 Joint Statement by Prime Ministers on the Defense Relationship between Papua New Guinea and Australia provides for consultation about "matters affecting their common security interests and about other aspects of their defense relationship." Furthermore, under the terms of the joint statement and other arrangements, Australia provides quite extensive technical assistance, logistical support, training, and loan personnel to the PNGDF. It also provides direct funding to the tune of about seventeen million dollars annually, representing about sixty percent of the total defense budget (Papua New Guinea 1982b). There can be no doubt that the extent of this support serves "to limit the Papua New Guinea government's control over the PNGDF in a conflict situation" (Papua New Guinea 1982a:35). But it also means that any aggression directed against Papua New Guinea and requiring the use of the PNGDF automatically involves Australia.[21] Of course Australia could distance itself from any conflict by responding negatively to requests for assistance or even by withdrawing its existing support. But strategic, economic, political, and even cultural considerations make such a response unlikely.

Not surprisingly, the island of New Guinea has figured prominently in all assessments of Australia's defense needs since World War II. In the late 1940s and early 1950s there was widespread support for the notion that both halves of the island were "vital" to Australia's security interests (George 1980:149; Spender 1972:290). While few would take such a strong position today, neither is there much support for a position at the opposite extreme in which New Guinea is considered irrelevant in the geopolitics of Australia's security. In any case, strategic importance, especially if it is assessed somewhat less than "vital," is not sufficient in itself to guarantee that Australia will take up arms to defend Papua New Guinea, particularly when the aggressor is Indonesia. After all, Australia concurred, albeit reluctantly, to the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia in the 1960s despite its reservations about the security implications of such a move (Beddie 1973:127–132).

However, Australia has more than a security interest in Papua New

Guinea and it is the combination of strategic with other considerations that makes intervention likely. Perhaps most importantly, Australia has a large economic stake in Papua New Guinea. Shortly before self-government in 1973, Australians controlled an estimated sixty-six percent of the nonsubsistence sector of the economy and generated sixty-one percent of the gross monetary sector product (Joint Intelligence Organisation, cited in Donaldson and Turner 1978:16–17). Since that time, Papua New Guineans have extended their control over the economy but continue to rely heavily on foreign investment. The single most important source of investment flows into Papua New Guinea remains Australia, with Australians controlling a high proportion of the equity in such key projects as the giant Bougainville and OK Tedi copper and gold mines (Daniel and Sims 1986:18–19). Indeed, some $420 million, or thirty percent, of total Australian foreign investment in 1980 was in Papua New Guinea (King 1984:279). In the 1980s Australia remains the major source of Papua New Guinea's imports. Although these imports represent less than three percent of total Australian exports, the balance of trade is usually in Australia's favor to the tune of about six to one (Commonwealth of Australia 1984b:169). These are interests that any Australian government will be under domestic pressure to protect.

The legacy of Australian colonial rule in Papua New Guinea is not confined to the economy. It is also apparent in the system of government and administration, in the legal system, in educational institutions and curricula, and in myriad other cultural relics. Furthermore, this is a neocolonial situation in which many of an estimated fifteen thousand Australian expatriates occupy important, often key, positions in the public and private sectors (King 1984:279) and effectively contribute to the maintenance of a relatively advantageous status quo. As the Jackson report on Australia's overseas aid program defines the situation: "Papua New Guinea is not only Australia's closest neighbour, but the developing country with which it should maintain very close cultural, economic and strategic links" (Commonwealth of Australia 1984a:146).

It is clear that Australia has a strong and rather direct interest in the continued security, stability, and prosperity of Papua New Guinea. This is reflected in the defense relationship and in Australia's aid program in Papua New Guinea. In 1969–1970, Papua New Guinea received about seventy-four percent of all Australian bilateral aid. Although this proportion had dropped to fifty percent in 1982–1983, the absolute amount had climbed from A$116 million to A$275 million, or about US$100 per capita (ibid.:49).

But the dilemma for policymakers in Canberra faced with conflict on

the Irian Jaya border is how to safeguard Australian interests in Papua New Guinea without jeopardizing good relations with Jakarta, a goal which has been afforded a very high priority for several decades. Australia's linkages with Indonesia are much less comprehensive and intense than those with Papua New Guinea. There is none of the shared history that marks the Australia–Papua New Guinea relationship and none of the legacies of that colonial relationship. However, Indonesia is the second largest recipient of total Australian bilateral aid after Papua New Guinea and has received some forty-five percent of all Australian aid to East Asian countries since 1946 (ibid.:50, 189). The emphasis on Indonesia in Australia's aid program is one indication of its importance in Australia's wider foreign policy interests.

Indonesia occupies a central place in Australian foreign policy-making partly because of its geographical proximity and size, but mostly because of its perceived significance for national security. Not only does it straddle some of Australia's major lines of communication with Asia and Europe, but it also represents a potential route for direct attacks from the north. Furthermore, Indonesia's aggressive posture in the West New Guinea dispute, in confrontation with Malaysia, and, more recently, in the invasion of East Timor has led to fears in some quarters that Australia will one day be the target of such hostilities. These considerations, coupled with a perception that Australia has little political influence or leverage in Indonesia (Mackie 1974:4), have caused successive generations of policymakers in Canberra to go to great lengths to prevent an adversary relationship developing with Jakarta.

The principle that Australia can not "afford to pursue policies which entail any substantial risk of seriously antagonizing Indonesia" (ibid.: 168) has clearly been a determining one for four decades and raises doubts about Canberra's propensity to defend Papua New Guinea should that become necessary. Certainly, successive governments have made it clear that Papua New Guinea must manage its own relations with Indonesia. On occasion, when Indonesian military action in the border area has been especially intense, the Australian government has publicly expressed concern. But, in general, Australian officials have been extremely cautious when it comes to doing or saying anything about the situation in Irian Jaya or its effects in Papua New Guinea that could be construed in Jakarta as "interference."[22]

However, the detached public posture masks an obvious desire to use all available resources to head off threatening situations before they develop. King notes that Australia has "quite extraordinary leverage and influence over PNG government policy" (King 1984:280) and it is

not surprising to find evidence, for example in a leaked Australian cabinet paper (*National Times* 1984), that at least some of that influence has been brought to bear in the foreign policy arena. While it is not possible to determine the extent of such influence, it is clear that Papua New Guinea has consistently articulated a policy toward Indonesia that complements Australia's own in all its major features and perceptions. The evidence suggests that Australia will continue to urge Papua New Guinea to avoid confrontations with Indonesia and to vigorously pursue its anti-OPM activities to this end.

Should such preventative measures fail and hostilities break out between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, then military intervention of some sort seems inevitable. The leaked 1983 "Strategic Basis" papers indicate that military options were under active consideration by the Australian cabinet at that time (ibid.). This support would almost certainly be delivered in as low-key a manner as possible, with initial efforts aimed at strengthening the PNGDF's own capabilities, particularly its logistics. A decision to commit Australian forces for direct air and ground support would probably be taken only if the situation in Papua New Guinea bespoke of widespread bloodshed or imminent political collapse.

The historical record suggests that in the security triangle of Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Indonesia, Jakarta holds what King calls "the whip hand" (King 1984:282). Both Papua New Guinea and Australia seem to have premised their foreign policy postures toward Indonesia on the assumption that there is little they can do to deter Jakarta from following policies that they find objectionable or threatening. But this premise can now be challenged on two fronts. In the first place, there are signs that Jakarta would like to see relations with both countries improve from their present low ebb and is willing to make some concessions to this end. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's visit to Australia in late 1985 was in itself an indication of this, even if no major changes in direction eventuated or were expected (Mackie 1985:90). Similarly, Indonesia's "look east" policy, announced by Mochtar in early 1986 and aimed at improving ties with South Pacific nations, may provide new opportunities for communicating concerns westward to Jakarta. In these circumstances Australia and Papua New Guinea might find an assertive diplomacy advantageous in their dealings with Indonesia.

The second, and more significant, justification for reassessing the dynamics of the security triangle lies in some recent signals from Washington concerning the role of the United States in any future conflict

between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. A critical factor in deter-
mining the outcomes of major disagreements between Australia and
Indonesia over the last four decades has been the posture of the major
powers (Beddie 1973:132–137; Angel 1983:241). Indeed, it is better to
conceptualize the security situation at the juncture of the Asia and Pacif-
ic regions not as a triangle, but as a tetrahedron with the United States
occupying the fourth, elevated, apex—and holding the whip hand.

The United States' defense relationship with the South Pacific Islands
is an indirect one. In effect, Washington relies on Australia and New
Zealand to take care of any lesser-order threats to regional security and
stability, while perceiving the ANZUS alliance as the appropriate vehi-
cle for "the military response to any global and major regional threat in
this part of the world" (Herr 1984a:186). Thus, Papua New Guinea,
like the other island states of the South Pacific, has no defense treaty
with the United States, although some limited military connections are
maintained (ibid.). If any US support for Papua New Guinea's defense
is forthcoming, it is likely to be through ANZUS and at the behest of
Australia.

The precise nature of the ANZUS partners' commitments under the
terms of the treaty remains undefined. But as Herr notes: "the initiative
in matters such as the demarcation of responsibilities and the extent of
ANZUS support rest almost completely with Washington" (ibid.:188).
This "strategic fact of life" is apparent in the record of Australian
involvement in Southeast Asia, with the United States invoking the
treaty in a 1956 plan to invade Indonesia (Birgan 1985) but declining to
support Australia in its attempt to keep Indonesia out of West New
Guinea a few years later (Herr 1984b:26). Nevertheless, there are
grounds for believing that the ANZUS treaty will be invoked should
Australia become involved in Papua New Guinea. In a 1984 article
State Department official John Dorrance writes that "any military
attack on any state within the region by an external power would repre-
sent a direct challenge to the vital interests of the ANZUS partners and
would require a response." Furthermore, he notes that an attack "on the
forces or territory of any of the signatories within the Pacific area"
would be sufficient to trigger ANZUS commitments. Thus "the security
obligations of all three governments could be triggered by an attack on
the forces of one responding to an attack or the threat of an attack on an
island state" (Dorrance 1984:13).

Recent American assurances of support for Australia add strength to
Dorrance's assessment (Clark 1986). However, the nature of that sup-
port is unclear at this stage. Most likely these statements are designed to

deter Indonesia from any precipitous action on the Irian Jaya–Papua New Guinea border and may be effective as such. Clearly the United States is an influential member of the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia and as the supplier of military aid to the tune of $500 million in the period 1974–1983 (TAPOL 1983:104) must be assumed to enjoy some leverage in Jakarta.

On the other hand, the United States seems primarily concerned with the strategic implications of developments in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. As Secretary of State George Shultz made clear in 1985, the purpose of "our alliances" is "to deter Soviet aggression in Europe and Asia by making it clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that allied nations will resist, repel, and punish the aggressor" (Shultz 1985:5). So far, problems on the Irian Jaya–Papua New Guinea border have not introduced any elements obviously threatening in this regard. There have been no significant indications that the Soviet Union, or any other "unfriendly" power, has sought to use the situation to increase its influence in either region. As long as this remains the case, the attitude of the United States is likely to be, as one State Department official reportedly put it, that "there's really no need for us to get tied up in this one" (*Indonesia Reports* 1985:62).

Events on the Irian Jaya–Papua New Guinea border in the last few years have threatened the security and stability of Papua New Guinea and forced Australia to confront some difficult choices. However, recent developments have served to reduce tensions somewhat. An important factor here has been the refugee policies of the Wingti government in Papua New Guinea. Unlike the previous Somare government, whose policy of persuading the Irianese to return home fell into considerable disarray, Wingti has acknowledged that at least some of the "border crossers" may be genuine refugees. He announced that Papua New Guinea will accede to the 1967 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and asked the UN high commissioner for refugees to assist in monitoring and resettlement activities. As many as a thousand Irianese are reported to have returned to Irian Jaya in 1986, although some concern has been expressed regarding the treatment of some of them by Indonesian officials. Also, there has been some traffic in the other direction. Perhaps most significant, in the context of security, is the decision to move the refugee camps away from the border area and the influence of the OPM (Reinhardt 1986a, 1986b).

These decisions have been greeted with enthusiasm by officials in both Canberra and Jakarta. Australia's foreign affairs minister, Mr. Hayden, described Wingti's policy as a "significant step" in resolving

the refugee problem (Radio Australia 1986), while Foreign Minister Mochtar announced both a "look east" policy and a positive response to the suggestion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in February 1986 (ibid.).[23] But, while these developments undoubtedly serve to reduce international tensions for now, it should not be forgotten that Papua New Guinea's "border crosser problem" is merely one symptom of an ongoing and escalating crisis for Melanesians in Irian Jaya. As long as the crisis continues there, the effects are likely to spill over into Papua New Guinea and bring with them familiar dilemmas for policy makers in Port Moresby, Canberra, and even Washington.

Conclusion

Policymakers in Papua New Guinea are aware that they must manage their relations with Indonesia with extreme care as the costs of mistakes are likely to be extremely high. However, it is possible to identify a range of available policy options.

First, Papua New Guinea could move closer to Indonesia's position on matters concerning their common border. In practical terms this would mean taking stronger measures against OPM activists and sympathizers in its territory. It would also mean conducting joint military operations in the border region to curb OPM activities there. In addition, it might include the right of either party to conduct "hot pursuit" forays into each other's territory. A harsh policy of turning back or expelling border crossers and the rapid development of a cordon sanitaire in the border region would be other likely components.[24]

There are several objections to such a position. It would certainly attract much opposition from an influential and articulate section of society, and there might well be difficulties of implementation. Adopting this posture might also be considered akin to surrendering some degree of sovereignty in the face of threats and pressure from another power. However, the main objection is that it would not necessarily have the desired result. "Stamping out" the OPM is not an easy task given the degree of popular support that its cause enjoys.

At the other extreme, Port Moresby might consider bowing to an influential section of society and refusing to cooperate at all with Jakarta. This policy might include an "open door" policy toward the OPM, which would certainly represent a major boost for the Irianese cause. Again, the consequences of such a posture might be undesirable. In particular, it would almost certainly invite Indonesia to intervene

either covertly or overtly in Papua New Guinea's affairs, and military raids would be a likely component of such intervention. This is also a policy that, even if it attracted applause from certain sections of the Australian public, would certainly displease Australian officials and might jeopardize aid and other relations.

Finally, some position in the middle ground might be found. The first principle of such an approach would be to attempt to deal with the problem and not just its symptoms. While the Papua New Guinea government would not necessarily recognize or support the OPM, it would recognize the fact that there are grievances to be addressed in Irian Jaya. It would also recognize that refugee flows are likely to continue in the future, regardless of the state of the OPM. Concerns about these grievances would have to be raised in Jakarta even at the risk of incurring displeasure. Transmigration might be a useful topic for discussion, especially in light of the fact that parties within Indonesia have recently expressed doubts about the wisdom of moving so many people into Irian Jaya in such a short period of time (Blowfield 1985a). Finally, the approach would have to recognize that the OPM's goal of independence for Irian Jaya (or integration with Papua New Guinea for that matter) is quite unrealistic.

However, this policy would have to proceed on several different fronts simultaneously in order to be successful and the key would lie in "internationalizing" the issue. Except on rare occasions, Papua New Guinean leaders have refrained from raising the Irian Jaya issue in organizations such as the United Nations and the South Pacific Forum and have been displeased when others, such as Vanuatu, have done so.[25] Such a campaign would undoubtedly receive support from Pacific Island states, at least some of which have been extremely outspoken on behalf of other aggrieved "Melanesian brothers" in New Caledonia and Vanuatu. The usual objection here is that these other "brothers" are or were in an unresolved colonial position according to United Nations criteria, whereas the Irianese have ostensibly already exercised their right to self-determination. While it would probably be impossible to have Irian Jaya placed on the Committee of Twenty–Four's list of Non–Self–Governing Territories alongside recently reinscribed New Caledonia, a concerted informational campaign by Pacific countries at the United Nations might prove useful.

Papua New Guinea would have to work very hard to win support for this sort of approach in Canberra, and such support would be critical for success. However, if present policies of accommodation prove dysfunctional and serious conflict appears imminent in Papua New Guinea, Canberra may have no choice but to consider other options.

NOTES

1. The name Irian Jaya is used throughout this paper to refer to the political entity that occupies the western part of the island of New Guinea. Its inhabitants are referred to as Irianese. The choice of these names rather than any of the several commonly used alternatives is simply a matter of convenience and not intended as any sort of political statement.

2. The boundary follows the 141 degrees east meridian and, apart from a westward bulge to accommodate the course of the Fly River, acknowledges few of the geographic or ethnographic characteristics of the area.

3. The OPM had planned to seize control of certain facilities in Jayapura in order to pressure the authorities into negotiating with them. However, news of the planned "uprising" reached the security forces well ahead of time and the operation proved abortive.

4. The issue of whether or not West New Guinea should be included in the emergent state of Indonesia remained unresolved after the 1949 Round Table Conference had settled most other issues. In early 1962 Indonesia launched the first of a series of military operations designed to take West New Guinea by force, and the Dutch prepared to defend their position by moving troops into the area.

5. The views of the Irianese people were identified, not by means of a referendum, but by the Indonesian process of *musyawarah*, "consultation," between government officials and a total of 1,025 selected representatives. Few commentators recognize the Act of Free Choice as a legitimate act of self-determination. Indeed, many express surprise that the Suharto regime decided to mount the consultative exercise at all.

6. The Indonesians' claim to West New Guinea had two strands, one historical and one legal. The historical claim related to the supposed inclusion of New Guinea in the thirteenth-century Majapahit empire. But the main thrust of their argument concerned the fact that the territory was legally part of the former Netherlands East Indies. As the successor state, they argued, they had a right to all of the colonial entity; their liberation struggle had concerned all of these colonial people. The Dutch reply was that no meaningful unity between West New Guinea and the rest of Indonesia had ever existed and that the New Guinea people were quite different racially, culturally, and in level of development from the Malay people to the west. As such, they had a right to a separate act of self-determination—to be exercised after an appropriate period of Dutch tutelage. At no stage did the United Nations pronounce on the validity of these competing claims.

7. The negotiations were set up under the auspices of the the acting secretary general of the United Nations, but the idea that this was somehow a neutral intervention is not plausible. Even McMullen's (1981:13) account of these events, which is very biased toward the US position, admits that Bunker "did not divest himself of his American personality: He was an unofficial US mediator acting in the US interest as well as an international mediator acting under the auspices of the UN Secretary General."

8. The Soviets registered their support for Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea and much of Indonesia's arms buildup in the early 1960s was financed by low-interest loans from the USSR.

9. The Indonesians expressed the desire to liberate the Irianese from Dutch colonial rule, while the Dutch wished to protect them from alien subjugation and prepare them to "stand on their own feet." However, the dispute essentially involved ongoing Indonesian attempts to expel the colonial master from the region and Dutch attempts to protect their established interests there.

10. The situation is reminiscent of what President Wilson must have had in mind when he declared in 1918 that "people and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game" (in Ofuatey–Kodjoe 1977:75–76).

11. Perhaps "Javanization" is a more accurate term here. The greatest efforts have been in the education field, but Indonesian political and administrative institutions, complete with the ubiquitous military presence, also serve to integrate the people into Greater Indonesia. One notorious integrative program was "Operasi Koteka," which sought, among other things, to persuade highlanders to abandon their traditional penis gourd in favor of shorts in the early 1970s.

12. Deposits of copper, silver, gold, nickel, cobalt, tin, molybdenum, and oil are being developed by a bewildering array of international consortia (TAPOL 1983:35–39). Oil is the biggest revenue earner while the best-known mineral development in the province is Freeport Indonesia Inc.'s Ertsberg copper project, which required more than $210 million in start-up costs (Hutabarat 1980:27–28).

13. Hutabarat (1980:29) shows that only between 2.8 and 10.6 percent of the gross revenues generated at the Ertsberg project between 1972 and 1976 did *not* flow directly overseas. Osborne (1985:122) suggests that the state sometimes earns twenty-five times more from enclave developments here than it returns by way of the provincial budget.

14. A 17.5 percent share under Repelita IV compared to 2.3 percent under Repelita II (Aditjondro 1985).

15. Larmour estimates that "on a seven-year cycle of cultivation, six times the amount of land a community was using at any one moment would be needed in the future" (1984:5).

16. Even without transmigrants, the pressure on subsistence agricultural systems is mounting. At present rates of natural population increase, the Irianese population may double to more than three million by the turn of the century (Blowfield 1985a:7).

17. PNG Minister for Defence Epel Tito was dismissed by Prime Minister Somare in September 1983 for publicly predicting an Indonesian takeover within twenty years. The latest development fueling suspicions about Jakarta's long-term intentions is the construction of a road that will eventually link the north and south coasts of the province. The Trans–Irian Highway runs close to the border. Indeed, in 1984 it was discovered that it actually crossed the border into Papua New Guinea in at least three places.

18. The absence for many years of a concerted campaign to attract Eastern-bloc aid is probably due to the influence of the Christian churches on the movement's leadership. However, it is also likely that extraregional powers see little advantage in such involvement at this stage.

19. Diro is now a member of Parliament and was appointed minister for foreign affairs in the Wingti government in late 1986.

20. Its ability to move militarily against the OPM is similarly limited.

21. Australian military personnel on loan to the PNGDF took part in the "Kumul Force" intervention in the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu in 1980. Approval for their deployment had to be obtained from the Australian government and it is doubtful whether that operation could have proceeded if permission had been denied (Beasant 1984:124–125).

22. On the other hand, individuals and private groups in Australia have not hesitated to condemn Indonesia for a wide variety of alleged crimes, particularly abuses of human rights. Australian diplomats have had their work cut out trying to explain to officials in Jakarta that these groups do not speak for the Australian government.

23. The treaty was ratified by the Indonesians in February 1987.

24. Some commentators believe that the location of many existing and proposed transmigration settlement projects near the border is an attempt to improve the security of the border.

25. Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu did articulate some of Papua New Guinea's concerns to the UN General Assembly in 1984, but this avenue has been used rarely.

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CULTURE, CASH, AND CHRISTIANITY: THE GERMAN COLONIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE CASE OF THE RHENISH MISSION IN NEW GUINEA

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The Germans who faced the start of their nation's colonial expansion in 1884 may have harbored a dream of celebrating a "Century of German Colonial Policies" in 1984. But things turned out differently. The German colonial empire, founded with pomp and ceremony in 1884/1885, came to an abrupt end during World War I. It started with ideological scheming and down-to-earth calculations and it ended in frustration over "theft of the colonies" that had cost so much and had yielded so little.[1]

German colonial history was squeezed into three decades, and for this very reason it was a dramatic experience for both the German "protectors" and the "protected" indigenous populations. For Germany, it was an imperial episode; for the overseas populations under German rule, the "colonial situation"[2] meant a meeting between native cultures and European civilization, often synonymous with contact and conflict over a distance of centuries and even millenia in cultural development, and a catapulting into modern times at the expense of their own cultural identity.

The Course of German Colonial History:
Basic Problems and Developments

The German colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific was formed primarily in 1884/1885 by a series of swift moves during this short but favorable span of time in foreign policy. This period was preceded by massive colonial agitation, initiated in 1879 by Friedrich Fabri, director of the Rhenish Mission based in Barmen. Not without reason, Fabri was often called "father of the German colonial movement" because of his famous pamphlet *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?* (Does Germany Need Colonies?). This work of propaganda offered colonial expansion as a solution to almost all supposed or anticipated national, economic, and social problems.[3] Fabri's schemes were supported by middle-class colonial publicists and lobbies of organizations with prominent names on their boards of directors and mostly middle-class members. They courted the attention of the public at large and tried to engage traders and financiers to put pressure on Berlin, for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had shown distinct reservations since the Reichstag had rejected the Samoa bill in 1880—a measure merely to support a troubled German South Seas company without direct colonial participation as such. He filed away all suggestions "*ad acta* Samoa," even if only latently expansionistic.

Export producers and overseas merchants under growing pressure from international competition, such as the Hamburg merchant Adolph Woermann (operating in the Cameroons), "turned tail" in the early 1880s from free-trade expansionism to the "colonial party." They had a substantial role in persuading Bismarck to launch a series of protective actions overseas in 1884, celebrated by the German colonial movement during the Reichstag election campaign of that year as the uprise of German colonial policies. Bankers remained more reserved, though with exceptions such as A. von Hansemann's Diskonto-Gesellschaft and its South Seas interests in Samoa and New Guinea. The declaration of German overseas protectorates in the mid-1880s surprised even the leadership of the German colonial movement.[4]

Two circumstances were overlooked at the dawn of German colonial history: (1) Bismarck, the apologist for free-trade expansionism, had not become a proponent of state colonialism; and (2) on the "colonial question," merchants and bankers tended to have a totally different attitude from the primarily middle-class colonial lobby. Thus the German colonial venture began with a series of grave misunderstandings on both sides. These, together with the unforeseen dynamism of colonial expan-

sion and native response, provoked chain reactions that soon deflated the enthusiastic dreams of colonial grandeur.

In German colonial history, three broad stages of development can be distinguished with reference primarily to the major German territories in Africa:[5] (1) an experimental stage through the 1880s; (2) next, what in imperial Germany was called the "heroic" phase up to 1906/1907; and (3) finally, the "Dernburg era" and the years up to World War I.

The first, experimental stage ended in the late 1880s with the collapse of the system of royal charters *(Schutzbriefsystem)* promoted by Bismarck in German Southwest and German East Africa. In Togo and the Cameroons, the system never got off the ground due to the indifference of Hanseatic merchants. Only in the South Seas did the charter system last any length of time. There it ended for the most part in 1899 with the transfer of sovereignty from the "New Guinea Company"[6] back to the Reich. The smallest of the charter societies *(Schutzbriefgesellschaften)* survived the longest: the "Jaluit Society," operating from Jaluit, the main island of the German Marshall Islands, transferred sovereignty back to the Reich in 1906.[7]

The colonial situation began developing its own dynamism, especially in Africa. National and international prestige allowed no retreat. The road ahead was direct colonial administration by the Reich, which Bismarck blocked. The second stage of German colonialism began with Bismarck's departure from office in 1890. It was accompanied by alterations in the administrative framework in Berlin: the colonial department of the Foreign Office was founded in 1890, the Colonial Office (Reichskolonialamt) in 1907. This stage was characterized in Africa by the violent "clarification" of power in the colonies, culminating in the Herero War in German Southwest Africa, 1904–1907; in the grave unrest in the Southeastern Cameroons, 1904–1906; and in the Maji-Maji uprising in German East Africa, 1906–1907. With the armed conflicts in Africa, German colonial rule obviously was once again on a dead-end road. The crisis forced a change in course.

The third and final stage of German colonial history began with the banker Bernhard Dernburg's assumption of office at the colonial department of the Foreign Office and subsequently at the newly established Colonial Office. The change of political and economic strategies turned on Dernburg's program of "scientific" and "rational" colonial policies, including his new "native policy." Besides administrative reform, supportive measures for the colonial economy, and the acceleration of overseas capital exports, Dernburg's program featured respect for traditional native norms and values and the protection of the native

population as, in his wording, the most important "asset" of the German colonial economy.[8] World War I destroyed any chance the new system might have had to prove itself in the long run. The Treaty of Versailles, which forced the Reich to give up all overseas territories, put an early end to German colonial history.

Mission, Rule, and Economy
In the German Colonial Empire

German colonial history, like all others, had two faces—one European and one colonial. They were linked by problems and conflicts brought from Germany to the colonies, which then merged with the real problems of cultural contact and conflict, creating a particularly complex situation. The following surveys the basic problems of the German colonial situation in the related fields of colonial missions, colonial rule, and colonial economy. My point of departure is the problem of the national "colonial mission,"[9] such as, in this context, the work of German mission societies in overseas territories under German rule during the three decades from the mid-1880s to World War I.

Missionary work, colonial rule, and colonial economics harmonized at times and conflicted at others. The German experience proved both the rule and the exception for missionary work in a colonial situation. It was the rule in that the background for consensus and cooperation as well as the reasons for disagreement and conflict were applicable to the work of mission societies in general, whether those of other colonial powers in their colonies, German missionaries in foreign colonies, or foreign missionaries in German colonies. It was the exception in that the missionaries in German colonies had to deal with representatives of a new colonial power who lacked any experience in colonial administration but who were, at the same time, self-compelled to succeed in their overseas activities.[10] The German experience was also the exception in that what came to be called "German colonial history" was, in reality, no more than Germany's arrested attempt to become a colonial power. This lent a particularly dramatic character to the meeting of mission, rule, and economy.

To draw a historical balance, we have on the one hand the activities of the missions: not only proselytizing, conveying Christian values, educating in the broadest sense of the word, teaching vocational skills, and providing health and medical care, but also doing academic research and training a new native elite. On the other hand, we have the prob-

lematic aspects of these activities. Aside from internal differences among missionaries and mission societies over methods, we can broadly distinguish six major problem areas as follows.[11]

Mission and Secular Civilization

The missionaries stemmed from the same European culture as the representatives of colonial rule and economic interest. In cultural contacts and conflicts, missionaries and colonial officials, traders, planters, and settlers were culturally closer to one another than to any group of native inhabitants. Similarly, the various indigenous groups, despite their internal differences, were culturally closer to one another than to any group of whites. It was initially difficult for the local people to distinguish between the missionaries and the secular interest groups, both of them representing the same culture, nationality, and ways of life, for most of the first cross-cultural contacts began with an exchange of gifts and goods, such that the missionaries often appeared simply as a particularly friendly type of white trader. Moreover, the credibility of a white group preaching nonviolence and charity became questionable as a result of the activities of the two other white groups, one striving for profit by unscrupulous methods and the other willing to use force to take power.

Mission and Native Culture

A good deal of tension and misunderstanding resulted from the distance between Western Christian culture and the animistic native environment in which the future converts lived. What often appeared to the missionaries as heathen barbarism readily replaceable by Christianity was, in fact, just as strongly anchored in the life-style of the people and as determinative of their social behavior as Christian values were in Western culture. It was not primarily a question of appropriate proselytizing strategy but rather of whether the mission, as a "harbinger" of Western civilization, might interfere in native culture to a greater extent than did the colonial administration and the framework of colonial economy, for missionary work affected those religious and mental structures that held together the whole system of cultural and social values. This raised questions as to the interrelation of Christianity and civilization and the connection between mission and colonization that made theological disputes back in Germany seem like abstract musing.

Spiritual Authority and Secular Power

The missionaries had a different, stronger motive for their work than did the representatives of secular interests. They were the intimate partners of the local people, in contrast to the government officials temporarily posted to the colonies who made occasional visits to the villages. The position of the missionaries was therefore all the more important and difficult—as advisers to the native elite and to the colonial administration; as mediators in conflicts between native groups or between natives, traders, planters, settlers, and colonial officials; and in general as advocates of the local population against the European representatives of secular interests. Thus the mission often became involved in conflicts that it did not instigate and that could not be solved, however, without its help, at least not peaceably. The mission thereby acquired an influence that could only lead to conflict between spiritual authority and secular power, the mission's law being more highly respected by the people than that of the colonial administration.

Mission and Colonial Economy

Several conflicts merged in the colonial economy, among them disputes concerning the mission's own business enterprises. These had a double function: on the one hand, to supply the mission stations and relieve the missionaries of the task of trading and, on the other hand, to replenish local mission finances as well as the budget of the missionary society at home by general trading. Another argument arose over "educating the natives to work," an endeavor often used by representatives of economic interests as a yardstick to measure the utility of missionary work. In disputes about land and labor-related questions, the mission functioned as an advocate against disproportionate economic and physical exploitation. Thereby it often came into conflict with the colonial administration, to which the Europeans appealed to assert their "acquired rights," whereas the local villagers could only appeal to the missionaries.

The Nationality Question

Because the missions were generally seen as representatives of Western culture and, in cases of conflict, of national interest, the nationality question raised problems where missionary activities in German colonies were carried out by foreign societies. Suspicions arose among colonial authorities, "patriotic" settlers, and plantation owners wherever

German missions did not eventually replace foreign missions, especially those of other colonial powers. This happened with the London Missionary Society and the French Marists in German Samoa. A particularly notable instance involved the missionaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Boston Mission) in the German Marshall Islands, under whose influence independent church committees arose. These committees were a thorn in the eye of the German colonial administration endeavoring to "Germanize" the population: they were seen as cells of native resistance under foreign influence.[12]

Interdenominational Competition

The episodic spread of the *Kulturkampf* to the colonies made missionary work even more difficult. After Catholic missionary orders were once again authorized in the Reich and permitted to work in the "protectorates," the difficulties of missionary work were aggravated by interdenominational competition. In extreme cases, missionaries and mission training centers of the different denominations vied with one another and forced the colonial administration to intercede. Here too, conflicts imported from Germany grew in importance and had repercussions on colonial policy discussions in the Reich.

A number of these problems, experienced in the German colonies both in the Pacific and in Africa, became traumatic for the Rhenish Mission in New Guinea.[13]

The Rhenish Mission in New Guinea: Theory, Practice, and Failure of a National Colonial Mission

Toward a Nationalistic Concept of Colonial Mission

At the very beginning of expansionist ideas finally linking colonialism and Christian mission in a concept of "colonial mission" stood the journalistic activities of Friedrich Fabri, who headed the Rhenish Mission until 1884 and remained in close contact with the society after his resignation. The vociferous colonial propaganda and the mission inspector's political statements to the German Foreign Office annoyed the chancellor in the early 1880s. But after Bismarck began supporting colonial policies, he grew more and more interested in the opinions of the now-retired mission inspector; for in a period of rising colonial fever, Fabri warned of colonial illusions, drafted a concrete program of "colonial

tasks,"[14] and subsequently commented critically on German colonial policies and economic practices, both public and confidential. Bismarck requested Fabri's critical assessment of developments in German colonial policies on several occasions in the late 1880s, finally even contacting him personally.

Decisive to Fabri's thinking was his experience with the crisis-prone work of his mission society in southwestern Africa, where the Rhenish Mission owned a trading company. The interests of the mission and of the trading company were severely jeopardized by recurrent conflicts there between rival tribes. The collapse of the trading company in the late 1870s strengthened the mission head in his view that no mission or trading company overseas could be successful without political guarantees of its security. This view evolved in the early 1880s into a nationalistic conception of the colonial mission, outlined by Fabri at the Bremen Mission Conference in March 1884 in a speech entitled "The Importance of Political Order for the Development of the Missions"[15] and expanded in 1885 with several additional economic aspects in his series of articles on Germany's "colonial tasks."

Fabri's conception of the colonial mission was based on the following ideas: (1) With its pioneering cultural activities, the mission was breaking ground for trade that followed the mission; (2) the preparatory work done by missionaries and traders justified colonial rule by the nation they both belonged to; and (3) colonial rule, in turn, created the "political order" that missionaries and traders needed to expand their activities on a permanent basis. Moreover, the mission was to serve as a mediator in the colonial economy. Fabri saw three basic requirements for economic success: "intelligence, capital, and labor." By capital he meant that of industry and banking, which were to supply active trading capital. By intelligence he meant detailed project studies, local expertise, and good management. The Europeans were to be responsible for both capital and intelligence. Labor on the plantations was to be provided by the local inhabitants, whom Fabri regarded as more or less lazy, careless, and lethargic. This prompted his demand: "What we need in this respect is to educate the natives to work."[16]

Missionary work was to provide direct assistance in this area. As early as 1879 Fabri had indicated: "Missions of an educative character, i.e., even training the natives to work, would be most useful. With them and following them should come capital and people for the plantations and larger trading companies."[17] Fabri assumed that "educating the Negroes [as well as Melanesians and Papuans] to work" would not be possible without "gentle compulsion" that should be "initiated and supervised in a humane and understanding manner."[18]

Fabri regarded his conception of "educating to work" as a long-term program in which rash steps and pressure would only provoke resistance. He never envisaged encountering in German protectorates the "dreadful atrocities of the worst kind" so rife in colonial history because he believed that colonial entrepreneurs in their "economic wisdom" would do without such "foolish stupidity": "It is obviously unwise to saw off the branch one is sitting on in order to reap its fruits." In this economic tenet of colonial history he saw "a providential force to moderate and control the profit motive."[19]

These statements remained controversial in missionary circles, but aroused great regard in political and economic ones. Fabri's headway in these circles was part of the early history of the Rhenish New Guinea Mission.

The Road to New Guinea: Rhenish Mission, Diskonto-Gesellschaft, and the New Guinea Company

Even Fabri's first public reference to the "utility" of the mission for overseas commercial and political interests did not go unheard. In summer 1880, the head of the leading German bank, Adolph von Hansemann, asked his son-in-law, Kusserow at the German Foreign Office, who knew Fabri personally, whether and to what extent the Rhenish Mission could be persuaded to assist the New Guinea plans of the Berlin Diskonto-Gesellschaft. Hansemann sought through Kusserow to find out if Fabri could "provide the missionaries considered to be absolutely necessary for the acquisition of the island." Fabri answered with an "elated yes" and, in view of the chronic deficit of his society, proposed that the New Guinea Mission be financed by the prospective company. His only condition was that the missionaries, despite material dependence, not be restricted in their spiritual and instructional activities by the commercial interests of their financial backers.[20]

Hansemann had to put off his New Guinea plans in 1880 because Bismarck was no longer willing to support semicolonial activities after the failure of the Samoa Bill. Four years later, Kusserow was able to win Bismarck over. The "charter" drafted by Kusserow was issued on 17 May 1885.[21] Immediately, all the South Seas lobbies involved with the New Guinea Company (NGC) showed renewed interest in the mission. Since New Guinea was now a "protectorate" administered according to the charter system, they could even use the mediation of the German Foreign Office.

Fabri showed himself willing to meet these and other requests. In Berlin he now presented mostly economic arguments for setting up Ger-

man colonial missions, "quite apart," he added, "from the primary reli-
gious motives" to which he made no further reference in his memoran-
dum. "Only missionaries," he argued, "are capable of effectively raising
the cultural level of barbarian peoples and educating them to work, the
basis of all cultural progress. Unless the natives are educated to work,
the richest possessions in the tropics become worthless. . . . Only thus
can heathen tropical countries gradually achieve a rising export as well
as import capacity."[22] These ideas of the former mission head now
seemed to Bismarck "perhaps worth considering."[23]

In October 1885, a conference of German-language Protestant mis-
sion societies, to which Bismarck sent a delegate from the German For-
eign Office, met in Bremen under Fabri's leadership to deal with "the
Mission's position on the German colonial movement." Bismarck con-
veyed the wish of the Reich government "for our respective ways, dif-
ferent though they must be, always to run parallel." The Foreign Office
delegate read aloud a message from the German consul in the Bismarck
Archipelago requesting "immediate measures to set up the mission in
New Guinea" and asking the Rhenish Mission directly to begin work
there.[24]

The delegates of mission societies at the Bremen Conference declared
themselves against an intermingling of mission and colonial policy.
Some strongly criticized Fabri's idea of the mission "educating the
natives to work." But all agreed to "offer their services benevolently to
the colonial power, given their expert knowledge and moral influence,
in return for the protection they received." They lent their support to
the Foreign Office's request that the Rhenish Mission begin work in
New Guinea, particularly since it was already active in the neighboring
Dutch East Indies. In November 1885 the governing body of the Rhen-
ish Mission agreed to begin work in New Guinea, and in May 1886 the
General Assembly of the mission society voted in favor of the project.[25]
Bremen also spawned the Neuendettelsauer New Guinea Mission,
which developed differently and in many ways more favorably than the
Rhenish New Guinea Mission.[26]

The Rhenish Mission agreement marked the beginning of a series of
disappointments that was to last up to World War I. First came the long
and difficult negotiations with the New Guinea Company. Following
the Bremen Conference, the NGC had clearly lost interest in the mission
and was showing distinct reservations. As mistrustful as other colonial
enterprises, the NGC was obviously responsive to the harsh criticism of
exploitative practices overseas that was beginning to be heard once the
colonial fever had cooled off and the colonial situation could be viewed

more objectively. The early protest movement in Germany struck out in two directions: against the brandy trade[27] and against the rumored methods of labor recruitment[28] in the new German "protectorates." In both cases, the participation of Protestant missionaries in the initial protests made commercial circles strongly suspicious of the missionary work that they had earlier esteemed so highly.

The NGC was not affected by criticism of the overseas brandy trade, for the importation of spirits had been prohibited in German South Seas territories since 1885. But the criticism of labor recruitment practices did have the potential of becoming unpleasant. After disappointments in real estate speculation, the NGC attempted to speed up production on the plantations in order to amortize its investment as fast as possible. This was possible at the time only with the help of labor imported from abroad in lieu of local workers. Unlike the native work force, foreign laborers were unable to quit their jobs and return to their villages if maltreated or underpaid. If they wished to return home, which was possible only aboard the white man's ships, they had to fulfill the terms of their contracts. In practice, this could amount to forced labor.[29]

News of the importation of foreign workers to New Guinea reached the broader public with unexpected rapidity and promptly led to an extremely embarrassing situation in April 1886 when it was asserted at the general meeting of the German Colonial Society "that slavery was being practiced on the German plantations of New Guinea." "Slavery" was interpreted as "the employment of laborers against their will, that is, under compulsion."[30] This sounded a warning to the NGC. The spectacular incident showed that critical observers in the territory of a chartered company could pose a considerable risk to its reputation with the public.

However, the NGC was more concerned with getting the Rhenish Mission committed to cooperating in "education to work" before the start of its operations in New Guinea and with making suitable arrangements for neutralizing the mission's potential to make trouble. Both these concerns delayed by nearly two years the start of the mission work originally requested for 1885. The NGC had temporarily prohibited the entry of the missionaries (who had been prepared to go from the start), the excuse given being that it wanted to make certain that its agents in New Guinea had carried out certain "instructions concerning their receptions" beforehand. Only after the agents themselves had a "firm footing in the country" should the mission follow.[31] Thus from the very beginning, Fabri's program was reversed.

After tedious negotiations for a proper contract between commercial

interests and the mission society, the NGC finally presented its conditions in November 1887. The mission society was free neither to choose its field of work nor to make decisions on the location or relocation of outposts, but had to submit its plans to the *Landeshauptmann* (leading official of the NGC) for approval. Only in their capacity as "spiritual and religious educators" were the missionaries responsible to the mission administration; otherwise they were obliged to bow to the laws and regulations of the local authorities in the same way as other settlers.[32] The NGC officials were instructed to do everything in their power to assist the work of the missionaries. In return, the missionaries were obliged "to support the administration without reward as interpreters and mediators in disputes, etc." and in particular to endeavor "to instruct the natives in all manner of useful knowledge and arts and to accustom them to regular work." The Rhenish Mission knew only too well what kind of "knowledge and arts" were intended, but accepted the NGC conditions without delay.[33]

The Failure of the Colonial Mission in the Conflict of Cultures

The expectations that the NGC had for a productive system of exploitation with the help of the mission could not be fulfilled in New Guinea. Of the three basic requirements for success that Fabri had named— intelligence, capital, and labor—the NGC had only one: capital. Its hasty procedure, the result of an impatient urge for profits, was prey to a serious lack of exactly the "economic wisdom" that in Fabri's judgment was the prerequisite for profitable organization of a colonial economy—a lack accentuated by the company's inexperience in handling the New Guineans.[34]

Even the auxiliary economic function of "education to work" that Fabri had intended for the mission was unintentionally blocked by the NGC itself. The mistrust of the New Guineans, aroused and strengthened by the administration's measures, was an extraordinary hindrance to mission work. It was caused in large measure by the colonial administration, which tried to discipline them swiftly and, if need be, by force in accord with European norms. Trivial infractions were punished severely, which provoked violent protests and uprisings. These in turn were quelled by punitive expeditions.

In 1888, Fabri, as former head of mission, protested strongly about the NGC to the German Foreign Office. The most serious "mistake" he criticized was the NGC's attempts to impose abruptly an administrative system geared to European norms upon a population split up into innu-

merable tribes with different languages and customs and, in contrast to the population of the African protectorates, unused to communicating with Europeans. "What a missionary and what a trader actually want will be grasped by the native after a period of mistrust," wrote Fabri.

> What these German officials suddenly infesting his country want must be incomprehensible to him. He can only gain the impression that "they want to rule over us." Naturally he resists if not compelled by force. To date, no German in the country has really been able to make himself understood to even a small section of the population. It is no wonder that the New Guinean, frightened by a few signs and unintelligible words of a perhaps well-meaning official who lacks all understanding for the mentality, customs and usages of the people, takes on an attitude of resistance and, as has happened, opposes and attacks the settlement. Who is at fault in this case?

The NGC had not yet learned to wait, Fabri continued. Economic gains in New Guinea could only be expected in the course of decades. The waiting period had to be employed to advance the population gradually to the point "where they can understand and sustain a European system of administration." The NGC had to entrust not to unexperienced officials but to the "pioneer work of the missions" the task of leading the indigenous population "quite gradually along the ways of civilization."[35]

The NGC was, of course, unwilling to wait for the long-term success of missionary pioneer work. Tension between the NGC and the New Guineans had immediate repercussions on the work of the Rhenish Mission, especially because in 1892 the NGC transferred its administrative headquarters from the "fever-hole" Finschhafen to Friedrich-Wilhelmshaven on Astrolabe Bay in the immediate neighborhood of the Rhenish Mission station.[36]

More and more frequently the mission had to act as "mediator in disputes" and could win the trust of the New Guineans only with great effort and for short periods given the virtually classic situation of a minority from the "ruling nation" preaching peace and brotherly love while the majority resorted to repression to create the political order that Fabri, too, had requested in the mission's interests. Even in 1903, five years after the Reich had assumed direct responsibility in place of the NGC, a report of the Rhenish Mission commented: "Our missionaries there are acting as advocates of the natives against many an unscrupulous European. How often did they avoid bloodbaths by their

mediation, how often were they able to prevent injustice and baseness!" In New Guinea, the report ended, the "preservation of the people is to be credited largely to the missions."[37]

Apart from the extraordinary difficulties confronting the missionaries because of the tensions, friction, and bloody conflicts among the colonial administration, imported labor, and native population, New Guinea's dangerous climate contributed decisively to making that "dark island" the "death land" of the Rhenish Mission. A few missionaries narrowly escaped death by leaving the area, sometimes after only a short sojourn, their health severely impaired. Those who remained in the country were often unable to work for months on end because of grave illness. As a result, the Rhenish New Guinea Mission suffered from a lack of continuity of personnel, a factor so essential in missionary work.[38]

Finally, the New Guineans soon saw the connection between the "Jehovah talk" and the social behavior forced upon them by the administration, only to cling the more stubbornly to their "heathen beliefs and superstitions." These provided their sole spiritual support against new sociocultural norms that were an incomprehensible, and therefore oppressive, burden of prohibitions and threats.[39] Part of the local population rejected baptism with the explanation that "we do not want to be tied down by God" and cooperated in their church-going and school attendance only just enough (in their view) to keep the missionary there. Although he, too, was considered a burdensome intruder, he was valued as a mediator between them and the colonial regime. Others accepted baptism precisely because they misconstrued the punitive expeditions as "divine judgment" on their disobedience toward the missionaries. Both these reactions had, as one missionary recognized, a basis in the New Guineans' widespread belief "that our sermons and the governmental regulations were the same, so that whenever they failed to follow what we said, they could expect difficulties or punishment from the authorities."[40]

All of this undermined Fabri's program of colonial mission. At first, missionary work made no progress whatever; later it advanced only falteringly, and even in the third decade it attained scarcely more than a depressing alternation of short-lived successes and serious setbacks. As statistics for 1896, the mission noted all in all: "Three (at the moment only two) stations, no Christians; but ten graves in eight years."[41] In sixteen years, the mission succeeded in baptizing only one, a permanently employed houseboy. When in 1906, after nineteen years of work at the Ragetta station, there was a larger baptismal celebration with twenty

converts, the Rhenish Mission had already buried the same number of
its personnel—ten missionaries, five missionary wives, and five mission-
ary children. Even its small, hard-won successes were of short duration.
In 1906, there were four stations of the Rhenish Mission where twenty-
four were baptized and fifty-one catechumens were enrolled. But the
next year, at Siar and Ragetta alone, twenty-seven of the baptized had
to be expelled from the "congregation"; in 1912, they demonstratively
celebrated their traditional secret rites in place of the Christmas fes-
tival.[42]

The End of Colonial Rule and the End of the Colonial Mission

Only with the end of German colonial rule did the Rhenish Mission
achieve the greater success for which it had long striven in vain. At the
beginning of World War I, the mission was able to count, after twenty-
seven years of sacrificial work, only ninety-six parish members in New
Guinea, some of them highly unreliable. At the end of the war, there
were in its area six hundred baptized New Guineans. But even this suc-
cess, as the missionaries suspected, was in part due to the above-men-
tioned, quite crass motivation of the New Guineans, who quickly real-
ized that the end of German colonial rule had not brought them
longed-for freedom, but only a change in colonial masters.[43]

There was little time for the Rhenish Mission to secure and increase
these surprising successes because they took place against the back-
ground of World War I, in the wake of which Germany lost New
Guinea and the Rhenish Mission lost its mission field. In 1921, the Bar-
men society received notification from the Australian government that
it had to hand over its mission territory to the United Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Australia. Attempts at mediation by Australian
Lutherans were futile. The Australian government remained firm.[44]

The national leitmotiv of the colonial missionary concept turned
against its very advocates. In November 1911 the Rhenish Mission had
invited the president of the German Colonial Society, Duke Johann
Albrecht of Mecklenburg, to the Barmen mission house. In a welcoming
speech, mission head Kriele emphasized the role of missions as "pro-
moters of colonial interests"; recalled the significance of the former mis-
sion head, Fabri (who had died in 1891), to the German colonial move-
ment; and pleaded for an intensification of the "teamwork between
missions and colonial policies." By way of reply, Albrecht admonished
the attending members of the mission seminary to understand mission-
ary work in specific nationalistic terms: "I am confident that the youn-

ger generation will never forget that they are Germans, German men and German Christians, so that the obligation devolves upon them to function as German missionaries in the awareness that God the Lord had placed them there as Germans."[45]

Seven years later, at the end of World War I, those German evangelical societies active in the South Seas—in the first instance the Rhenish Mission—besought the chancellor to insist on the return of the German South Seas territories at the coming peace negotiations. Their fear "that an abandonment of German territorial claims in the South Seas might threaten and endanger the future of our missionary work"[46] was the consequence of their own nationalistic concept of colonial missions, according to which the end of colonial rule necessarily meant the end of mission work for the Rhenish Mission.

NOTES

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Centennial History Seminar, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, November 7–9, 1984.

1. References have purposely been kept short. For a more extensive discussion of the wide array of literature see K. J. Bade, *Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit. Revolution—Depression—Expansion* (Freiburg, 1975); idem, "Colonial Missions and Imperialism: The Background to the Fiasco of the Rhenish Mission in New Guinea," in *Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870–1914*, edited by J. A. Moses and P. M. Kennedy (Brisbane, 1977), 313–346; idem, "Antisklavereibewegung in Deutschland und Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1888–1890," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 3, no. 1 (1977): 31–58; idem, "Die deutsche Kolonialexpansion in Afrika. Ausgangssituation und Ergebnis," in *Afrika im Geschichtsunterricht europäischer Länder. Von der Kolonialgeschichte zur Geschichte der Dritten Welt*, edited by W. Fürnrohr (München, 1982), 7–47; idem, ed., *Imperialismus und Kolonialmission. Kaiserliches Deutschland und koloniales Imperium* (Wiesbaden, 1982; 2d ed., 1984); idem, "Zwischen Mission und Kolonialbewegung, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialpolitik in der Bismarckzeit: der Fall Friedrich Fabri," in ibid., 103–141; idem, "Das Kaiserreich als Kolonialmacht: ideologische Projektionen und historische Erfahrung," in *Die deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, edited by J. Becker and A. Hillgruber (München, 1983), 91–108; idem, "Imperialismusforschung und Kolonialhistorie," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9, no. 1 (1983): 138–150.

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F. Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire* (New York, 1977), 394–435; L. Gall, *Bismarck. Der weiße Revolutionär* (Frankfurt, 1980), 615–618; M. Stürmer, *Das ruhelose Reich. Deutschland 1866–1918* (Berlin, 1982), 230–233.

5. Bade, "Die deutsche Kolonialexpansion in Afrika," 21–35; idem, "Das Kaiserreich als Kolonialmacht," 99 ff.; with special regard to Africa see W. Baumgart, "Die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Neue Wege der Forschung," in *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 58 (1971): 469–470; A. Wirz, "Die deutschen Kolonien in Afrika," in *Europäische Kolonialherrschaft, 1880–1940*, by R. von Albertini in cooperation with A. Wirz (Zürich, 1976), 302–327; cf. H. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn, 1985), 241 ff.

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7. W. Treue, *Die Jaluit-Gesellschaft auf den Marshall-Inseln, 1887–1914. Ein Beitrag zur Kolonial- und Verwaltungsgeschichte in der Epoche des deutschen Kaiserreichs* (Berlin, 1976).

8. W. Schiefel, *Bernhard Dernburg, 1865–1937. Kolonialpolitiker und Bankier im wilhelminischen Deutschland* (Zürich, 1974), 30–142.

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10. See Pogge von Strandmann, "Domestic Origins."

11. As to these problem areas see Bade, ed., *Imperialismus und Kolonialmission*, 17–22. For case studies on these aspects of the German South Seas see, for example, P. J. Hempenstall, "The Reception of European Missions in the German Pacific Empire: The New Guinean Experience," *Journal of Pacific History* 10, no. 1/2 (1975): 46–64 (revised version: "Europäische Missionsgesellschaften und christlicher Einfluß in der deutschen Südsee: das Beispiel Neuguinea," in Bade, ed., *Imperialismus und Kolonialmission*, 226–242); J. A. Moses, "Zwischen Puritanismus und Ultramontanismus: die 'Politik der Diagonalen' auf Deutsch-Samoa, 1900–1914," in ibid., 243–256; S. G. Firth, "Die Bostoner Mission in den deutschen Marshall-Inseln," in ibid., 257–268. For the German colonial empire in general, though neglecting the South Seas, see H. Gründer, *Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus. Eine politische Geschichte ihrer Beziehungen während der deutschen Kolonialzeit (1884–1914) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Afrikas und Chinas* (Paderborn, 1982). For a critical survey on approaches and results of previous research on the history of Christian missions see E. Kamphausen and W. Ustorf, "Deutsche Missionsgeschichtsschreibung: Anamnese einer Fehlentwicklung," in *Verkündigung und Forschung* 2 (1977): 2–57.

12. See J. A. Moses, "Zwischen Puritanismus und Ultramontanius"; and P. J. Hempenstall, "The Reception of European Missions."

13. For the history of the Christian mission in New Guinea under German rule, see K. J. Bade, *Fabri*, 261–271; idem, "Colonial Missions"; P. J. Hempenstall, "The Reception of European Missions"; S. G. Firth, *New Guinea*, 136–160.

14. F. Fabri, "Koloniale Aufgaben," in *Kölnische Zeitung*, 13–16 July 1885 (quotations here from the expanded version, *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 2 [1885]: 536–551); see Bade, *Fabri*, 243–286.

15. F. Fabri, "Die Bedeutung geordneter politischer Zustände für die Entwicklung der Mission," in *Allgemeine Missions–Zeitschrift* 11 (1884): 314–315 (hereafter cited as *AMZ*).

16. Idem, "Koloniale Aufgaben," 538–543, 551; idem, *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?*, 37.

17. Ibid., 94.

18. Idem, "Koloniale Aufgaben," 541–543.

19. Ibid., 542; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 3 (1886): 316.

20. Fabri to Kusserow, 30 June 1880, Archiv der Rheinischen Mission, Wuppertal-Barmen, Copierbuch G, pp. 363–366.

21. Wehler, *Bismarck*, 223–225, 396–397.

22. Fabri to Gossler, 2 June 1885, Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Potsdam, Reichskolonialamt (hereafter cited as RKolA), 6893, pp. 86ff.

23. RKolA, 6893, p. 85.

24. Ibid., pp. 110–111, 113, 118–121, 125, 132–133, 141, 144–145; *AMZ* 12 (1885): 545–546, 550, 556; Archiv der Rheinischen Mission, Wuppertal-Barmen, Berichte der Rheinischen Missions–Gesellschaft (hereafter cited as BRM) 42 (1885): 356; L. Raschdau, *Unter Bismarck und Caprivi* (Berlin, 1939), 2.

25. *AMZ* 12 (1885): 552, 561; BRM 43 (1886): 100ff.

26. *AMZ* 12 (1885): 555; G. Pilhofer, *Die Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission in Neuguinea*, 3 vols. (Neuendettelsau, 1961–1963).

27. See Bade, *Fabri*, 272–279.

28. See S. G. Firth, "Arbeiterpolitik in Deutsch–Neuguinea vor 1914," in *Tradition und Neubeginn. Internationale Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*, edited by J. Hütter et al. (Köln, 1975), 481–489; idem, "The Transformation of the Labour Trade in German New Guinea, 1899–1914," in *Journal of Pacific History* 11, no. 1/2 (1976): 51–65; idem, "Governors versus Settlers: The Dispute over Chinese Labour in German Samoa," in *New Zealand Journal of History*, 1977: 155–179; idem, *New Guinea*, passim; P. J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance* (Canberra, 1978), passim; J. A. Moses, "The Coolie Labour Question and German Colonial Policy in Samoa, 1900–1914," in J. A. Moses and P. M. Kennedy, *Germany in the Pacific and Far East*, 234–261.

29. See n. 6.

30. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 3 (1886): 313–315.

31. L. von Rohden, *Geschichte der Rheinischen Missions-Gesellschaft*, 3d ed. (Barmen, 1888), 510; Hansemann to Neuendettelsau Mission, 18 January 1886, in G. Pilhofer, *Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission*, 1: 58ff.

32. BRM 43 (1886): 101–102, 165, 305; 44 (1887): 10ff., 163–164, 259; *AMZ* 14 (1887): 85ff.

33. BRM 44 (1887): 11, 164, 235.

34. See Bade, "Colonial Missions," 331–333; cf. n. 13.

35. Memorandum by Fabri, August 1888, RKolA, 6924, pp. 7ff.; cf. Fabri, *Fünf Jahre deutscher Kolonialpolitik. Rück- und Asblicke* (Gotha, 1889), 9ff.

36. *AMZ* 18 (1891): 530; 22 (1895): 545; 23 (1896): 305.

37. *75 Jahre Rheinische Missionsarbeit, 1828–1903* (Barmen, 1903), 195.

38. Monatsbericht der Rheinischen Mission (hereafter cited as MbRM) 61 (1886): 11; 78 (1903): 2; Jahresbericht der Rheinischen Mission (hereafter cited as JbRM) 59 (1888): 48–50; 63 (1892): 70–73; BRM 45 (1888): 269; 46 (1889): 172; 49 (1892): 133; 64 (1907): 115; *AMZ* 23 (1896): 77; 28 (1902): 7–9.

39. BRM 63 (1906): 94, 115, 217.

40. BRM 62 (1905): 278; 63 (1906): 94, 96, 115; 70 (1913): 26, 135.

41. *AMZ* 23 (1896): 77.

42. BRM 60 (1903): 143; 63 (1906): 181; 68 (1911): 244, 246; 69 (1912): 107ff., 137; JbRM 74 (1903): 59; MbRM 81 (1906): 67ff.; *AMZ* 33 (1906): 489.

43. JbRM 85 (1914): 76; 89 (1918): 72; BRM 72 (1915): 106, 179, 247; 73 (1916): 30–31, 185; 75 (1918): 126.

44. BRM 77 (1920): 13–14; 78 (1921): 165–167; JbRM 91 (1920): 47; 92 (1921): 43; cf. E. Kriele, *Geschichte der Rheinischen Mission* (Barmen, 1928), 1:354–355; G. Pilhofer, *Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission*, 2: 25ff.

45. BRM 68 (1911): 15–17.

46. BRM 75 (1918): 46–49.

JOINT VENTURE RICE PRODUCTION
IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS:
THE INNER WORKINGS OF DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT

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The history of rice production in the Solomon Islands is briefly examined with the focus on the involvement of a Hawaii firm, C. Brewer and Company, Limited. The discussion centers on the factors believed to have caused the company to become involved in rice production in the Solomon Islands, as well as those factors that contributed to the company's withdrawal six years later. While the initial decision was made when Brewer was engaged in a long-range strategic program of global agricultural diversification, the latter decision was reached when the decision-making framework was altered, largely as a consequence of international corporate and sociopolitical factors unrelated to specific aspects of the Solomon Islands project. The implications of this outcome are discussed from the general perspective of Third World economic development.

The problem of underdevelopment and economic dependency has been linked to acute shortages of skilled labor, absence of entrepreneurship (or in some cases, cultural conflicts with the norms of Western business), inadequate pools of capital, and internal markets that are too small to permit the achievement of economies of scale. When such conditions exist within a country, they can set the stage for tremendous reliance on overseas experts, overseas sources of capital, and overseas markets. Such reliance may not be detrimental in and of itself, but uncertainty and vulnerability increase when the success of a development venture is highly dependent on overseas markets and when the capital and expertise are being obtained through the direct involvement of multinational

corporations. These general claims about the nature of economic dependency are illustrated in this article by an examination of the development of a major rice project on the Guadalcanal Plains (figure 1) by C. Brewer and Company, Limited (Brewer)—a Hawaii-based multinational agribusiness firm—in a joint venture with the Solomon Islands government. The case study additionally exposes the connection between multinational corporations' organizational strategies and international geopolitics in the overall fragility of island development.

FIGURE 1. Location of rice plantations on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands. (Source: modified from Huetez de Lemps 1984, fig. 7.)

My overall aim is to identify the factors that gave rise to initiation as well as termination of this joint venture in the hope that conclusions reached can provide understanding of the nature of linkages in the wider multinational business sphere and their potential contribution to success or failure at the local project level. Hence, I first examine the background and facts of Brewer's involvement in rice production in the Solomon Islands. Brewer's successes temporarily offered new hope for the realization of the long-standing national dream of achieving self-sufficiency in rice production. The second part of the article identifies and analyzes factors that are believed to have led to Brewer's engagement in the venture in early 1975 and disengagement by 1982. The findings suggest that had not the decision-making framework of Brewer changed so dramatically during the late 1970s, the company might not have been so hasty in pulling out of the rice project. This supports the argument advanced by McDermott and Taylor (1982) and others (see Harrigan 1984) that business locational decisions reflect an organizational context rather than purely a profit motive. In a global environment increasingly characterized by mergers and take-overs of business enterprises, this reality compounds development problems for emerging nations, rendering them not only dependents but also vulnerable "takers" (Rimmer and Black 1983) in an arena of uncertain business relationships.

Background to Brewer's Involvement in the Solomon Islands

There has never been much reason for sustained optimism about rice production in the Solomon Islands. A bright spot did appear, however, in the late 1970s when Brewer-Solomon Associates (BSA), a subsidiary of Hawaiian Agronomics International (HAI), Brewer's agribusiness firm, was able to grow 2.7 crops per year with yields averaging 3.7 tonnes per hectare of paddy. This output equates to 10 tonnes per hectare per year, which, at the time, was the highest productivity for rice anywhere in the world. Brewer was then able to sell rice to several countries within the South Pacific, in addition to satisfying a substantial portion of local needs.

Brewer is a 160-year-old Hawaii company that was primarily involved in sugar production in the Hawaiian Islands until the 1970s. By the mid-1970s, it had become a diversified agribusiness company primarily engaged in the production and marketing of a range of agricultural products and related agribusiness activities, such as consulting and management of agricultural projects in both U.S. and foreign locations.

Brewer first became associated with the Solomon Islands rice opera-
tion in 1973 when its subsidiary HAI was retained by the then owner,
Guadalcanal Plains, Limited (GPL), to assist in a farm expansion pro-
gram. In that same year, GPL was purchased by Mindoro International
Corporation, another U.S. firm. A year later Mindoro declared bank-
ruptcy; this opened a way for the entry of Brewer into rice production
in the Solomon Islands. Brewer's involvement might have brought to an
end the long line of overseas experts and entrepreneurs who sought to
convert portions of the vast alluvial plains of Guadalcanal into rice
fields.

Rice in the Economy of the Solomon Islands

The importance of rice in the emerging economy of the Solomon Islands
is illustrated in figure 2. During the period from 1960 to 1983, rice
imports fluctuated generally within the range of 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes
per year. Over the most recent five years (1979–1983), the cost of these
imports averaged US$1.2 million annually. Increasing local demand for
rice after 1975 was met largely by dramatic increases in domestic pro-
duction to a 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes per year level during this same 1979–
1983 period. The importance of this rising domestic production in
import substitution is further illustrated in figure 2 by the decreasing
share of imported food spending given over to rice. From these statistics
it is evident that domestic rice production by 1980 was well on its way
in helping to meet the twin objectives of increasing national food self-
sufficiency and improving the negative balance of trade situation that
had plagued the economy throughout most of the post–World War II
years.

Rice first gained importance in the early 1900s as part of the weekly
ration to coconut plantation laborers mandated by the British Protec-
torate government. Lever wrote that "large quantities of rice were con-
sumed as this new item soon became a favourite of the plantation
labourer" (1973:30). The consumption of rice grew along with urban-
ization and general modernization of the Solomon Islands in the post–
World War II era, for within the urban environment people easily were
able to substitute readily available rice for the traditional sweet potato
staple. Unfortunately, while rice provides more calories per unit
weight, it is nutritionally inferior to sweet potatoes (British Solomon
Islands Protectorate 1974:11). But given its widespread acceptance, the
drain of import spending on the local economy, and the fact that the
Guadalcanal Plains were seen to be well suited for large-scale mechani-

FIGURE 2. Bottom: **Rice imports and domestic production, 1960–1983.**
Top: **Value of imported rice as a percentage of all food imports.** (Source:
British Solomon Islands Statistical Reports 1960–1978, *Solomon Islands Statistical Year-
books 1979–1984* [Honiara: Ministry of Finance].)

cal cultivation, the Protectorate government promoted and supported the attainment of self-sufficiency in rice production even before the war (see Shephard 1945 and Badcock 1946). This goal continued to receive the active support of politicians and other government officials long into the 1970s. For instance, in 1974 the Solomon Islands Committee on Food Supplies advocated the achievement of self-sufficiency in rice production by 1975 and toward that end recommended that the government should "be ready to act if necessary to protect the strategic aim of rice self-sufficiency" to the extent of "shareholding and a seat on the board [of the existing company] if necessary" (British Solomon Islands Protectorate 1974:29).

The first major rice crop grown on Guadalcanal Island was undertaken by the U.S. Army as part of a mixed farming enterprise to feed troops during World War II (British Solomon Islands Protectorate 1966). Immediately following the war the Protectorate government became directly involved in rice production when 200 hectares of unirrigated rice were planted under a 1945 agreement with the U.S. Army. Even then, officials saw the local market as being able to absorb 1,500 tons of rice per annum and sought to establish a large-scale mechanized production system. In the ensuing years, rice yields fluctuated widely (from 136 to 492 kilograms per hectare) due to problems ranging from insect pest infestation and a lack of labor, equipment, and supplies to bad weather, so that by the mid-1950s the government abandoned its efforts. Hence from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, rice imports increased from around 2,000 to 3,000 tons per year. Nonetheless, self-sufficiency in rice production remained a priority of government policy, in support of which studies were commissioned to further assess the rice-growing potential of that portion of the plain situated roughly between the Ngalimbiu and Mbalisuna rivers.

In a report issued in 1961, Ballantyne reasoned that the availability of water and "ease of cultivation combined with careful scientific experiment could transform the plain from a waste of coarse grass and war debris into a bulk provider of basic foodstuffs for men and stock" (1961:12). Notwithstanding this, he "strongly advised" that prospective rice growers await the results of two or three more years of experimentation.

In another site evaluation, Youll (1961) concluded that a system of two rice crops per year might not be possible due to limitations imposed by the long wet season and associated cloudiness that were disadvantageous for plant growth and seed production. Likewise, the wet soil would impede the operation of heavy mechanical equipment. He therefore calculated that if a single rice crop were grown each year, 800 hec-

tares would enable the Protectorate to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production. He further offered that rice could be seen as part of a mixed farming development on the Guadalcanal Plains.

The next major attempt at rice growing was undertaken by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), a quasi-governmental organization that was the investment arm of the British Commonwealth Secretariat. From 1963 to 1966, the CDC commissioned its own assessment of mechanized rice production at an abandoned government rice farm near Ilu. Once again the Protectorate government became involved by providing guarantees of irrigation water and partial financing of rice trials. In addition, the government assumed responsibility for supplying machines for hire by the CDC (Mulholland 1966). But the CDC soon abandoned rice growing in 1966. The Mulholland report, on which the CDC based its decision to abandon rice growing, had concluded that self-sufficiency in rice production seemed to be the most that should be aimed at since it was "unlikely that rice grown on a mechanized irrigated scheme can be produced to compete in world markets." Alternately, it suggested that the "natural resources of soil and climate may be better used in producing currency with which to purchase rice from areas with relatively low rice production costs" (ibid., app. 2:2).

In the meantime, the CDC continued to focus on the development of oil palm plantations—one of the crops for which trials were started in the early 1960s. The dazzling success of oil palm in the Solomon Islands (a joint venture: CDC 70 percent, government 26 percent, and local land owners 4 percent) is attested to by the fact that it has now superseded copra as the leading export crop with more than 3,600 hectares planted in 1984.

Despite the example set by the CDC, overseas-based commercial rice growing interests persisted, and in 1965 Guadalcanal Plains, Limited (GPL), was established by Australian interests. GPL commenced operations with a 12-hectare, unirrigated rice farm at Tetere and within five years expanded production to more than 1,000 hectares growing one crop annually. In 1971, GPL initiated irrigated rice production on 320 hectares at Matepono, taking water from the Mbalisuna River. Production averaged 2.5 crops per year, but soon the company was beset with problems not unlike those experienced by earlier rice growers. GPL eventually went into receivership and, in February 1975, Brewer acquired GPL's fixed assets for A$950,000, including the lease to a total of 4,000 hectares of land held by the Protectorate government, of which less than 400 hectares were in rice paddies.

Some of the more apparent lures for Brewer were a guaranteed local

market and an ever-growing local demand for rice, a developable regional market offering the potential for attaining economies of scale, and a cheap labor supply (SI$0.16–0.18 per hour minimum wage in 1976). Furthermore the company, like those before it, had the full cooperation of government, which insured that concessions considered reasonable and necessary would be made (*Solomon News Drum* 1975).

Brewer's Motivation for Entering the Solomon Islands

Brewer-Solomon Associates (BSA) was not spared the vicissitudes that had bedeviled prior operators. Nor were the environmental and general agronomic problems of rice production ignored in Brewer's preacquisition evaluation. Predictably, over the course of its tenure in the Solomon Islands the company experienced pest outbreaks, floods, windstorms, a labor strike, an earthquake that destroyed a rice drier, difficulty maintaining the heavy field equipment used, and tension with landowners. In addition, a growing environmental awareness among the population caused conflicts over the general health effects of possible contamination of waterways and subsistence field crops from aerial application of fertilizers and pesticides (*Pacific Islands Monthly* 1979). Yet the company was able to overcome these many problems: doing so was part of the challenge and necessary to reap the potential profit that motivated purchase of GPL in the first place.

For Brewer the purchase of GPL was justifiable as part of a grander corporate strategy within the multinational at the time. A prerequisite to understanding this strategy is an examination of Brewer's business environment and its position within that environment at the time. Brewer had gained its status as one of Hawaii's five largest corporations on the basis of wealth obtained from the production of sugar cane. By the early 1970s, however, it was clear that cane sugar was a declining industry in Hawaii and new directions were therefore being sought. Quite fortuitously for the company, windfall sugar profits were made in 1973 and a strategic decision was then made to aggressively diversify, using the earnings to acquire new businesses in anticipation of a fall in sugar prices. During the same period, one of the star earning performers within the Brewer portfolio was HAI. HAI sold mechanized sugar technology to developing economies, in the form of long-term management contracts. One of its most profitable contracts was in Iran, where HAI had amassed sizable investments. HAI was extremely successful but it, like its parent company, anticipated that earnings would suffer from a decline in world sugar prices. Therefore, HAI shared with Brewer the

need to diversify its portfolio, and the strategic decision was made to expand HAI's scope to include rice production expertise in its product offering in addition to sugar technology. Involvement in rice production made sense in that: (1) rice is a tropical crop, and HAI's expertise was centered on tropical agriculture; (2) most developing economies where developmental financing (including AID funding) was available to governments to pay for HAI's services were located in the tropics; and (3) it was expected that demand for rice would grow more rapidly than could be supplied within the tropics, considering that many of the traditional exporters of rice were losing ground and becoming importers. In short, there seemed to be an attractive market for rice technology that HAI could exploit if it had expertise in rice production.

Furthermore, about the same time (in 1974) Brewer became involved (jointly with Pacific Resources, Incorporated, of Hawaii) in the development of a $150-million rice-growing and milling complex for the Indonesian government at Palembang, Sumatra. In addition, nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific were beginning to invite HAI proposals for management contracts for rice projects. Given these opportunities, "The investment in Brewer Solomons Agriculture, Ltd., then, was really a Research and Development investment which would allow us to develop our expertise, and to create a model project for our prospective clients. Make no mistake about it; the profitability goal was still there. [That is,] we worked hard making a go of our Solomons investment on a stand-alone basis" (former BSA Manager, pers. com. 1985). But the question may still be asked why Brewer undertook to enter the Solomon Islands in view of their work in Indonesia. Obviously the Solomon Islands presented an opportunity for ownership and control of a development that was in keeping with the new corporate objective of internationalization and expansion in diversified agricultural production.

Brewer's Tenure in the Solomon Islands

BSA began optimistically in 1975 with an announcement in August from Brewer's headquarters in Honolulu that the Solomon Islands operation "currently is expanding its rice production from 400 to 2,000 hectares and building a new rice drying and milling facility" (Brewer 1975). BSA's bullishness was partly due to the opinion that the operation had failed so far only for lack of skilled management and the use of machinery and insecticides to control insect pests (British Solomon Islands Protectorate 1966).

In 1977 Brewer was able to report that revenue from its "10,000 acre rice [4,000 hectares], livestock and poultry estate under development had increased 34 percent as a result of additional cultivated acreage and a 20 percent improvement in yields per acre" (Brewer 1977:4). However, the company reported experiencing operating losses reflecting "development costs associated with expansion and fixed operating costs of a new rice mill constructed to process the much larger crop planned for future years" (ibid.). This optimism was reflected in the size of the factory, designed to produce 70 tonnes of polished rice per day. Continuing to look to the future in the Solomon Islands, in 1978 Brewer issued a report stating that much of its land there was being used as a cattle ranch, 1,000 hectares were in paddy rice, less than 160 hectares were in coconuts, and that there were also a piggery, a poultry farm at the project site, and a general store—the Mendana self-service store in Honiara. But, despite this diversification, much of Brewer's hopes for market success hinged on expanding rice production to accommodate the rapidly growing Solomon Islands market (where, according to the company, consumption had jumped from about 3,000 tonnes in 1975 to 6,500 tonnes in 1978) and to allow for "substantial exports" (Lim–Chan 1978). BSA eventually was able to increase its market share from 35 to 80 percent of local demand by breeding rice varieties that matched, as nearly as possible, the taste characteristics of imported Australian rice.

Despite these successes, HAI sought to share ownership of BSA with the government. By late 1978 the newly independent Solomon Islands government announced that it had acquired ownership of 45 percent of BSA's shares at an investment of $3 million. A new entity was formed under the name of Brewer Solomons Agriculture, Limited (BSAL). Financing this move was an independence loan from the departing British Protectorate government. The new government's involvement in the rice project could be seen as serving a range of national development objectives. Such objectives, stated in the Government Shareholding Agency Ordinance of 1977, were: furthering economic development; the promotion of agricultural and industrial expansion and efficiency; and the provision, maintenance, or safeguarding of employment. To carry out these objectives, the ordinance empowered the Government Shareholding Agency (GSA) to form partnerships with corporations and individuals and to acquire no more than 49 percent of the share capital of any corporation. The GSA ordinance enabled HAI to successfully solicit Solomon Islands investment in BSAL. In doing so, HAI found a partner that it felt could share the risks of undertaking this project,

which was marginal to HAI and to Brewer. However, HAI retained management control of the project so that it could still be used in support of HAI's global marketing strategy.

Like Brewer, the Solomon Islands government anticipated that once the refurbished farm was in full operation it would produce at least 15,000 tons of polished rice a year. Of that quantity, 10,000 tons would be earmarked for export with the remainder for local consumption. Furthermore, rice sold for local consumption would be subject to control to insure that prices were lower than for imported varieties. Efforts payed off somewhat: by 1980 the export of rice and rice products contributed A$1.51 million to the local economy. However, in 1981 BSAL was hit by rapidly rising costs in the battle against the main pest of irrigated rice—the brown plant hopper *(Nilaparvata lugens stal.)* that can cause considerable damage (hopper burn) and consequent loss of yield. In that same year, the company also experienced a sharp increase in regional market competition arising from a drop in the selling price of rice by Australian and American suppliers. By February 1982 BSAL had stopped exporting rice and in the same year Brewer transferred full ownership of the joint venture to the Solomon Islands government for US$1.

Brewer's decision to withdraw from rice production in the Solomon Islands must, in part, be attributed to lower levels of profit than the corporate decision makers were prepared to tolerate. Factors contributing to this were too small an acreage farmed to render cost effective the high-priced technology used; entomological problems possibly related to continuous cropping of the paddies, which provided no fallow time for pest populations to die off; and some lingering consumer preference, locally and throughout the region, for Australian or American varieties over locally grown rice (Hutton 1980). However, much more important in Brewer's decision to pull out of the Solomon Islands than this litany of admittedly adverse factors were unpredictable sociopolitical factors, which negatively impacted on the unique Brewer strategy for corporate viability as a tropical agribusiness management consulting firm. As I argue below, the failure of the joint venture was related more to the dynamics of the global political-economic system, in which Brewer itself lost control by the late 1970s, than to the lack of profitability of the operating entity in the Solomon Islands.

In the case of Brewer, a growing internationalization and increasing complexity did not bring stability. Rather, Brewer lost its decision-making autonomy and it lost major overseas assets as a consequence of its

risk taking, growth, and development. These changing circumstances contributed directly and, perhaps, indirectly to the divestment of BSAL.

The first set of factors, which can only be weakly linked with the failure of the BSAL joint venture, relates to the take-over of Brewer by a larger U.S. multinational firm, IU International. Brewer's success in general, and its vast Hawaii real estate assets in particular (which were carried at a relatively low book value), made it the target of several take-over attempts by IU. IU had gained a 54.8 percent controlling interest in Brewer in 1969 and succeeded in a full merger by 1978.

IU International is a diversified multinational company whose total assets were given as US\$2,793.5 million in 1978 (Brewer's total assets were valued at US\$257.6 million in 1977). IU is chiefly engaged in shipping, land transportation, utilities, and marketing of industrial products and services. During the 1970s IU had evolved from a company with a large number of small businesses into a company with a small number of large businesses. It was thus altered from a corporation with forty subsidiaries in twelve markets to one with fifteen subsidiaries in five major markets (IU International 1979). In effect, IU had divested itself of subsidiaries that were underperforming or were incompatible with corporate goals. It was during this time, when corporate strategy was emphasizing concentration of production and decision making, that Brewer was acquired in full. In contrast, Brewer was then in an expansionary phase of corporate development. This meant the strategic objectives of the two entities were not synchronous and the smaller, less powerful company therefore had to forfeit much decision-making autonomy to its new, larger parent company. IU's corporate plans were intimated in 1979 when it was concluded that the long-term potential for Brewer rested largely with businesses other than sugar and with the upgrading of sugar cane acreage and other Hawaii landholdings to "higher-value"—that is, residential, commercial, and industrial—uses (IU International 1983). Systematic divestment of Brewer's subsidiaries and sale of real estate followed with the latter providing a major part of subsequent earnings. (The value of land sales remained on the order of US\$18 million per annum from 1980 to 1983). These changing forces were beyond the control of Brewer and they boded ill for the future of rice production in the Solomon Islands. Additionally if, as Lindquist has found, "only those firms which pursue a consistent, long-term policy of product diversification have a high probability of joint venture survival" (1972:86), then the Brewer/Solomon Islands arrangement was incompatible with the more mature organizational stage of IU, which

was undergoing divestment and concentration. According to this theory, therefore, IU's merger with Brewer could have meant that the joint venture in the Solomon Islands would eventually fail.

The second and crucial set of factors underlying Brewer's disengagement from the Solomon Islands joint venture was caused primarily by the 1978 Iranian revolution and, to some extent, by HAI's loss of the large Indonesian rice contract at Palembang, Sumatra. HAI had several large contracts in Iran and a very large Iranian government receivables exposure when the political turmoil began in 1978. Given the antagonistic posture of the new leadership toward the U.S. at that time, the prospects of an American company collecting on its Iranian government receivables were considered very poor. To recoup some of its losses, Brewer sold the management consulting portion of HAI to Lebanese interests who had some hope of collecting payment from Iran. In breaking up HAI, Brewer's grand strategy or raison d'être for the Solomon Islands rice project disappeared. Subsequently, the rice project was evaluated as an independent profit center and was unble to meet new performance criteria established by Brewer. A key factor was the payment of substantial management fees to the new owners of HAI in return for which HAI gave no services to BSAL, an arrangement included in the terms of the sale of HAI. This new cost burden, added to the preexisting problems of small scale, technology, entomology, and agronomy already mentioned, rendered the venture nonviable from Brewer's point of view. Therefore the decision was made to abandon the project altogether.

Essentially then, the Solomon Islands was a victim of Brewer's attempt to minimize losses from its much larger assets in Iran. Brewer sacrificed the more peripheral rice project by consenting to have BSAL pay HAI's new owners excessive annual payments, without which, in the opinion of the then BSAL manager, the rice project would have been able to survive and ultimately prosper (pers. com. 1985).

Impact of Brewer's Withdrawal

Brewer's termination of activities could not have been a happy event for the Solomon Islands—not only because rice has always been perceived as one of the building blocks of economic development, but also because rice has long been a political issue. As the first joint venture undertaken by the newly independent nation, success would have provided reassurance of the wisdom of the policy being pursued quite apart from any other benefits, direct and indirect.

At the most fundamental level, the management expertise for which the government had paid departed when Brewer did. As a consequence, by late 1982 the government had cut back the plantation from 1,600 to 1,000 hectares and was having serious problems with cultivation, in part because of the lack of specialized labor.

In 1984 the Solomons Rice Company (SRC), the newly renamed, fully government-owned rice operation, had a monopoly on rice supply within the country. SRC's strategy was to import unmilled Australian and Thai rice to overcome increasing local production shortfalls. A sad end to the saga of large-scale rice farming came in May 1986 when the rice farm and mill were severely damaged by a cyclone that devastated much of Guadalcanal. With almost uncontrollable levels of insect attack and persistently low yields against the small-scale, high-cost production, it was only a matter of a short time anyway before the company would have been forced to close down completely (GSA manager, pers. com. 1986).

Implications

Three main sets of implications are derived from this investigation. The first relates to environmental factors and the selection of appropriate technology. The second concerns the impact of joint ventures in Third World economic development, and the third points to the pervasiveness of the international political-economic system and the vulnerability of small states.

The Solomon Islands experience with commercial rice growing indicates that there may well be several physical environmental factors that cannot be ignored in the choice of technology or system of rice farming. It is apparent that the local climate may severely limit the number of paddy crops that can be grown each year. Without a fallow period, pest populations not only reduce yields but also, perhaps, affect the healthfulness of the local human population in that habitats are provided for disease-bearing pests like mosquitoes (malaria is pandemic in the Solomon Islands). Rather than abandoning large-scale rice production, however, it might be worth investigating the economic feasibility of dry (rain-fed) production or rotating rice with another food crop. Furthermore, since rice is now widely accepted among Solomon Islanders, its production may be successfully carried out on smallholder farms within an overarching cooperative organization. Such a strategy would be in keeping with the recommendation of the World Bank, which found that "if the benefits from large-scale enterprises are to be maximized,

smallholder developments should be linked with estate and plantation developments wherever feasible" (World Bank 1979). Still, the management expertise and initial capital required for this more complex arrangement could become a major hindrance to the development of such an alternative.

The most important implication for economic development has to do with the joint venture policy that is widely pursued by governments to augment national resources, improve allocation of existing resources, and transfer foreign skills to nationals. There is no doubt that for the Solomon Islands and other small island nations in the Pacific and Caribbean this route to economic development offers much hope for national advancement (see Weigel 1976). The joint venture rice scheme left the government with the management of an operation it was, perhaps, not prepared nor equipped to undertake. Nevertheless, the Solomon Islands experience with joint ventures has generally been positive from an economic standpoint. Joint ventures entered into by the Solomon Islands government with overseas investors have permitted a significant degree of diversification of the local economic base away from almost-complete reliance on copra in the 1960s to include fish, palm oil, timber, and cocoa at present. Clearly, certain costs accompany these benefits. For instance, Meltzoff, in her discussion of the Solomon Islands/Taiyo (Japanese) joint venture fishing industry (1983), argues that, while there have been blunt monetary gains, there has been no localization of management positions within the industry so workers perceive the joint venture as a continuation of the old-time plantation system, essentially no better or no worse than migratory labor has ever been. This situation is now being remedied by government localization policy, evidenced in a recent manpower training plan issued by Solomon Taiyo Limited (n.d.). Likewise, Meltzoff finds that there has been no true transfer of technology in the sense of increased mastery over modern equipment. The reason is that, as with the Brewer project, neither the technology nor the training fills the existing needs within the country. Other writers have pointed out a major disadvantage of joint ventures as being the system of transfer payments involving intrafirm sales, which disadvantage the host country (Winkler 1982 and Weigel 1976). Simple examples of this were the purchase of tractors and fertilizers by BSAL through HAI, thereby incurring additional costs as payment to the intermediary company, and HAI's continuing demand for management fees even when no service was being provided.

Even more disconcerting is the brutal reality that national economic development necessarily entails incorporation into a wider economic

system through association with multinational corporations in a process that benefits the large and powerful business organizations and their home countries more than the host countries. But the fact that Brewer was unable to forestall its own demise arising from changes in the Iranian government or even in its relationship with the larger multinational, IU International, highlights the even more vulnerable position of countries like the Solomon Islands. Clearly, the advantages to Brewer produced by the joint venture arrangement were inadequate to counter the disadvantages of carrying BSAL within the altered corporate structure.

Since joint ventures with multinational firms are indeed one way for capital- and technology-poor nations to attain national development goals, how then might the risks be minimized? Clearly, because of intrafirm and international linkages, all firms exist in an uncertain business environment. Therefore the best that can be hoped for is that joint ventures do not leave poor countries with sunk costs due either to project abandonment or to irretrievable losses arising from the unequal power position or a lack of common purpose. It is important that the observation made by Lindquist (1972:86) that "only those firms which pursue a consistent, long-term policy of product diversification have a high probability of joint venture survival" be equally applied to political units when constituting their investment portfolios. The important lesson of this case, though not new, deserves underscoring. It is that risks are a part of doing business in an increasingly interlinked global economic system. The attendant vulnerability dictates that countries cautiously diversify their economies in the hope of acquiring some degree of resiliency.

Conclusion

The joint venture described here represents a partnership of entities that, to a certain degree, had divergent goals for the project undertaken. Hence certain perceived advantages of the joint venture to the overseas partner quickly vanished when the relative importance of the Solomon Islands rice project was altered under the changed corporate structure accompanying Brewer's sale of HAI. It was a sale precipitated by political events affecting Brewer's operating units in Iran and the consequences were also felt in the Solomon Islands. The consequences included sunk costs to the Solomon Islands as represented in reduced scale of the rice farm and dashed hopes, at least for the present, of self-sufficiency in rice production. The circumstances causing these out-

comes are seen to be produced by sociopolitical and economic processes that provide an understanding of the inner workings of dependent development. It is also obvious from this study that these processes are more easily manipulated by large, powerful corporations than by small companies or poor, underdeveloped nations.

Further conclusion can be made regarding appropriate methodology for building an understanding of factors that promote or hinder Third World development. The study illustrates well the point made by Taylor that business entities "are the arenas within which internal structural pressures and external environmental contingencies come face-to-face to influence investment decision-making and, ultimately, the flow of funds within and between different parts of the capitalist system" (1984:178). Clearly then, in order to properly understand the geographical transfer of value that contributes to uneven economic development between nations situated at the core and periphery of the global economic system, it is necessary to focus on the individual business organization.

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CONFLICT FORMAL AND INFORMAL:
ELECTIONS IN NEW CALEDONIA, 1984–1986

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Introduction

In a 1983 account of the evolution of the contemporary political situation in New Caledonia, I concluded in part that, at the beginning of the 1980s, the way ahead for the Melanesian or Kanak independence movement lay along one of three strategic paths: (1) the internationalization of the Kanak cause, particularly in the southwest Pacific region; (2) Kanak withdrawal from participation in established democratic institutions into some form of grass-roots ethnopolitics; or (3) the adoption of nondemocratic militancy, including political terrorism.[1]

In the intervening years, resort has been made—at different times and to varying degrees—to all three approachs. In more recent years this Kanak radicalization has no less predictably engendered responses of violence and political extremism among the non-Melanesian majority of the Caledonian population, a majority which includes Europeans, Polynesians, Wallisians, and Vietnamese.

Fundamental to the territory's painful emergence into a durably redefined future remained—in 1986 no less than in 1980—a triangular power struggle. On one side was the Kanak independence movement, on another the non-Melanesian electoral majority opposed to independence, while the third side was occupied by a metropolitan France keen

both to preserve its strategic and potential economic interests in the South Pacific, and to promote civil order and socioeconomic justice within New Caledonia.

This present essay offers a paradoxical sequel to my previous report. It is a sequel in that it renews, in more elaborate fashion, the presentation, analysis, and interpretation of recent elections in New Caledonia. This time electoral developments between late 1984 and mid-1986 are examined. The paradox lies in the effectiveness and inescapability of the electoral dimension that this study finds underscored by Caledonia's recent unruly political experience. For all its limitations in terms of social divisiveness, the formal conflict of elections here emerges as not merely preferable to but also more effective than the informal conflict of civil disruption, political extremism, and violence.

Militancy and the Electoral Dimension, 1984–1986

If the extent of international media coverage offered a pro rata guarantee of a country's fortunes, New Caledonia would today be set fair for a promising future. Certainly the several months of occasionally intense, more usually sporadic disruptions—roadblocks and demonstrations, arson, bomb attacks and other forms of localized terrorism, occupations of land, politically motivated killings, and industrial sabotage—of the territory's political life consequent on the "active boycott" by the FLNKS[2] of the 1984 Territorial Assembly elections ensured that the Caledonian crisis, albeit only in its gross terms, became familiar as never before throughout the South Pacific and beyond.

It could be argued that the radicalized activist strategies pursued by the FLNKS since October 1984 were both inevitable in the circumstances and, as things have turned out to date, profitable to the Melanesian independence cause. According to this argument, the vehement revolt of the FLNKS from late 1984 on at the very least advanced the date of a self-determination referendum from 1989 (as proposed in the 1984 Lemoine Statute) to 1987 (as in the 1985 Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, currently still in force). Moreover the noisy, embarrassing, and costly pressure applied by the FLNKS compelled the Socialist government in Paris to accord a higher priority to Caledonian affairs, to dispatch (in December 1984) Edgar Pisani as special government delegate for New Caledonia, and to produce in a matter of months the heavily regionalized form of territorial government over which the FLNKS has exercised a form of majority control since October 1985.

According to this line of interpretation, if militancy does not yet entirely rule in New Caledonia, it certainly pays. Indeed it pays so well that by April 1986 the president of the FLNKS, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, saw no paradox or inconsistency in warning the recently installed French government of Jacques Chirac against dismantling the regionalized institutions.[3] The FLNKS was now determined, Tjibaou claimed, to work within them to achieve its independence goals. In objective alliance until March 1986[4] with François Mitterrand and the Socialist government, "immense progress" had been made toward independence, according to Tjibaou.

Given the repeatedly asserted nonnegotiable nature of the FLNKS's commitment to Kanak sovereignty and to an independence based on it, Tjibaou's position in the aftermath of the 1986 French legislative elections was as coherent as it was predictable. Only when such positions, and such radical strategies as those adopted by most of the independence movement over the last couple of years, are examined in a perspective of electoral democracy do their consistency—not to mention their long-term effectiveness—appear more suspect. To take one obvious example: after previously (in 1984–1985) disrupting elections and the working of institutions of which it disapproved, the FLNKS executed an about-face in order to participate in the 1985 regional elections and to win control of three of the four regional councils at stake. This hardly qualified the FLNKS—a minority political alliance within the territory—to instruct the freshly legitimated metropolitan government of Jacques Chirac in what institutional reforms it may or may not in its turn seek to introduce by constitutional means.

The pro-independence side frequently asserted that the sovereignty of the indigenous Kanak people stands supreme. So why, since October 1985, has the FLNKS elected to exercise that sovereignty within a regionalized institutional framework that has been legitimized and established by the workings of French parliamentary democracy? One answer, of course, is that the FLNKS, then and still, thought it was in its political interest to do so. And, in the short run, it may have been.

However, seen from a formal democratic—and, coincidentally, anti-independence—perspective, the FLNKS has simply been playing fast and loose with the electoral system since 1984, now exploiting that system's potential to advance the independence cause, now rejecting it and disrupting its normal workings. In doing so the FLNKS have intermittently been aided and abetted by a Socialist metropolitan government that consistently showed itself to be sympathetic to the ethnic and socioeconomic legitimacy of the FLNKS's cause, while unable to cir-

cumvent entirely the electoral and democratic shortcomings of that same cause.

Such comments do not in any way imply that the FLNKS's political opponents have been less given to partisan exploitation of the electoral and constitutional system. Far from it. For the last several years, the conservative parties hostile to independence from France—RPCR and FN[5]—have insistently demanded that an immediate territorial self-determination referendum be held in New Caledonia. In doing so, they righteously drape themselves in the flag of French republican democracy: "Let the Caledonian people—all ethnic groups together—speak!" The Socialist administration in Paris and the FLNKS have been at one in resisting such calls.

In making these demands the RPCR and the FN have been justifiably confident that, given the current ethnic mix of the Caledonian electorate,[6] any such self-determination vote would at present come down firmly against independence. It is moreover arguable that exploitation of this formal electoral strength has, in practice, enabled the RPCR and the FN to ignore Kanak claims to sovereignty and to neglect crying needs for ethnically, territorially, and regionally balanced social and economic development.

On the other hand the anti-independence parties have, unlike the FLNKS, invariably played by the rules of the electoral game—even when those rules had manifestly been designed to disadvantage them, as was the case with 1985 regional elections. What is involved here is not the maintenance for its own sake of a formally irreproachable democratic track record. In societies at critical stages of political evolution, majority forces doubtless always find this is an easier task to accomplish than do their minority opponents.

Rather, what is important to note at this stage is the permanent character and—short of protracted civil conflict—the stark unavoidability of the electoral dimension in the resolution of New Caledonia's future. After the storm and fury of the first half of 1985, it was (the regional) elections that redefined and restored administrative normality—in however provisional a form. More significantly, to date all sides—FLNKS, RPCR, and Paris—remain in broad agreement to abide by the verdict of the self-determination referendum that by law must be held before the end of 1987.

In late April 1986, the Chirac government announced its intention to advance the date of this referendum, which should now take place in July-August 1987. Paris probably did so in part in the optimistic hope of reaching a definitive settlement of the Caledonian issue well before the

1988 French presidential elections. In any case the adjustment was of secondary significance since the electoral hurdle remains to be cleared by the FLNKS. Durably central to this issue is the fact that France—whether metropolitan or overseas—is a country wedded to a written constitution. In consequence, and however wrong-headed to external eyes it may appear at times, the nation's political system lays heavy store in formally strict respect for the constitutionally elaborated mechanisms of the electoral process.

In recent years the essentially moral case of the FLNKS, the positions adopted by the South Pacific Forum and by other organized expressions of South Pacific opinion, internal territorial development policies, and even in some respects the elaboration of wider French strategic policies within the Pacific Basin have all been subordinated to, or at least conditioned by, the constraints of this process. Between 1981 and 1986, even the Mitterrand government—avowedly sympathetic to Melanesian complaints of ethnic and economic injustice—never veered from its constitutionally unavoidable commitment to self-determination for New Caledonia, which was to be decided by a comprehensively multi-ethnic vote of the territorial electorate as a whole. The conservative and nationalist parties of the French Right (RPR, UDF, and FN in France;[7] RPCR and FN in New Caledonia) spent the same period in rigid, ungenerous, and unimaginative adherence to the letter of the law. When late in 1984 the FLNKS saw fit to smash ballot boxes and set up roadblocks, the unbendingly juridical approach of the Right appeared to be merely confirmed. By their political activism the pro-independence parties had, in RPCR and RPR eyes at least, become "outlaws."

The 1986 legislative elections brought the RPR and the UDF to parliamentary power in France, displacing the Socialists from government, if not from the presidency of the French Republic. At present (June 1986), policy changes concerning New Caledonia are proceeding through the metropolitan legislative pipeline; their definitive content and impact remain in consequence unknown. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Chirac government will adopt a sympathetic view of any attempt by the FLNKS to avoid, still less to disrupt, the workings and the consequences of the electoral process.

More strikingly—as indicated by the following review of elections in New Caledonia during 1984–1986—a single, durable, clearly effective attitude toward electoral participation has yet to be developed by the FLNKS as a whole. Such relative incoherence has by no means invariably benefited the pro-independence cause. If persisted in, it augurs ill for any post-independence Caledonian political future.

The Lemoine Statute, 1984

"A sort of syncretism of the two civilizations, European and Melanesian" was the philosophically elevated nub of what the Socialist government intended to achieve in New Caledonia by its new territorial statute, adopted by the French Parliament at the end of July 1984.[8] This Lemoine Statute was to be implemented in accordance with the outcome of the Territorial Assembly elections held on 18 November 1984.

The statute represented the Socialist government's translation into legislative terms of the convergence of views that had emerged from the historic roundtable talks held at Nainville-les-Roches, south of Paris, in July 1983. Attended by Caledonian leaders, European and Melanesian alike, these talks had recognized the "innate and active right" of the Kanak people to independence, an independence to be achieved by a process of self-determination in accord with the French Constitution and open to all ethnic groups in New Caledonia. The 1984 statute was to be transitional in character. It was to prepare the institutional, political, and economic way for a self-determination referendum, to be held most probably at the end of the new Territorial Assembly's normal five-year term in 1989.[9]

The main lines of the Lemoine Statute offered an imaginative amalgam of the well-tried and the innovative. The statute advanced further along the path trod by previous, conservative metropolitan administrations by further expanding the scope of territorial administrative autonomy and by placing internal executive authority—and responsibility—entirely in the hands of the president of the territorial government, who would be elected by the members of the Territorial Assembly.

At the same time, a concerted attempt was made to integrate Melanesian custom authorities into the administrative and developmental process. Each of six traditional *pays* (regions) was to have its own Melanesian custom council. A consultative Regional Assembly (Assemblée des pays) made up of local councillors and custom authority representatives was to be established. (These moves have since proved particularly significant in that their twin underlying principles—Melanesianization and regionalization—were later incorporated in the 1985 Pisani Interim Statute and were therefore still in force as of 1986.) Finally, a joint state-territory committee *(comité Etat-territoire)* was to be charged with preparing the terms and conditions of the self-determination referendum.

The wisdom and fundamental moderation of the Lemoine Statute

were underlined by the rapidity and firmness with which both principal political blocs—in particular the minority extremes within these blocks—rejected it. For the RPCR and the FN, Lemoine's proposals went too far, both in imposing (rather than merely allowing) the territorial self-determination process and in granting unrepublican, discriminatory institutional recognition to a particular ethnic group, the Melanesians. (Why not set up Polynesian councils too, or Indonesian, or Vietnamese?)

No less predictably, the pro-independence groups found the Lemoine Statute inversely inadequate. It postponed independence for far too long: by August 1984, Tjibaou had "fixed" the date for independence at 1985.[10] A self-determination referendum implied the possibility of alternatives to independence and therefore no commitment to guarantee exclusively Kanak sovereignty. The statute contained no formal commitment to a reform of the electoral system that would effectively ensure a Melanesian majority in the electorate.

Territorial Assembly Elections, November 1984

Territorial Assembly (TA) elections were nevertheless set for November. There was never any question that, for all their criticisms, the anti-independence parties would participate. In direct contrast, the pro-independence parties split on the issue. On 28 July 1984 an extraordinary convention of the FI[11] decided both to boycott and to obstruct the TA elections, and to withdraw the Front's participation in territorial institutions.

This decision constituted a major shift in strategy. Since June 1982, the FI had not only participated in government, it had actually exercised majority control over the Government Council (Conseil de gouvernement), with Tjibaou as vice-president and head of the Caledonian executive body. Division and incoherence resulted from the strategy shift. A constituent party of the FI, the LKS[12] of Nidoish Naisseline, rejected the new line and decided to present its own candidates for election. The LKS has since regularly attacked the FI/FLNKS's nonparticipatory radicalization, insisting rather on the necessity to first develop the structural and economic content of Kanak independence.

As it was, the FI saw no inconsistency between its new policy stance (symbolized by sending delegates to Libya in August 1984) and its continued participation in the Government Council until within a week of the TA elections. The FI combined with PALIKA to found the FLNKS (Constituent Congress, 22–24 September 1984), which in turn went on

to institute the (non-elected) provisional government of Kanaky (1 December 1984).

Given these positions adopted by the FLNKS, the results of the 1986 TA elections contained few surprises (see tables A and B). The "active boycott" organized by the FLNKS produced a high abstention rate:

TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 18 NOVEMBER 1984

TABLE A Global Results

Registered voters	79,291		
Votes cast	39,735		
Turnout	50.13%		
Valid votes	39,296		

Parties	Votes	% of Valid Votes	Seats in New TA
RPCR	27,851	70.87%	34
FN	2,379	6.05%	1
LKS	2,879	7.33%	6
FNSC	1,748	4.45%	1
7 minor parties	4,439	11.29%	0

TABLE B Results by Electoral District

	South (includes Nouméa)	West Coast	East Coast	Loyalty Islands
Registered voters	40,894	15,766	12,507	10,104
Votes cast	27,641	7,561	2,391	2,142
Turnout	67.59%	47.96%	19.12%	21.20%
Valid votes	27,330	7,485	2,350	2,131
Major Parties				
RPCR	19,685	5,611	1,537	1,018
FN	1,838	376	165	—
LKS	1,074	335	425	1,045
FNSC	902	739	92	15

Seats in Territorial Assembly

South (17 seats): 16 RPCR, 1 FN.
West Coast (9 seats): 8 RPCR, 1 FNSC.
East Coast (9 seats): 7 RPCR, 2 LKS.
Loyalty Islands (7 seats): 4 LKS, 3 RPCR.

49.87 percent on average, reaching virtually 80 percent in the predominantly Melanesian electoral districts of the East Coast and the Loyalty Islands. The largely non-Melanesian anti-independence vote emerged both inflated and radicalized. At 4.45 percent of the vote, support for the moderate FNSC had shrunk heavily from the 17.82 percent gained in the preceding TA elections in 1979.[13] In contrast, proportional support for the RPCR increased massively, from 40.24 percent of the vote in 1979 to 70.87 percent this time. The participatory LKS tripled its number of seats to six in the new TA, although the party was clearly able to offer only formal rather than effective opposition to the absolute majority controlled by the RCPR. (In May 1985 the six LKS councillors resigned from the TA.) LKS support, moreover, was heavily localized, with 36 percent of its total vote and half of its TA seats coming from the Loyalty Islands (where party leader Naisseline is custom chief on Maré, the southernmost of the Loyalties).

If the RCPR's electoral victory was impeccable in formal democratic terms, politically it soon proved to be an artificial affair. The informal representativity of the FLNKS had been demonstrated, however illegitimately, by the abstention rate and by the relatively successful disruption of the TA elections.

The Pisani/Fabius Statute, 1985

As roadblocks, land occupations, and other forms of disruption continued from November 1984 into the following year, it became evident that the FLNKS had succeeded in preventing the implementation of the Lemoine Statute. This was recognized by the Second Congress of the FLNKS (at Nakéty, 9 February 1985), which hardened the movement's militant line, opting to maintain destabilizing tactics to exert pressure on the French metropolitan authorities while negotiating guarantees for Kanak objectives.

This aggressive approach met with mixed success. On the one hand Pisani's initial proposal, effectively to accede to FLNKS demands by holding a self-determination vote at the much earlier date of July 1985, was eventually rejected by Paris. And the formula of Caledonian "independence-in-association" with France that underlay the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, which became law in August 1985, was scarcely compatible with hard-line Kanak calls for untrammeled sovereignty. Also objectionable were the modernization and extension of French strategic military installations in New Caledonia that, at Mitterrand's initiative, the interim statute also included.

On the other hand, the interim statute did contain sufficient electoral and economic substance to warrant critical acceptance by the FLNKS (at its Third Congress, at Hienghène, 25–26 May 1985). This relative return to pragmatism was, on the face of things, understandable. The statute offered the creation of four socioeconomically autonomous regions combined with a form of proportional representation engineered (or, as critics said, gerrymandered) to favor rural, largely Melanesian Caledonia (see figure 1). Furthermore, development contracts negotiated directly between each region and Paris would effectively short-circuit the new territorial assembly (to be known as the Congress) that would be dominated by non-Melanesian conservative opponents of independence.

In fact, the constituent parties of the FLNKS were far from unanimous in their attitude to the Pisani/Fabius Statute. The FULK, led by Yann Céléné Uregei, for example, initially rejected it "totally": the

FIGURE 1. The four regions established under the 1985 Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, showing the percentage of Melanesian population within each municipal district. Region 1: North; 2: Centre; 3: Loyalty Islands; 4: South (includes Nouméa).

party congress (at Tibarama, 19 May 1985) voted not to participate in the upcoming regional elections. The other minority components of the FLNKS—PALIKA, UPM, PSK—shared FULKS's logical reluctance to return to a strategy of electoral and institutional participation the rejection of which had been the raison d'être of the FLNKS at its inception less than a year earlier. Nevertheless, the political and financial weight of Tjibaou's UC majority prevailed a week later at the FLNKS's Hienghène congress.[14] As in other policy areas, the FLNKS remained far from united in its commitment to electoral procedures: similar dissension arose early in 1986 over the FLNKS's participation in the 1986 legislative elections.

Regional Elections, September 1985

The firmly policed regional elections (29 September 1985) produced the results intended by the Pisani/Fabius Statute (see tables C and D). At 80.62 percent, voter turnout was the highest recorded in the territory's history. The representativeness of the FLNKS among Melanesian voters was demonstrated beyond dispute: 59.6 percent and 52 percent of the vote in the North and the Loyalty Islands respectively. Centrist or moderate alternative formations (the OPAO,[15] led by J.-P. Aifa, and the participatory LKS) were eliminated or marginalized. Opponents of independence retained a firm majority, with 60.85 percent of the territorial vote (RCPR plus FN plus RPC,[16] allied to RPCR). The total pro-independence vote of 35.19 percent (FLNKS plus LKS) had increased by just 0.76 percent over the FI's 34.43 percent in the 1979 TA elections. The issue of electoral eligibility for the 1987 self-determination referendum was implicitly posed.

Ethnic bipolarization—Melanesian against non-Melanesian—over the independence question was accentuated more sharply than ever. But the election's institutional consequences appeared oddly skewed: with only 28.76 percent of the territorial vote, the FLNKS now controlled three of the four economically powerful regional councils. The potential for triangular institutional conflict among the Congress (dominated by the RPCR), the regional councils, and the Paris authorities (whether socialist or, as since March 1986, the liberal conservative RPR of Chirac) appeared evident.

Inconsistency and internal dissension have characterized the subsequent workings of the FLNKS. The principle of proportional representation that produced its extensive regional control in the elections of September 1985 had, by November, been rejected by its minority mem-

REGIONAL ELECTIONS, 29 SEPTEMBER 1985

TABLE C **Global Results**

Registered voters	89,906		
Votes cast	72,483		
Turnout	80.62%		
Valid votes	71,441		

Parties	Votes	% of Valid Votes	Seats in New Congress
RPCR	37,148	52.00%	25
FLNKS	20,545	28.76%	16
LKS	4,594	6.43%	1
OPAO	2,317	3.24%	0
FN	5,263	7.37%	3
RPC	1,058	1.48%	1
CN	516	0.72%	0

TABLE D **Results by Regions**

	South (includes Nouméa)	North	Centre	Loyalty Islands
Registered voters	48,683	15,157	14,260	11,806
Votes cast	37,975	12,462	12,061	9,985
Turnout	78.00%	82.22%	84.58%	85.58%
Valid votes	37,689	12,386	11,951	9,415
Parties				
RPCR	26,615	2,890	5,003	2,640
FLNKS	2,820	7,383	5,434	4,908
LKS	1,230	709	788	1,867
OPAO	1,245	346	726	—
FN	5,263	—	—	—
RPC	—	1,058	—	—
CN	516	—	—	—

Seats in Regional Councils

South (21 seats): 17 RPCR, 3 FN, 1 FLNKS.
North (9 seats): 6 FLNKS, 2 RPCR, 1 RPC.
Centre (9 seats): 5 FLNKS, 4 RPCR.
Loyalty Islands (7 seats): 4 FLNKS, 2 RPCR, 1 LKS.

bers as the basis for internal power sharing *within* the FLNKS. Against the wishes of the majority UC, the Fourth Congress of the FLNKS (at Oundjo, 16–18 November 1985) decided to retain equal representation for all six component parties of its political bureau.

More recent efforts made by the UC to promote participatory moderation and the economic construction of Melanesian independence through the autonomous development of the regions now under the FLNKS's control have enjoyed mixed fortunes. In early January 1986 the UC formally disassociated itself from the views of Yann Céléné Uregei (president of FULK) on relations with Libya. In mid-March, the political bureau of the FLNKS suspended Uregei from his position as minister of external relations in the provisional government of Kanaky over the same issue: Uregei had persisted in attending a conference of world liberation movements in Tripoli. FULK and UPM have since shown signs of intending to promote their priority, the militant struggle for political power, over the UC's preference for electoral participation and autonomous regionalized economic development. While both minority components can scarcely afford to break with the FLNKS, it is hard to see how FULK in particular can avoid a far-reaching clash of strategy with the UC, a clash that could manifest itself as a struggle between Tjibaou and Uregei for the leadership of the FLNKS.

Legislative Elections, March 1986

Over the question of participation in the 1986 legislative elections, the militant tail again wagged the pro-independence dog. In spite of the UC's expressed preference for participation, the FLNKS adopted (at its convention at Sarraméa, 15 February 1986) the one electoral line not previously followed, that of a "passive boycott" or simple abstention. As a result, the legislative elections produced an even more massive—and artificial—formal victory for the anti-independence RPCR than in November 1984 (see table E). In the process, the cause of Melanesian independence lost its long-standing representation in the Paris National Assembly.

Just two months after these legislative elections, a program-law *(loi-programme)* redefining the terms of a transitional period leading to the territorial referendum on self-determination had been elaborated,[17] presented to (30 April 1986) and approved by (12 May) the RPCR-dominated Congress in Nouméa, and adopted by (21 May) the Chirac cabinet in Paris prior to its passage through the metropolitan Parliament. Mitterrand's presidential misgivings notwithstanding, the program-law became operational in August 1986.

TABLE E **Legislative Elections, 16 March 1986**

Registered voters	90,578		
Votes cast	45,642		
Turnout	50.39%		
Valid votes	44,817		

		% of Valid	
Party Lists	Votes	Votes	
RPCR	39,677	88.53%	
Mod. indep. (Paita)	3,985	8.89%	
Dissident FN	1,155	2.58%	

Two RPCR deputies elected to National Assembly, Paris.

This program-law vigorously affirmed formal electoral legitimacy by reasserting the political authority and policy preferences of the (anti-independence) territorial majority. Early in April 1986, the leadership committee *(comité directeur)* of the UC had warned that it would reject any transfer of powers from the regional councils established in September 1985 to the territorial Congress. In large measure the new program-law was focused precisely on such a transfer.

While maintaining the physical and institutional framework of the Pisani/Fabius regions, the program-law stripped them of much of their administrative substance and policy spirit. The regions' powers (particularly in areas of economic policy, fiscal authority, land reform, and direct development links with Paris) were substantially reduced and transferred either to the High Commissioner (Haut-Commissaire) or to the Congress—that is, to the authority of either the state or the territorial majority. The Land Office (Office foncier) was disbanded, to be replaced by a rural development agency presided over by the High Commissioner. Development conventions between state and territory were to be established, superseding the direct contracts between the regions and Paris that the Pisani/Fabius Statute had envisaged. Victims (usually non-Melanesian) of the political and civil unrest since November 1985 would be indemnified for material damages suffered. Finally, one year after parliamentary ratification of the program-law, a self-determination referendum would offer the Caledonian electorate the stark choice between continued attachment to France (within a definitive statute of enlarged autonomy still to be drafted) and independence.

Several French ministerial statements, combined with security reinforcements since March 1986, have recently underscored the resolve of the Chirac government to determine New Caledonia's destiny in accord

with the will of the territorial majority. Until at least the second half of 1987, the latent constraint of this formal, electoral conflict will probably remain as unavoidable and as intense as ever. The potential for renewed informal conflict should remain no less acute.

NOTES

1. Alan Clark, "Formal Conflict: On Recent Elections in New Caledonia," *Pacific Studies* 6, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 8.

2. Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste, Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front. Constituted in September 1984 as a majority replacement for FI (Front Indépendantiste, Independence Front). The principal component parties and groups of the FLNKS are: UC (Union calédonienne, Caledonian Union), PALIKA (Parti de libération kanak, Kanak Liberation Party), UPM (Union progressiste multiraciale, Multiracial Progressive Union), FULK (Front uni de libération kanak, United Kanak Liberation Front), USTKE (Union des syndicats de travailleurs kanaks et exploités, Allied Unions of Kanak and Exploited Workers), and PSK (Parti socialiste kanak, Kanak Socialist Party). On FI, see below, n. 11.

3. Interview with J.–M. Tjibaou, *Journal de Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 1 April 1986.

4. At which date legislative elections in France (and New Caledonia) produced a liberal conservative parliamentary majority headed by Chirac, reducing the Socialists to opposition.

5. Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République, Rally for New Caledonia in the (French) Republic. Front national, National Front.

6. See Clark, ibid., 3–4.

7. Rassemblement pour la République, Rally for the Republic (neo-Gaullist, liberal; leader, Jacques Chirac). Union pour la Démocratie française, Union for French Democracy (Giscardian alliance of liberal and center-right parties). Front national, National Front (nationalist extreme right; leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen).

8. Georges Lemoine, secretary of state for French overseas departments and territories, speaking in the French National Assembly debate on the territorial statute, 28 May 1984.

9. For the text of the final communiqué of the Nainville-les-Roches talks, see *Le Monde*, 14 July 1983.

10. Declaration of J.–M. Tjibaou, 29 August 1984, quoted in *Le Monde*, 31 August 1984.

11. Formed in 1979 as an electoral union of UC, PALIKA, FULK, UPM and PSC (Parti socialiste calédonien, Caledonian Socialist Party). See Clark, ibid., 3.

12. Libération kanak socialiste, Kanak Socialist Liberation. Formed in May 1981 as a result of a split within PALIKA, at which point LKS remained in FI while PALIKA left. At the formation of the FLNKS, in September 1984, this movement was effectively reversed.

13. Fédération pour une nouvelle société calédonienne, Federation for a New Caledonian Society. For the results of the 1979 TA elections, see Clark, ibid., 6–7.

14. UC provides on the order of 60 percent of the membership and more than 90 percent of the financial resources of the FLNKS (see *Le Monde*, 25 May 1985).

15. Organisation politique d'alliance d'Opao, Political Organization of the Opao Alliance. Opao is an old Kanak term for the Caledonian mainland.

16. Rassemblement, progrès et coutume; Rally, Progress and Custom.

17. The work of Bernard Pons, RPR minister for overseas departments and territories in the Chirac government.

BOOK REVIEW FORUM

Norman Meller, *Constitutionalism in Micronesia*. Laie: Institute for
    Polynesian Studies, 1985. Pp. x, 400, illustrated, appendices, index.
    $24.00 paper.

Ralph R. Premdas and Jeff S. Steeves, *Decentralisation and Political
    Change in Melanesia*. South Pacific Forum Working Paper, No. 3.
    Suva: University of the South Pacific Sociological Society, 1984. Pp.
    iv, 200. F$5.00 paper.

Review: GLENN PETERSEN
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In *Constitutionalism in Micronesia*, Norman Meller has, in a sense,
given us two books in one. The first is a richly detailed, firsthand
account of the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional Convention in Saipan
and the historical and political contexts in which it took place. What
would eventually become the Constitution of the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM) was drafted there. As one who lived through a piece
of that history, and continues to contemplate its aftermath, I can express
only appreciation for the acuity of this account; it will no doubt stand as
the history of American Micronesia in the 1970s.

The second book therein is an interpretation of that history. Meller
played a key role in much of it, and he tells his tale from the perspective
of his place on stage. It would, of course, be quite impossible to do
otherwise. But precisely because this will be *the* history of the new

Micronesian nations, and will probably be required reading for the various young diplomats, technocrats, and carpetbaggers assigned to work in and with them, I find it necessary both to stress that this is *an interpretation* of what happened and to suggest that an array of alternative interpretations might shed more light on much of what took place during those critical years. I would not, I hasten to add, want anyone to take my word on this at face value. Meller's is a book first to be read, and only then debated. It would be a gross error to let my arguments and those of others stand in place of his enormous accomplishment.

Meller's story, which is structured as a play, begins where his *The Congress of Micronesia* (1969) left off: the formation of the pan-Micronesian legislature in 1965. One of the Congress's first acts was to initiate the long quest for self-government and the end of American trusteeship. This unbelievably complex process included the decision of the people of the Northern Marianas to seek closer ties to the U.S., America's ready acquiescence, and the 1975 plebiscite that gave them U.S. Commonwealth status, a vote that preceded the Constitutional Convention by only weeks.

Heading the list of proposals that the first Micronesian Political Status Delegation brought to Washington was "that the people of Micronesia will draft and adopt their own constitution" (p. 53). As the negotiations dragged on, and the question of future status grew more equivocal, they increasingly sought a more concrete notion of what self-government might actually look like. When the Constitutional Convention was finally convened, Meller, who had been a consultant to the first Congress of Micronesia, served as head of its Research and Drafting Section.

By the time the Convention got underway, the separate status accorded the Marianas had already had an impact. Palau and the Marshall Islands were pursuing the possibility of conducting separate status talks with the U.S.[1] The Palauan delegation to the Convention brought with it a set of seven "non-negotiable demands" (a phrase widely current in the American political discourse of those days). For the most part, these were aimed at limiting the role of any central Micronesian government that might be constituted and assuring the preeminence of the "states" (the Trust Territory's "districts") that would comprise the new nation.

Meller sees the Palauans' threats to quit the deliberations and proceed with separate status negotiations as the fulcrum on which the Convention turned. Considerable drama evolved out of what he calls the "Palauan ploy" and the other Micronesians' brilliant strategies to counter it.

While arguing that this maneuver enabled the Palauans to "call the tune" at the Convention, he also acknowledges that in the end their hopes that the individual states would be "recognized as the basic political unit of government" were superseded by creation of a "true federation." The "powers delegated to the central government provided it with a far greater scope of authority than contemplated by the Palauan delegation's outline of its position" (pp. 308–309). The Palauans ultimately rejected the pan-Micronesian Constitution, and went on to negotiate their own Compact of Free Association with the U.S., and Meller thus finds it thoroughly ironic that they had such an impact on the framing of the pan-Micronesian document.

But did the Palauans really call the tune, or were the Micronesians and the Americans (and this includes both the U.S. government and the Convention's own staff) merely marching to different drummers? Bear with me a moment as I "open my album" and show to you a few "snapshots" from the life and times of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention.

• Several years ago, in the course of a wide-ranging conversation, a Micronesian leader who had not been there told me a story about the Convention. He spoke of the large number of American lawyers and advisers who aided the Convention delegates, and noted that throughout the Convention there had been on Saipan a man from the U.S. State Department. It appeared to the delegates, he said, that their American lawyers were passing along drafts of the various pieces of the constitution so that the State Department could advise them on how they should be framed. The delegates began to feel that the drafts they were receiving were not responsive to their requests. Eventually, as the time allocated for the Convention neared an end, a special committee was formed. This committee excluded from its meetings all the American lawyers and advisers, and then proceeded to work out the draft constitution that was ultimately approved. One of the lawyers, so the story goes, was so shamed by this turn of events that he wept.

• After receiving the request to review Meller's new book, I asked a man who had been a delegate to the Convention about this story. He responded with mild incredulity, directed not at the question but at my need to ask for confirmation. "Of course. Why would you think otherwise?" was his tacit reply. When I pressed for more information, he told me he knew nothing specific about the relations between the Convention's American advisers and the U.S. government, but he agreed that the special committee had indeed excluded advisers from its deliberations so that members could write a draft as they wanted it. He sug-

gested that one of the reasons the Convention proceeded so slowly was all the extra work put into turning aside the U.S.'s efforts to shape the constitution to its own liking.

• Just as the Convention was getting underway, the U.S. State Department's Micronesia specialist wrote:

> Every effort should be made to assure that the convention does not write a constitution containing clauses which would be seriously inconsistent or in conflict with an acceptable (to the U.S.) future political relationship. . . . The U.S. *quietly* should seek to work with the constitutional convention in identifying and avoiding problem areas which could later jeopardize negotiations of a satisfactory political relationship. (Dorrance 1975: 774–775, his italics)

• Midway through the Convention, according to Meller, Senator Lazarus Salii, one of the Palauan delegates and a prime mover in Micronesia's status negotiations with the U.S., charged that

> "Some staff members . . . have enormous emotional investments in the outcome . . . and preconceived ideas of what the outcome ought to be. The staff are not here to mastermind the Convention, not here to direct or steer us. They are here to render professional services. If they cannot give us their services without promoting their emotional and philosophical considerations, they should—and this Convention should—reconsider their position." (p. 1, Meller's ellipses)

The first two of these four vignettes convey views that are still current in Micronesia, and were expressed to me by men who, as it happens, have quite different attitudes toward the U.S., yet share a common understanding of the context in which the Convention took place. The fourth suggests that theirs is not an entirely ex post facto perspective; it was voiced even while the Convention was in session. Meller several times characterizes this outlook, or variations of it, as "devil theory." The third comes from a study prepared at the National War College in Washington, D.C. It indicates to me that Micronesian perceptions need not be attributed to a conspiracy theory, but reflect, rather, quite accurate readings of what the U.S. intended for the Convention.

I should make it clear at this point that I do not share these Micronesian views about the activities of the Convention's American staff. I have nothing but respect for the work done and the advice tendered by Meller and his staff. I repeat these accounts only because I think we

must bear them in mind if we are to comprehend the milieu in which
Micronesian negotiations with the U.S. have taken place. Micronesians
know better than most that the actions of individual American citizens
do not at all necessarily coincide with the plans and policies of their gov-
ernment. But the people of Micronesia have also had to live with what
the U.S. has wrought in their islands, and I think we would do well not
to dismiss their perspective lightly.

Meller's account succeeds very much in spite of his dismissing such
suspicions as "near paranoia" (p. 71). For a host of cultural, historical,
and political reasons, the peoples of Micronesia have a range of view-
points that, in places, contrast sharply with those of a professor emeri-
tus of political science at the University of Hawaii. While Professor Mel-
ler is acutely aware of these differences, the overall perspective of his
book seems—to me, at least—to deny them.

Whether scholars agree with them or not, many Micronesians do in
fact view their constitutional history as having been shaped by their
responses to the colossus of America's presence in Micronesia, and in this
they share much with the Melanesians. As Ralph Premdas and Jeff
Steeves demonstrate in *Decentralisation and Political Change in Mela-
nesia*, the internal political organization of the Melanesian nations must
be understood in the context of their efforts to end colonial rule. The
critical difference, of course, is that the Melanesians (excluding New
Caledonia's Kanaks and the peoples of West Irian) were able to success-
fully pursue independence, an option denied to the Micronesians. The
Herculean efforts of the delegates to the Micronesian Constitutional
Convention had to be directed toward the Augean task of designing a
constitution that satisfied the wishes of their people for an end to colo-
nial rule and yet acknowledged that the U.S. was not likely to recognize
any document that truly did so.

A broader perspective provides us with other ways to interpret the
story told in Meller's book. As he notes—with the self-awareness that
plays such an important part in his chronicle—his belief that it is "in the
best interests of the Micronesians in the modern world that they achieve
unity as a single political entity" is "based on Western logic—my cul-
tural logic" (p. 167). He is thus led to dismiss Micronesian anti-Ameri-
canism as "a poor substitute for a more positive premise, such as might
have been supplied by a common traditional heritage, to bind together
all the peoples of the Trust Territory" (p. 22). This ignores the successes
of the Melanesian nations in preserving unity despite cultural heteroge-
neity equal to or surpassing that of Micronesia. This unity has in some
measure been achieved precisely because of cooperation spurred by

shared anticolonial sentiments. Meller's a priori discounting of the deep
Micronesian resentments toward colonial rule makes the Palauan posi-
tion appear *sui generis*, rather than symptomatic of strains shared by all
Micronesians. Indeed, it may have been empathy, rather than strategy,
that occasioned the enormous efforts that went into accommodating
Palau.

Meller's book provides ample indication that the spark of disunity can
be traced not to cultural differences per se, but to the very real fear that
these differences would be eroded by a highly centralized national gov-
ernment. Opposition to a strong central government was hardly pecu-
liar to Palau. Indeed, Meller himself notes that this position "probably
represented the inchoate views of a majority of the delegates" (p. 181).
The Palauan proposal merely gave shape to this sentiment.

Micronesian concerns about the character of the central government
had at least two sources. Again, both of them are to be found within
Meller's own account. The first springs from traditional Micronesian
notions about what constitutes good government. The second grows out
of the Micronesians' experiences with colonial governments, particu-
larly that of the American Trust Territory. The two are so thoroughly
intertwined that any distinction between them is heuristic rather than
palpable.

As do many Pacific peoples (and others elsewhere, for that matter),
Micronesians often conceptually merge social groups and tracts of land
in ways that seem baffling, if not illogical, to European *Weltan-
schauungen*. Eminent domain—the right of the government to seize
land for its own purposes—for the proposed new national government
was one of the points on which the entire constitutional exercise nearly
foundered. Another was the opposition between civil liberties and tra-
ditional custom. At one point the schism grew so broad, a delegate felt it
necessary to insist that "Micronesians need their land more than they
need their civil liberties" (p. 267). This seemingly peculiar dichotomy
actually marks one of the major fracture lines that run between
Micronesian notions about the kind of government they *should* have
and the kind of government they *have* had.

I was present during the opening sallies of the civil liberties debate;
what I heard in the Convention chambers and, more pointedly, in
nearby restaurants, bars, and hotel rooms was etched deeply on my
mind. Because my recollections coincide so closely with Meller's de-
tailed account, I am inclined to trust them. The Bill of Rights articles
proposed for the constitution were unsettling to a number of delegates
because they were, among other things, perceived as placing the locus

of social responsibility in the individual and the government and remov-
ing it from family and community groups. If someone gives offense, I
heard it said, the offended social group has the responsibility and the
right to seek redress with the group that gave offense. The freedom-of-
expression rights put forward at the Convention were seen by some as
denying fundamental rights that inhered in the *groups* of which they
were a part.[2]

The doctrine of eminent domain commits even greater powers to the
central government. It not only holds that authority resides in the gov-
ernment rather than in the social group, it specifies that the government
may disenfranchise any group of its land—and, therefore, of its essence.
Some delegates argued that eminent domain is inherent in a sovereign
(that is, national) government; one group was "adamant in its demand
that the central government must possess eminent domain powers" (pp.
268–269). Others sought to restrict the power to state governments. In
the end, the constitution remained, and remains, silent on the issue of
eminent domain. It does, however, specifically preclude the national
Supreme Court from jurisdiction over land matters; these are reserved
to state courts.

While the civil rights dispute was sidestepped by adding to the
Micronesian constitution a complex and ambiguous article on tradition
and traditional leadership, eminent domain remained one of the few
areas in which no compromise could be found, no consensus reached.
Clearly, compelling forces were at work here; the delegates were strug-
gling not merely with notions about how government should be *struc-
tured*, but about what it should *be*. In doing so, they considered both
the question of what would be acceptable to the U.S. and the history of
what the U.S. had already wrought in Micronesia.

Meller observes that "nowhere in all the exchange of rhetoric was ref-
erence made to the central government's need to condemn land if it
were to meet possible commitments to the United States under a future
status compact" (p. 270). Left unstated here is that this refers only to
the transcripts in the Convention's journal. The U.S. had made it clear
that eminent domain was one of *its* "non-negotiable demands" and the
delegates completely understood this.[3] Meller also notes that in the past
the possibility of "losing their properties through public condemnation
by the American Administration was believed to be the moving force for
the owners agreeing to lease or sell them" (p. 268). Elsewhere, he
remarks that "the journal of the Convention contains disappointingly
little debate on the subject of future political status" (p. 52). When this
is juxtaposed with his comment about the delegates' silence over the

central government's obligation to condemn land, one gets the sense that there were certain things that simply did not need to be talked about—or were too fundamentally disturbing to discuss.

As they drafted their constitution, the delegates were aware of past abuses by a single central government, that is, the Trust Territory administration. Meller's comment that "rulings of the High Court with respect to customary obligations and, particularly, land matters in Micronesia had given rise to regional pockets of dissatisfaction with American law" (p. 33) understates the case. The delegates had reason to suspect that a new central government (their own), subordinated to the U.S. by the terms of a future political status yet to be resolved, would be required to behave in much the same fashion. Resistance to a powerful central government derived, then, both from the belief that it would arrogate powers that rightfully belonged to the community and from past experiences of the Trust Territory administration doing just that.

The Micronesian constitution was drafted before there was agreement on what the end of the trusteeship would mean for Micronesia. Meller explained to the delegates, as the Convention got underway, that this was not a problem: "like clay in the potter's hands, the shape of future political status would emerge as the powers and structures of the new Micronesian government were decided upon" (p. 154). This is, in a sense, what happened. But ignored, or derided as a chimera of "devil theory" (pp. 75, 340), is the refusal of the U.S. to acknowledge the right of the Micronesians to draft a constitution as they pleased. The delegates had to design a government centralized enough to satisfy America's insistence that it still rule Micronesia and yet decentralized enough to protect the people from that rule—an Augean task if ever there was.

Meller is skeptical about those who are "inclined to see hidden intrigue in Micronesian–American relations" and laughs at any who might have thought him a "conspirator or simpleton" (pp. 165–166). He makes only parenthetical reference (and this already in a note) to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) surveillance conducted in Micronesia in the mid-1970s (p. 166). A U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence news release, while making no explicit reference to the Constitutional Convention, deserves more than the passing notice Meller gives it.[4]

Another snapshot:

> The CIA engaged in clandestine intelligence collection operations in Micronesia from early 1975 until December 1976. The program included recruitment of Micronesian residents, some with affiliations with Micronesian political entities and some of

whom were paid for their information. None was informed
that they were reporting to the CIA. At least one of the persons
served on one of the island government entities involved in
developing a compact with the U.S. as to future status.

The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, General Brent Snowcroft, asked the CIA to initiate
clandestine collection activities in Micronesia. A legal opinion
was sought by the CIA prior to initiation of its collection activi-
ty, and such activity was found to be lawful by the then Gen-
eral Counsel of the CIA—an opinion disputed in May 1976 by
the State Department Legal Adviser. The CIA sought and
received in October 1973 from the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, approval for
collection operations in Micronesia as well as permission "to
assess the possibility of exerting covert influence on key ele-
ments of the Micronesian independence movement and on
those other elements in the area where necessary to promote
and support U.S. strategic objectives." (U.S. Senate 1977:1–3)

The release goes on to note that as far as the Senate Committee could
determine, the CIA did not actually engage in covert action or influence
in Micronesia. It further acknowledges that the U.S. Congress had been
notified of the CIA's plans.

While I am willing to believe that the CIA sought and received per-
mission to assess the possibility of exercising covert influence on the
Micronesians who were negotiating future status, nothing that has tran-
spired in the past decade or so gives me reason to believe the assertion
that the CIA did not try to exert such influence. Most Micronesians
would find it patently absurd to grant any credence to such a denial.

The Micronesians were not, then, merely trying to draft something
that would preserve a fragile unity. They were bent on producing a doc-
ument that could protect them from the U.S. And as they engaged in
this formidable task, they worked with full expectation—if not knowl-
edge—that the U.S. was trying mightily to keep them from doing so.

Unity, and the Palauans' role in threatening it, did not, then, serve as
the Convention's fulcrum. The Palauans' proposals were directed
squarely at the nature of the proposed national government. Fears of a
strong central government, shared by many—perhaps most—of the
other delegates, were not simply the chauvinistic calls for "Marshalls
Mokta" ("Marshalls First") or "Palau for Palauans" that Meller cites
(pp. 90, 94); such sentiments have been expressed widely in the Pacific

(for example, *Samoa mo Samoa*, the title of J. W. Davidson's classic study [1967] of a comparable period in Western Samoan history, means "Samoa for the Samoans"). They were, rather, quite reasonable observations about what the U.S. had wrought in Micronesia and what it was still planning to achieve. The real fulcrum, as I read it in these pages, was the Micronesians' attempt to design a government that would simultaneously be competent—that is, strong—enough to negotiate with the U.S. *and* be decentralized enough to guarantee that, whatever the final outcome of the status negotiations, the Micronesians would reclaim a significant measure of self-rule.

I have made reference to Meller's use of the phrase "devil theory." He does not explicitly define this term, and it is difficult to be sure just what he means by it. He first employs it in his discussion of policies the U.S. pursued in the Marianas, which were radically different from those in the rest of the Trust Territory. "In keeping with the devil theory held by many Micronesians, this differentiation was deliberate: the Machiavellian U.S. at no time ever intended to surrender its control of the Northern Marianas" (p. 75). While this is a matter over which reasonable scholars might disagree, it hardly seems necessary to resort to namecalling; one could marshal considerable evidence suggesting that the U.S. has never entertained the possibility of surrendering the Marianas. He later writes: "To those who hold to the devil theory of Micronesian–American relations, the postponing of the referendum on the Federated Constitution was intentionally designed to further the process of Trust Territory disintegration initiated with the forming of the Northern Marianas Commonwealth, enabling the Americans to confront smaller, weaker Micronesian entities to the end of assuring a permanent United States presence throughout the area" (p. 340).

It appears to me that by "devil theory," Meller means any suspicion that the U.S. actually intended for the Micronesians to negotiate from positions of weakness, including all the problems that attend internal divisiveness. Yet this is certainly the regnant view in contemporary Micronesia, and both Dorrance's (1975) and McHenry's (1975) histories of the trusteeship, as well as the U.S. Senate's news release, provide substantial evidence that this was indeed the case.

Let us now consider the new Melanesian nations; they have thus far been able to preserve internal unity, and this in spite of the significant challenges that continue to arise. Why have they succeeded where Micronesia has not?

Premdas and Steeves's account of decentralization demonstrates that all the internal stresses under which the Micronesians negotiated self-

government were operating in Melanesia as well. The key difference is that Britain and Australia, if not France, wanted to decolonize.

The term "decentralization" carries much of the same burden in Melanesia that "federalism" bears in Micronesia. In his survey of Pacific islands constitutions, Stephen Levine found that only two nations—Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia—explicitly define their governments as federal. Nonetheless, similar allocations of powers and responsibilities amongst national, state, and local governments "may be found in Pacific Constitutions for non-federal entities as well, when internal politics suggest a need to maintain important local political structures" (Levine 1983:26). Furthermore, as Premdas and Steeves point out (p. 85), decentralization may be encountered in either a federal or a unitary system. In other cases, of course, nominally federal systems may not actually decentralize at all.

In *Decentralisation and Political Change in Melanesia*, a series of essays chart the various courses pursued by Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu as they have sought to balance the imperatives of sovereignty against the perils of bureaucratic centralization. At different points the approach is historical, political, or organizational.

Premdas and Steeves begin by heralding the role decentralization might play in realizing decolonization. They conclude, however, on a much less sanguine note. Decentralization, they find, "cannot by itself deliver upon all its potential promises. Whether through provincial government in a unitary state or local government in a federal system, in the last analysis an organisational structure must operate in the real context of culture and people. There is no inherent behavioral outcome that decentralisation can bestow spontaneously" (pp. 139–140).

Melanesian decentralization has not been—is not—a simple, or single, phenomenon; there are continuing disagreements about its purpose, utility, and efficacy. Nor are there agreed upon notions of what it entails or models of what it should be. In both theory and practice it is a product of competing political exigencies and ideologies. At its best, decentralization has been hailed "as a pre-eminent means of *decolonization*" (p. 121). Iambakey Okuk, then leader of the PNG opposition, has accused it of making a nation "ungovernable" (Okuk 1978:21).

Two broad issues emerge in the course of this study: the degree to which decentralization aids or impedes the ending of colonial controls in the periods just before and following independence, and the effects it has upon the efficient and equitable functioning of the new national governments. These are by no means exclusive of each other.

We find in Melanesia widespread apprehension that anything falling

short of a thoroughly unitary national government will lack the requisite strength to fully sever the colonial bonds. It is expedient, then, to turn first to questions about the internal strengths and weaknesses of decentralized governments. Premdas and Steeves hold that decolonization has two dimensions, the first being the independence process itself, while the second entails "the return of power to the people at the grassroots via elections" (p. 1). For some, however, these appear to be mutually exclusive possibilities; only a powerful national government, they believe, can hold onto independence, and any transfer of power to the grassroots will inevitably weaken the center.

From this follows the expectation that decentralization leads inexorably to fragmentation.[5] Many in both Papua New Guinea and the Solomons suspect that any shift of authority from the central government to the provinces will cause more and more regions to seek provincial status, and lead to even greater disunity. Calls for decentralization are thus interpreted as unenlightened demands on behalf of purely local interests, while any local control of development funding and planning that is achieved then receives the blame for inefficiency and corruption.

On the other hand, Premdas and Steeves argue, if decentralization is to be truly effective, it must be disruptive. In parts of the Solomons, people "seemed to share the feeling that the transition to independence was being made just a bit too smoothly and quickly, thereby denying the opportunity for citizens to discuss major issues such as the distribution of power in the state" (p. 185). As the authors point out, the transfer of government functions from the national to the provincial level is often no more than a shift from one center to another, and since local councils remain largely dependent upon central government for their funding, they remain effectively subordinate to them.

In response to the argument that too much local authority threatens to fragment the nation, it was acknowledged in the Western Solomons, for instance, that "a system of government that accommodated legitimate regional differences would no doubt cultivate provincial or state sub-nationalism, but that this was a first indispensable step in nurturing a sense of nationalism for the larger federal unit" (p. 155).

In the same way that independence does not necessarily return power to the grassroots, decolonization does not necessarily terminate the former colonial regime's control over a new nation. In PNG, for instance, the national infrastructure depends for its stability on large-scale financial aid and this in turn serves to maintain dependency. Australia's "contradictory aims—military security and self-determination" led to "delays in preparing the Territory for self-government" (p. 13). In the

newly decentralized Melanesian polities, local governments remain similarly dependent upon and subordinate to the national governments that are the sources of nearly all their revenues. It is often the symbols, rather than the substance, of power that are transferred.

The notion that decentralization is necessary to genuine decolonization has thus been countered by the claim that it actually serves as an impediment to independence. Again and again we see that independence is the premier goal, and anything that threatens to impede it is suspect. Thus Walter Lini, head of Vanuatu's ruling Vanuaaku party, "was fearful that those who advocated a federal formula had ulterior designs to dismantle the state and were manipulated by foreign interests" (p. 68), and Vanuatu eventually settled upon a unitary national government.

Ultimately, the Melanesian solutions to the dilemma of independence and decentralization were pragmatic. In PNG, Bougainville threatened secession and decentralization followed; in the Solomons, it was the breakaway movement in Western Province; in Vanuatu, Nagriamel's uprising. In each case, there was a great deal of expedience exercised. "Pressures translated into costs [which] set in motion the process of transferring power from the center to provincial and local units via decentralisation" (p. 3).

Within its unitary national government, Vanuatu incorporated a system of decentralization designed in response to the demands for federation. In the Solomons, where allocation of powers is "quasi-federal," calls have been voiced for a more explicitly federal system in which provinces or states are coequal with the national government. In PNG, the original report of the Constitutional Planning Committee recommended a government closely resembling "a federal arrangement," and the system of decentralization finally adopted drew heavily upon the original plan.

What, then, is the difference between the unity that has evolved in the Melanesian nations and the fragmentation taking place in Micronesia? It cannot be explained solely by relative degrees of geographical or cultural heterogeneity, nor by the minutiae of governmental structures.

Melanesians had a vision of independence as they organized their polities and have indeed been independent as they have set about resolving their internal problems. For them, a central government, whether strong or weak, was to be—and has been—their own government.

Micronesians, on the other hand, did not—could not—know what kind of relationship they would ultimately achieve with the U.S. Lacking that knowledge, their government had to be constituted with

extraordinary flexibility. The "Palauan ploy," as Meller calls it, can be read as a threat to unity (and I would not deny that it was); but their list of demands can also be understood as a remarkably comprehensive summary of what most of Micronesia wanted: real, local self-government. In the absence of any solid indication that the U.S. was going to give up final authority in the region, nearly everyone wanted to see a constitution that placed authority in the states.

I am not suggesting that everyone in Micronesia wanted independence. Many did not. But most wanted self-government. A deal struck locally with the U.S. must have appeared to provide a good deal more of this than a vaguely defined national government ever could. It is a tribute to the Convention delegates that they did write a constitution all could sign, and it is worth repeating that the Palauans signed a document that provided much less than they had called for.

The process continues. As Meller notes in his conclusion, the potential for continued fragmentation in the various Micronesian nations is quite real (p. 340). There are, after all, no precedents for overcoming centrifugal tendencies. The people of Pohnpei, a majority of whom voted against Free Association in the 1983 plebiscite, feel that the FSM national government is indeed too responsive to the U.S. and that they have not achieved the sort of local rule they expected when they approved the FSM constitution (Petersen 1986).

In explaining Pohnpei's current dissatisfaction, one of its more visionary leaders spoke to me of what he called Americans' fixation on unity. He voiced a sentiment that is widespread on Pohnpei these days: unity is worthwhile only when it grows from the cooperation of equal and autonomous groups; it is not efficacious when it is imposed from without. His observation about Americans' fixation on unity brings me back to Meller's discussion of his own predispositions. Meller acknowledges his own Western cultural logic as the source of his belief that it is in the Micronesians' best interests to achieve unity as a single entity.

In situating the question of unity as the fulcrum of the Convention, Meller has responded to his own intellectual imperatives. In shifting the center of gravity to the question of the Micronesians' future political status, I respond to my own. We have made value judgments, and quite rightly so.

In *What Is History?*, E. H. Carr addresses this question of historical judgment. History, he writes, "is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past," and "the historian is engaged in a continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to

his facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other" (Carr 1961:34–35). He expands on this with a metaphor singularly appropriate to the Micronesian case:

> The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use—these two factors being, of course, determined by what kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large, the historian will get the kinds of facts he wants. History means interpretation. (ibid.:26)

Meller and I interpret the Micronesian Constitutional Convention quite differently. His view of America's performance in Micronesia is prelapsarian, shaped by the liberating advance of America's forces during the Pacific War. My own introduction to the Pacific came when I was sent to fight in Vietnam. Where he sees a continued commitment to liberation, I see arrogant insistence on America's right to rule.

Nowhere, I think, do our perspectives clash more directly than on the matter of what traditional Micronesian politics has to contribute to modern Micronesia. Meller believes that "the cultures of Micronesia embodied no fundamental egalitarianism which would serve as the basic underpinning for the building of a democratic polity. In the main, it waited upon the American Administration after World War II to nourish political implants which subsumed that the future course of Micronesia was to be along the path of democracy, with all of its citizens to be treated as political equals" (p. 29–30). He reacts to the post-Convention history of the constitution with the observation that, "countering the democratic processes introduced during the thirty-five years of American rule, the influence of the traditional remains a major force to be reckoned with in Micronesian governance" (p. 329).

I find it difficult to comprehend how peoples so committed to the achievement of consensus and to the proper siting of government within their communities can be portrayed as lacking in a democratic tradition. When juxtaposed with the U.S. Senate's own report of Henry Kissinger's commitment to *Machtpolitik*, the delegates' efforts seem particularly noteworthy. It was, after all, the Micronesians who had to wonder about the possibilities for democracy while the U.S. sought to exert "covert influence on key elements of the Micronesian independence movement . . . where necessary to promote and support U.S. strategic objectives."

NOTES

1. A number of Micronesian entities have changed the spellings of their names in recent years, among them Belau (formerly Palau) and Pohnpei (Ponape). Meller uses the mid-seventies spellings, and I follow his usage in this case; I employ the current spelling for Pohnpei.

2. The delegates showed considerable perspicacity. Subsequent events suggest that at least some of what they foresaw has already come to pass. In deciding a precedent-setting case regarding the place of traditional Pohnpeian apology rituals *(tohmw)* in contemporary legal proceedings, FSM Chief Justice Edward C. King held that

> Ponapean customary law flows from an island tradition of interdependence and sharing. It de-emphasizes (compared to the constitutional legal system) notions of individual guilt, rights and responsibility, and places greater stress on the groups to which the individual accuseds and victims belong. . . . Families, clans and community groups are the principal subjects and objects of customary law. Major purposes of a customary forgiveness are to prevent further violence and conflict, to soothe wounded feelings, and to ease the intense emotions of those most directly involved so that they can go about their lives in relative harmony.
>
> The constitutional legal system, paradoxically, concentrates upon both smaller and larger units than those intermediate groups emphasized by customary law. This legal system's procedures are calculated to focus upon the individual accused. Grounded upon a premise of individual responsibility, the court system seeks to pinpoint one particular act or series of actions and to determine whether an individual accused is guilty of the crime. (FSM vs. Mudong and FSM vs. Benjamin 1982: 9–10)

Furthermore, as one of the Convention delegates (William Eperiam) and a historian have recently observed:"While many Pacific nations find themselves forced to acknowledge demands for decentralization of power and authority, the national government of the FSM seeks to secure its survival and well-being through a centralization of major governmental functions" (Hanlon and Eperiam 1983:98).

3. The U.S., like the Palauans, did not hold strictly to this "non-negotiable" posture. The FSM Constitution still makes no provision for eminent domain on the part of the central government.

4. In two separate but similar situations, Meller makes ambiguous use of his sources, or so it seems to me.
  When Meller chides those "inclined to see hidden intrigue in Micronesian-American relations," he gives no specific source for the information that the CIA was active in Micronesia at the time of the Convention. Much later, when quoting a delegate's remark that the Micronesians themselves are responsible for the outcome of the Convention, rather than "some American Secretary, or ambassador, or high commissioner, or CIA agent," he cites the Senate news release by way of explaining the reference, remarking, "Whether this included the Constitutional Convention is not known" (pp. 326, 344). At no point does he provide us with any information about the disturbing (to me, at least) contents of the Senate report.

In another context, we encounter an oblique reference to the so-called Solomon Report, a government study authorized by U.S. National Security Action Memorandum No. 243 in May 1963. This document provides a blueprint (much of which was never implemented) for creating an aura of successful economic development in the period preceding a planned mid-sixties plebiscite, and goes on to record that "it is the Mission's conclusion that those programs and the spending involved will not set off a self-sustaining development process of any significance in the area. It is important, therefore, that advantage [i.e., the plebiscite] be taken of the psychological impact of the capital investment program before some measure of disappointment is felt" (Solomon 1963:41–42; reprinted in McHenry 1975). Meller (p. 16) chooses to cite David Nevin's (1977) description of the capital improvement aspects of this plan, while ignoring the darker implications of the original report. Later, he does quote directly from the report (p. 37), which suggests that his circumspection does not have to do with the circumstances under which the still-classified document came to light.

Some readers might be inclined to find "angel theory" at work here.

5. The assumption that decentralization is inherently unstable has considerable currency in political theory (de Rougemont 1941; Franck 1968).

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Before the Micronesian Constitutional Convention was organized, I
was well aware that, due to there not being enough qualified Microne-
sians available, "the technical staff of the Convention was to be over-
whelmingly American. Many Micronesians believed that because of this
influence, what would emerge would be an American-dictated consti-
tution" (p. 145). Because of this and other reasons, I counseled that the
procedures of the Convention and the actions of the staff should be such
as to preclude direction from occurring. Whatever was finally incorpo-
rated into the constitution would be the incrementally accrued product
of the decisions of the Micronesian delegates. Dr. Petersen studiously
avoids all reference to these procedures and how the constitution was
laboriously put together by the delegates, piece by piece, in committee
and on the Convention floor.

Deliberately, no advance draft was prepared by the staff, for such a

document could form a frame within which the delegates would work. Instead, the staff sought to acquaint delegates with different political systems and structures and procedures other than those of the United States with which they were familiar. The delegates then introduced their own proposals, which were referred to committees that had been constituted so as not to prejudge by their jurisdiction whether or not there would be any particular component in the constitution. For example, there was no legislative committee for that would imply there was to be a legislature. After discussion and hearings, committee proposals were then submitted for floor debate and Convention modification. The delegates introduced some 163 separate proposals of varying length and technical complexity, covering nearly twice as many printed pages. Committee proposals and supporting committee reports probably doubled the total. It was the function of the drafting staff to express the directions they received from delegates and committees in the form of these proposals and reports. "Emphasized was the role of staff as supportive but subordinate, precluded from initiating or recommending policy" (p.154). They took their instructions and drafted as best they could to carry out what they believed to be the delegates' intent (see pp. 301–303 for illustration of problems that could arise). All of the many provisions in the FSM Constitution to which the United States government vehemently objected for years (p. 319) were phrased by the staff, acting on the directions of the delegates. None of what they did was derived, overtly or covertly, from either Trust Territory or United States government personnel (including the CIA).

To my knowledge there was only one—and I believe it to be the only one—contact with personnel of the United States on the constitution during the entire period of its drafting and in the prior preparations (for full details, see p. 230 and note 45). It is important that this be emphasized as Dr. Petersen's research base is in that part of Pohnpei opposed to the FSM Constitution, so his questioning of its integrity nicely coincides with those residents' objectives.

There are those who hold to the "devil theory of Micronesian–American relations," which attributes only the worst of all possible motives to the United States and, more importantly, makes a logical jump between the reasoning that such might be an explanation to the proof that it must be. Given the manner in which Dr. Petersen uses materials from my book out of context, I can only conclude that he falls within that group. I can only respond that while I believe there are firm grounds for sustaining the thesis that a grand design has helped shape the United States' policy toward Micronesia (see p. 340), overall Washington rela-

tions with the Micronesians have been so inept, and frequently so self-contradictory, that I consider the "devil theory" an inadequate proposition for ordering and analyzing all political events in Micronesia.

With respect to Dr. Petersen's contention that the Micronesians desired a decentralized government and were maneuvered—presumably by Americans—into adopting the form incorporated in the FSM Constitution:

> Early in the life of the Convention, Chairman Ismael of the Functions Committee had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain directions from the Convention over whether it desired a centralized or decentralized government to be erected. With the Convention sidestepping by shunting his resolutions off, . . . he presented a "working paper" for delegate study summarizing . . . his committee's internal decisions on the allocation of specific powers between levels of government. . . . And that is how the Constitution eventually was to be assembled by committees, each incrementally making its own decisions without instructions. (p. 209)

Whether or not Palau's role was the fulcrum of the Convention only can be answered by those who took part in the Convention's daily events. Most of the participating delegates from the Marshalls, Pohnpei, Truk, and Yap wanted to preserve Micronesian unity, and the Palauan "ploy" appeared to threaten it, particularly with its provision for a state's unilateral withdrawal. While relationship with the United States under the Compact of Free Association was always present in the background, it was the immediate that was most important to the delegates: how to turn the Palauans' "non-negotiable" demands without so antagonizing them that they would walk out, wrecking the Convention. Unfortunately, this does not fit Dr. Petersen's paradigm.

REVIEWS

Sidney Mead, ed., *Te Maori: Maori Art from New Zealand Collections.*
   New York: Abrams, 1984. Pp. 240. $35.00.

Reviewed by Karen P. Sinclair, Eastern Michigan University

Te Maori appeared in conjunction with the exhibition of Maori art that
recently toured the United States. This book is a formidable addition to
Maori ethnology and to our understanding of Maori artistic traditions.
Supported by many American and New Zealand groups, the exhibit be-
came an international undertaking in which art from New Zealand was
assembled and taken out of the country. As we learn in the book's fore-
word: "There has never been an international exhibition devoted exclu-
sively to Maori Art, and certainly not one in which all the objects were
borrowed from the country in which they were created." To do this
required considerable international cooperation. Thirteen New Zea-
land museums cooperated with the American Federation of Arts, the
New Zealand Government, and the Maori people to make this tour pos-
sible. The Mobil Corporation provided a grant, while further support
was derived from the National Endowment for the Arts, the National
Endowment for the Humanities, the Federal Council on the Arts and
Humanities, Air New Zealand, and the National Patrons of the Ameri-
can Federation of the Arts. For many Americans, the exhibit provided
the only opportunity to view a magnificent display of Maori art. This
catalogue provides those who were able to attend the exhibit with an
opportunity to look once more at the impressive assemblage. More
importantly, it makes the art accessible to those who were unable to see
it while it was touring the country.

The book is both a catalogue of the exhibition and an analysis of Maori art and Maori art history. Chapters by noted scholars discuss the effects European colonialism have had on the development and interpretation of Maori artistic endeavors. Many of the contributors explicitly attempt to reframe and redirect the analysis of Maori art by substituting a Maori aesthetic for the European standard that has dominated most discussions of Polynesian art. These articles, then, reflect the confidence and assertiveness that has, in recent years, come to characterize contemporary Maori intellectual life. This is an important impulse in New Zealand today and should not be trivialized. But if, as so many of the contributors to this volume maintain, the analysis, interpretation, and execution of Maori art has varied with the social and political context, it is important to realize that this volume is a continuation of that process.

Adrienne Kaeppler addressed the deficiencies inherent in a western analysis of a nonwestern artistic tradition. Specifically, she noted that the study of Polynesian art lacked a historical perspective, creating instead an illusion of timelessness. She was especially critical of the methods, or more properly lack of methods, brought to such an undertaking. Most pointedly, her criticisms were directed at the ethnocentricism involved in filtering Polynesian art through a prism of western art historical conventions: "When objects are analyzed from an outside observer's point of view without historical context, there are few rules and anyone can play. In short most such studies, especially the later ones have been ethnocentric, trivial and irrelevant to the study of Polynesian art" (Kaeppler 1979:82).

Te Maori, published in 1984 to coincide with the opening of the Te Maori exhibit at New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, makes none of the mistakes of its predecessors. In all cases, the authors bestow the requisite respect and honor due to such an undertaking.

The pieces that formed the exhibition are intrinsically sacred and have become even more so with time; they are *taonga*, "treasures," whose power derives from a variety of sources. In his introduction, Mead writes: "The mana of the personalities together with the power of the words and of the form created by the artist conspire to produce a powerful taonga—a taonga with mana, a taonga with immanent power, an object that has within it a hidden force. Every item in the present exhibition is a taonga of this sort, because each is very old, a few are several centuries old. Great antiquity adds yet another dimension" (23). The departure of these pieces from their ancestral home was not treated lightly. At each of the openings, the exhibit was accompanied by

chants from Maori elders who had come to welcome the art of the ancestors to its new home. Their chants were also designed to insure that the potency of the art would not have an untoward effect on the unsuspecting and necessarily ignorant observers. Like all important Maori ceremonies, these events were conducted at dawn. That Maori elders traveled across the world and performed this ritual on several occasions indicates both the respect and prestige that this art still holds and the power that continues to inhere in it. Indeed, the participation of the elders, the framing of the exhibit, and *Te Maori* itself all point to a radical departure in Maori art history. The book celebrates an insider's perspective, without sacrificing historical or anthropological understanding.

In addition to Sidney Moko Mead, who edited the entire volume and wrote both an introduction and a chapter, there are five other authors. These six articles are far more than superficial articles written to accompany a museum catalogue; all stand alone as scholarly contributions to our understanding of Maori art. However, there is more. A beautifully photographed catalogue, with extraordinarily rich description and analysis follows. The two parts taken together provide an impressive panorama of centuries of Maori creativity.

In this volume, Maori architecture and artifacts are depicted, displayed, and analyzed in such a way that, whenever possible, the Maori people may speak for themselves through their art. The cataloguing expertise of David Simmons and the analytic depth of the accompanying essays recreate the context in which this art was generated. Changes and developments, continuities and ruptures are discussed with reference to the dynamics of Maori culture. Indigenous Maori culture was both adaptable and resilient, developing along lines that acknowledged but ultimately diverged from an Eastern Polynesian background. This resilience came to the aid of the Maori in their confrontations with the intrusive and disruptive effects of European colonization. Despite their demoralization in the face of European domination and in spite of explicit attempts to denigrate their artistry, Maoris continued to adapt their art to the changing political context, in the process employing to their own benefit a new technology that facilitated the creation of novel and elaborate structures. In so doing, the Maori asserted resistance and accommodation where the Pakeha (New Zealanders of European ancestry) chose to see only ruin and degeneration. In this collection of essays, it is clear that the processes of adaptation and modification were continued, but not initiated, with the arrival of the Pakeha. Moreover, the authors effectively demonstrate that Maori art did not fall into irreversi-

ble decline in the nineteenth century. In place of that century's "well intentioned salvage operations" (Guiart 1983), the reader of *Te Maori* is given a systematic approach to the performance and execution of Maori art.

Many of the issues raised in these chapters go to the heart of our understanding of Polynesian art. In the past, commentators labeled the artistic horizon that greeted Europeans as "classical"; subsequent endeavors were seen to represent a decline. The assumption was that the Pakeha presence led to an immediate and inevitable falling away from a zenith of artistic achievement. Indeed, this notion of a linear rise and fall (the latter coincident with the arrival of Europeans) has been typical of many who have reviewed Maori art. The notion was so widespread that, apparently, few realized the implications. Thus Gathercole takes Sir Peter Buck to task on precisely this point: "Pakeha preconceptions of what the Maori past ought to have been limited Buck's view of the history of his own race to one of a linear rise and fall—a simple growth in prehistoric times, a flourishing in the late 18th Century, and then a European induced decline. His attitude toward Maori art conformed to this pattern" (1979:217). This volume offers a direct challenge to such a position.

Sidney Mead argues that Maori art can best be understood using a metaphor of growth. In employing such a metaphor, his purpose is twofold: on the one hand, he wishes to eliminate the use of European categories in the description and analysis of Maori art; and on the other, he offers a description of Maori art in a manner that summons forth connotations of continuity rather than of efflorescence and decline. His stages feature bilingual labels. Thus he suggests:

   Nga Kakano—The Seeds (900–1200)
   Te Tipunga—The Growth (1200–1500)
   Te Puawaitanga—The Flowering (1500–1800)
   Te Huringa—The Turning (1800–present)

He writes: "It is an effort, to the degree that it is possible and helpful, to deal with Maori art in the context of its own rich cultural background and to free it from other people's myths" (35). Such a proposal is designed to emphasize the transformation, at the same time that it denies the decline, of Maori art.

This is an important point to make, for words such as "decline" and "degeneration" carry connotations understood in terms of a western rather than a Maori aesthetic. More significantly, such a perspective suggests that Maori art merely responded (and inadequately at that) to

pressures exerted by the encroaching European culture. Implicitly, Mead argues that the use of a Maori metaphor in some way diminishes the European ethnocentricism that has so characterized the study of Polynesian art. While this may be true to some degree, the very division into stages, even with the caveat that their boundaries are far from impermeable, is itself a western academic exercise. This, however, is a minor quibble and any attempt to free any aspect of Maori culture from European domination is to be applauded.

More critically, Mead contradicts his own position. He appears to be arguing that there was a constancy to Maori art that the arrival of Europeans disrupted. While no one can deny that all aspects of Maori society came under attack from the Pakeha, Mead appears to overlook the resilience that in other places he champions. He writes:

> The items represented in the exhibition comprise some of the elements of the cultural grid mentioned earlier. But the grid has been under assault, figuratively speaking, ever since the coming of the white man to New Zealand. Annexation by the British, subsequent conquest of many Maori tribes, and occupation of the land by foreigners from across the sea put the whole of Maori society at risk and dislocated its many interlinking institutions. In addition, the supporting ideologies and practices which helped to provide a coherent, constant, and vibrant art tradition were called into question and became subject to Pakeha (European) evaluation and approval. The cultural grid which incorporated the arts was altered quite drastically until it became very much like a shredded road map.
>
> The result was that Maori art was interrupted and arrested in its development. (29)

The above passage carries disconcerting echoes of the kind of art history that Mead has otherwise managed to avoid.

He goes on to write that Maori art has not changed drastically since the beginning of the nineteenth century. He maintains "such changes as have occurred appear to be revolutionary and many, but despite them, the base against which judgments are made about artistic performance today is still that of the Classic, or Puawaitanga, period. Contemporary artists continue to reach into the Puawaitanga period for their inspiration, their models and motifs" (73). All of this would seem to betoken a rather Platonic view of Maori art; its true form is to be found only in the Puawaitanga.[1] He is not altogether easy with the technical innovation of contemporary Maori artists:

> New forms of art, borrowed from the traditions of the West,
> have been introduced into the Maori world. Maori artists
> trained in the art schools of the Pakeha are spearheading a
> movement to change the face of Maori art more radically than
> ever before. One does not know whether they innovate with
> love and understanding, or whether they are about to ignite
> new fires of destruction. (75)

Yet the ability of Maoris to adapt and accommodate is emphasized
consistently in this volume. Their Polynesian culture, brought from the
islands of the Eastern Pacific, had to be modified, often significantly, to
adjust to the rigors of New Zealand's climate. Contributor Agnes Sul-
livan documents the transformation of Polynesian culture as the Maori
settled in New Zealand, while Kernot, Simmons, and Salmond discuss
regional variations. These articles convincingly demonstrate the inten-
sity and vigor of Maori culture. Holding up any arbitrary period as an
ideal and suggesting that departures are a falling away from excellence
does violence to both the past and the present. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, such a stance violates the spirit in which this book was written.

In the nineteenth century, art became a medium through which
Maoris responded and reacted to the presence of Europeans. Steel tools
enhanced the artistic enterprise while many artists were emboldened to
innovate. New tools and new ideas promoted changes in Maori carving.
Yet continuity as well as innovation characterized Maori art:

> New experiences to the society were first absorbed into existing
> art forms. Sometimes this happened very rapidly. Forms were
> soon modified to contain new features, however much these
> were expressed in traditional ways. In general terms, by the
> mid nineteenth century carving appeared to possess a dual
> aspect. It had characteristics suggesting a continuity of imagery
> from prehistoric times, so that, for instance, important carved
> houses could be regarded as ancient items in society. On the
> other hand, certain changes occurred in artistic expression.
> There is more evidence of technical virtuosity and of a reluc-
> tance to leave carved surfaces undecorated, which may have
> been connected with the increasing popularity of the styles of
> some carving areas against others. (Gathercole 1979:222)

As new forms developed, these tended to demonstrate the readiness
with which the Maori could accommodate and adjust to change at all
levels of their society. The introduction of Christianity and Maori

understanding of the missionaries' theology promoted new forms of carving to decorate meeting houses, which themselves had been transformed by new technology. In many areas, most notably the Bay of Plenty and the East Coast, distinctive carving came to stand for tribal solidarity and integrity (Gathercole 1979; Kernot in this volume makes a similar point).

Ultimately, the issue of continuity[2] is complex and the damage, whether deliberate or unintentional, perpetrated by Europeans is not to be underestimated. But the resourcefulness of Maori artists is attested to in all the photographs and in all the articles in this volume. As Mead tells us, art "objects were chronicles of history objectified in visual form." It should not be surprising, then, that this art also chronicles a history of turbulence and transformation.

In a chapter entitled "Nga Paiaka o te Maoritanga, The Roots of Maori Culture," Agnes Sullivan clearly analyzes the ethnohistorical, archaeological, and linguistic evidence for Maori origins. Her examination of artistic horizons and available technologies illuminate issues of change and continuity. Major debates in Maori cultural history remain in the shadows of her chapter and thus she manages to intrigue the nonspecialist at the same time that she does not patronize those already familiar with much of the background information. Arguing that Maori art is an indigenous New Zealand development, she traces the paths through this transformation. In this she is in keeping with Mead, who in 1975 convincingly demonstrated that Maori art must be considered the culmination of a local Polynesian, rather than an introduced Oriental, tradition.

David Simmons argues in a chapter devoted to tribal art styles that regional and tribal differences are reflected in different artistic traditions. While for many familiar with the Maori this is an important point to bear in mind, it is especially essential for those who are coming to the art for the first time. Simmons's argument, along with Sullivan's article, convincingly explains and documents the range and variety in time and space of the works in the exhibit.

The symbolic dimensions of Maori art are the subject of Anne Salmond's chapter. She argues, along with others in the volume, that regional and tribal variations provided different contexts for the development of artistic expression. As she details the ritual intricacies involved with all artistic undertakings, she returns to the point made by Mead in his introduction—for Maoris art is a *taonga*, a treasure that binds individuals to one another, to their past, and to specific landscapes. Art, we learn, is a celebration, both in its execution and its cul-

mination, "of this unity of men, ancestor gods, and land." And yet, treasured pieces of art were able to cross important boundaries, connecting and merging otherwise distinct domains. Valuables passed through and over tribal divisions; the living and dead came together in meeting houses that were elaborately carved and decorated; each individual artifact possesses a history that links the past with the present. Salmond clearly makes the point that to a Maori audience these pieces represent not a lost and lofty heritage, but instead remain a testimony to the power and meaning that ancestors continue to bring to the present.

These works of art provide a glimpse of a complex cosmos. The carvings, burial chests, flutes, and weapons are more than mere artifacts from the past, antiseptically arranged in museum galleries; they reflect and, in important ways, continue to define the foundations of the present. Salmond tells us: "For all our efforts of interpretation, those of us who write in the catalogue cannot tell the stories that really matter about most of these works. We can only seek to demonstrate that these objects were once—and to Maoris still are—not artifacts, nor primitive art, but things of power" (137).

Carving provides us with an example of an art form that has both adhered to tradition and yielded to innovation; new tools and ideologies have merged with traditional procedures and techniques. But the ability of carving to accommodate to and ultimately prevail over the onslaught of Pakeha culture has been successful in only a few areas in New Zealand. Only in Rotorua has a unique carving style been sustained over hundreds of years. Here the focus of artistic elaboration shifted in the nineteenth century from the war canoe to the large meeting house. By 1890 "the first signs of self-conscious formalism began to appear in this art" (Neich 1983:247).

Traditional woodcarving was sculptural in conception; flowing lines and intricate spirals carried the observer's eye through and around the depicted figures. As Neich writes: "Spirals bulged out of the surface, hands passed through mouths from the rear, the profiles of figures met the background in various angles, and several layers of superimposed supplementary figures often overlapped each other and the main figure which carried them."

The introduction of Christianity fostered a more pictorial art. New technology, specifically the chisel, not only altered the depiction of figures, but undermined the entire system of meaning that had previously attached to the art. The timelessness and continuing importance of a group's ancestors were no longer clearly communicated. Now, the same

message required different devices. Neich writes: "To accommodate this, carvers made their meeting house carvings more and more denotational by using mnemonic devices, adding distinguishing attributes, illustrating famous incidents and adding printed name labels to carving. In time, this became the meaning" (1983:250). Frequently Maori carvers were supported by European patrons, thus hastening the process through which implicit connotations became explicit, and the message itself became trivialized. The effect was somewhat paradoxical; at the same time that the Maori became more aware of themselves as Maori they were also abandoning much that was distinctive in their art. Self-consciousness led to a loss of style as boldness was sacrificed to notions of regularity, symmetry, and neatness.[3]

To demonstrate many of these processes, Bernie Kernot discusses three schools of traditional carvers, analyzing the interaction of artist, symbolism, and cultural milieu. These specific cases allow the reader to chart the transformation of Maori art. In this article the complexities of colonialism are especially well documented. Christianity certainly undermined the political and religious roles undertaken by traditional carvers. In fact, missionaries discouraged carving, seeing in such artistic enterprises hints of the paganism they were trying so hard to combat. Yet carvers remained men of standing. Through them the traditional perspective was both maintained and modified. When they turned their attention away from the great war canoes to public architecture, they oversaw the ascendancy of indigenous churches, giving visual dimensions to the complex fusion of Maori and Pakeha ideologies. These carvers contrasted with their predecessors, as Kernot tells us:

> The tohunga whakairo of old tend to be remembered for their achievements and were loved and revered by their descendants even if they failed to engage the interest of the outside world, which found little to identify with in the works of the ancestors. The masters of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, were a different proposition. They lived in the turbulence of a bicultural frontier society and in various ways responded to its pressures, challenges and possibilities. Sometimes they responded politically, like Te Rangihaeata and Raharuhi Rukupo and came into conflict with settlers and the government or like Anaha Te Rahui, they fought for the Government against other tribal forces. (144–145)

His discussion of Rukupo, the renowned carver of Poverty Bay, allows the reader to see the vitality that Maori artists derived from introduced

elements. Kernot writes: "When he mastered the new technology he applied it to traditional forms in canoes and houses, and in new architectural structures such as churches. His carved panels are notable for their complex figure and relief structures and his figures have a remarkably robust vitality in pose and expression. The new literacy introduced in the mission school had a minimal and superficial effect on his work" (155). He makes it very clear in his analysis of the three carving traditions that Maori reactions to the changes introduced by Europeans were indeed variable. But the point is made quite explicitly that carvers to a large extent selected, modified, and turned to their own advantage much of what the Pakeha introduced. This recognition of Maori resilience is a major strength of Kernot's article and of the book itself.

Piri Sciascia's article provides an excellent summary of the themes taken up by others in the volume. While lamenting the inevitable loss of some Maori traditional practices, he celebrates the vitality that has consistently inhered in Maori artistry. Like others in the volume he both celebrates the legitimacy that has been bestowed upon Maori art at the same time that he regrets the delay in Pakeha appreciation. But his major focus is on the continuity of the present with a larger tradition. This volume is a testimony to the points he is making.

Taken together, these articles permit us to analyze and understand the aesthetics and creativity of Maori art. A number of maps allow the reader to follow the intricacies of tribal variation. In addition, there are magnificent color photographs of the pieces in the exhibition, photography that captures the scale and texture of the art itself.

Following the articles is a sixty-page catalogue in black and white, photographed by Athol McCredie with a text written by David Simmons. In keeping with the high quality of the volume, this too is exemplary. The notes are far more than mere descriptions of the pieces. Simmons scrupulously locates each piece by period and tribal area and then places it within the larger context of Maori and Pacific Islands art. He also relates myths and provides rich ethnographic detail so that the importance of each piece emerges. We learn, for example, that young boys would ask for permission to have their faces tatooed from the same pot as their chiefly fathers, thereby transmitting the father's mana to the son. But this served to exacerbate rivalry between co-wives, as each wife promoted the interests of her own son.

The skill of McCredie and Simmons allows the reader to trace the changes and transformations in Maori art. As the eye moves over beautifully photographed post figures, doorjambs, and lintels, the reader begins to gain a sense of Maori aesthetics. The diversity of weapons,

burial chests, amulets that we have read about in the preceding articles comes alive in the catalogue section. While each section could stand on its own, the two together present a formidable addition to Maori ethnography. This book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in Pacific Islands history or ethnography.

NOTES

1. In a recent article Kataraina Mataira (1983:85) maintains that those artists who maintain the status quo are accorded group approval. She goes on to discuss the work of Para Matchitt and Cliff Whiting, both of whom have been criticized by traditionalists and purists, and makes the telling point that in time their work, which seems so innovative at present, will itself become part of tradition.

She notes as well the tendency to substitute a western for a Polynesian aesthetic. She writes "this could account for the fact that so many Pacific peoples seem to prefer and value pictorial representations and landscapes more than works using ethnic idioms. This could be why in the latter part of the 1800s, the Maoris used pictorial forms in meeting houses rather than traditional poupou. The Maori had been made to feel that his art was decadent while pakeha art was refined and civilized."

2. Adrienne Kaeppler has written (1979:185) that the introduction of metal tools probably promoted the development and efflorescence of Polynesian art. She maintains that the artistic merits of any work exist independently of the time in which it was created and goes on to argue that art should be considered "traditional as long as the basic structure and sentiment have not changed or else have evolved along traditional lines."

3. Today, contemporary Maori carvers employ powerful and ambiguous symbols, which admit a considerable range of interpretations. Thus innovators and traditionalists may each be able to derive satisfaction and aesthetic pleasure from the same piece. This point is made very nicely by Kernot (1981).

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Reviewed by Bruce Biggs, University of Auckland

The New Zealand Maori are a much-studied people. More has been
written about them for a longer period of time than about any other
people in the Pacific, beginning in the seventeenth century and unlikely
to end with this book. The wealth of documentation accounts for the
apparent paradox of the authors' choosing New Zealand and the very-
acculturated Maori when setting out to analyze a Polynesian culture
before it was drastically altered by contact with the outside world.

The earlier accounts of traditional Maori society and culture were
anecdotal ethnographies written by amateur cultural historians who
regarded Maori traditions as history awaiting interpretation; the writ-
ers were frequently lifelong students (or even members) of the culture
they studied, with profound, detailed knowledge of its language and
customs. The theoretical orientation, if any, was historical, and quite
likely to be at once diffusionist and evolutionary.

Their successors have been professional anthropologists, striving to
find system in their subject matter. Most of them have tackled single
aspects of the culture (economics, warfare, marriage, religion, women).
The theoretical background to their study has usually been functional
(in the Malinowskian sense) and nonhistorical, occasionally structural
(in the Levi-Straussian sense). Few of them have made a lifelong study
of Maori culture, and this generally shows.

While the Hansons' study of Maori society has been relatively short-
term, they have read virtually everything that has been written on the
topic, including much Maori text. Nevertheless it is not difficult for an
oldest inhabitant to find errors of detail here and there. I do not believe

they affect the main argument of the book, and I will ignore most of them.

The book's general argument is that in Maori cultural perception, when different "entities" interacted, one of two general sequences would result, each of which could follow any of several more specific paths. Of the two main sequences one, the "complementary syntagm," involved entities whose differences were prominent, while the entities involved in a "symmetrical syntagm" display similarities of form or behavior.

In the complementary syntagm where differences are "brought to the fore" the relationship followed a pattern of coming together, producing a new entity or achievement, finding the union confining, and finally separating. The syntagm can repeat, though the new union may involve a different partner. Levi–Strauss' concept of bricolage is utilized: union quite naturally often takes the form of copulation, creation, the birth of offspring, and separation, divorce, desertion, or banishment. Again, quite naturally, a new union of complementaries (male and female) allows repetition of the syntagm.

The symmetrical syntagm is, in most respects, like the complementary syntagm. Entities are attracted, and separate, but the union is not fertile: that is, it does not produce a new entity or achievement. Its main defining characteristic is the similarity, not the complementarity, of the reciprocal behavior involved. Similarity of form is the hallmark of the relationship, but "the distinction between complementarity and similarity is determined far less by what the partners are than by what they do" (105).

An example of the complementary syntagm is the coming together of Sky and Earth (different because they are male and female), the production of their children, their separation. Sexual union, ubiquitous in Maori creation myths, marks the participants as different and operating in the complementary syntagm. An example of the symmetrical syntagm is the folktale of the shark and the lizard, superficially different but marked as similar by the similarity of their reciprocal taunts, "Go to the sea/land and be caught and dried/cooked by man."

One anticipates difficulty in deciding whether a given sequence of events is complementary or symmetrical. Could marriage, like taunting, perhaps be seen as a reciprocal and similar act? The Hansons anticipate this difficulty with "before a symmetrical relationship could be properly launched it was often necessary to explicitly establish that the parties to it were indeed symmetrical, or equivalent." This, they maintain, is the effect of the ceremonial confrontation that begins all Maori

gatherings, such posturing establishing equivalence "by a mutual dem-
onstration that neither party was intimidated by the other" (106). I
think it would be possible to maintain that these rituals of encounter
aim rather to emphasize the complementary roles of host *(tangata whe-
nua)* and guest *(manuhiri)*, which are at least as different as those of
partners in a marriage.

There remains one, nonsubjective, distinction between the syntagma.
Symmetrical relations do not produce new entities, the usual aim of
each party being to establish dominance over the other. This is best seen
in the hostile phase of such a symmetrical relationship, characterized by
the vendetta (the nonhostile phase is typified by gift-exchange). Maori
tribal histories, as Elsdon Best noted, are almost entirely accounts of the
settling of wrongs, often cycling through several generations.

Example after example establish the paradigms and show that the
sequences are plentiful in Maori culture. But—are such examples not to
be found in all cultures? Will not most relationships between entities in
most cultures fit the syntagm of coming together, doing something, and
repeating or terminating? And are not all pairs of entities either alike or
different?

The example from Grimm's "Snow White and Rose Red" of a syn-
tagm involving, among other things, ingratitude (11) is sufficiently spe-
cific for a structural solecism (for example, profuse thanks from the
dwarf) to be immediately detectable, and there are many similarly spe-
cific patterns in Maori traditional tales. But the patterns of folklore are
often contrasted with culturally approved norms, as when the dwarf
illustrates how not to behave. I feel that in seeking syntagma that will
include at once historical "truth" (and what is culturally appropriate or
seen to be possible) and myth (including inappropriate behavior) the
Hansons have been forced into a degree of generality that loses explana-
tory persuasiveness. I find their postulated syntagma interesting and
thought-provoking, but had no "by Jove, they've got it" reaction, and I
remain unconvinced that a cultural structure as real as the grammatical
structure of a language has been uncovered, as they claim. Informant
rejection of ill-formed sentences demonstrates the reality of the latter,
but there is no suggestion that a similar test exists for the former.

The striving for general, all-encompassing explanations is perhaps
conducive to blanket statements that can hardly be sustained. For
example, we are told that "once routed, . . . nothing could induce
[Maoris] to turn and face the on-rushing foe" (166), yet tradition is full
of examples of just that, usually in response to the rallying call of a
chief. Again, the statement that there were "no place for rash ventures

and . . . no honour upon those who attempted them" (166) should surely be modified to "unsuccessful rash ventures." Any success was given accolade, but failure (by being killed, for example) invited rebuke, as in the example quoted by the Hansons.

The use of traditional accounts is, of course, necessary, but great care must be taken to make no inferences not justified by the text. A border-line case between subjugation and separation in a symmetrical relation-ship is illustrated by Mangoo's humiliation of Whatihua by urinating on his head. So far, so good, but the Hansons proceed to state that "Whati-hua . . . apparently had no subsequent career of note," which is very far from the truth, though a narrator from Ngaati Toa (the descendants of Mangoo who were driven from their tribal lands by Waikato, the descendants of Whatihua) would hardly mention it.

For me, the most exciting section of the book is that entitled "The Gods Enter In," where a real advance in understanding is provided by the Hansons' view of *tapu*, not as twofold (pure and impure) but as a single influence that moves to and from the human world by the door-ways of the latrine and female sexual organs. Under the influence a per-son or thing is in the *tapu* state; with the influence removed the state is that of *noa*. The suggestion that *tapu* is not purely a state of being (holy, unclean) and that an entity is involved is supported by Maori language, where the word *tapu* is used freely as a noun as well as a stative verb and an adjective, unlike *noa* (uninfluenced by *tapu*) which is not used nominally.

A methodological issue raised by any study that relies entirely on written sources is the reliability of those sources for the purpose in hand, and there is some discussion of this (6–8). The Hansons' assessment of the reliability of material is somewhat astray in my opinion. On a num-ber of occasions, for example, they use supporting material from "a native account of the Pakeha–Maori wars in New Zealand" by Lieuten-ant Colonel Thomas McDonnell, Jr., which purports to strictly adhere to information given by a Maori chief named Kowhai Ngutu Kaka. This chief is unknown to history; his name, "parrot-beaked *kowhai*," is that of a flowering shrub; and the account has all the marks of being apocry-phal, as a cursory reading of the first half-dozen lines of the "Maori his-tory" reveals it to be a distillation of what settlers of the time believed about Maoris rather than "merely Maori ideas and what I *know* to be such" (McDonnell's italics). To quote from this piece of ethnographic rubbish, a completely bogus account of the killing and eating of a mis-sionary, is an unfortunate choice.

McDonnell was born among Maoris and spent years fighting against

them, so his fiction was based on long experience. Others among those quoted were in New Zealand for short periods and often misunderstood such information as they gleaned. Polack's reference to a "filthy deity" named Niturehu who lived at Piroa refers in fact to Ngaai Tuurehu, a mythical people who lived on mountain ridges *(pae roa)* throughout New Zealand. Such misinterpretations may not invalidate the arguments they are intended to support but, as in this case, they hardly strengthen them.

Counterpoint in Maori Culture presents and tests a thesis in a manner and with a degree of thoroughness that has been all too rare in Maori ethnography. Readers must decide for themselves whether or not the thesis has been sustained, but in either case they will have enjoyed a stimulating and enjoyable rerun of much familiar and some unfamiliar Maori ethnographic data against a new theoretical background. The experience is rewarding and no Polynesianist should forego it.

Ngatupuna Kautai, et al., *Atiu: An Island Community*. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1984. Pp. xiii, 207, maps, illustrations, index. F$7.00 (F$5.00 within Pacific Islands).

Reviewed by Rebecca A. Stephenson, University of Guam

The University of the South Pacific, particularly its Institute of Pacific Studies, has facilitated the preparation in the last few years of a number of books about the Pacific. Of particular interest are edited compilations where island residents have written the individual chapters, based on their own views of life in their particular island nation. Some of these books dwell upon local history (Talu et al. 1979; Chapman et al. 1982; Faaniu et al. 1983); some are concerned with politics (Iuta et al. 1980; Atkin et al. 1983); religion is the topic of others (Adler et al. 1983). One book considers aspects of tourism as seen by island residents across the face of the Pacific ('Akau'ola et al. 1980). Another book features personal experiences of one hundred Pacific Islanders from various islands (Adam et al. 1982). A 1985 publication sets forth case histories of the lives of four selected residents of Tahiti (Crocombe and Hereniko 1985).

The book *Atiu: An Island Community* differs from the above mentioned texts because it is a description of a particular sociocultural lifeway. In this, it is similar to an earlier book the people of Rotuma have produced about themselves (Fatiaki et al. 1977) and a recent book by

the I-Kiribati (Bataua et al. 1985). The Kiribati book concerns all the people of Kiribati, a nation made up of many islands. The Rotuma and Atiu books are alike in that they are collections of writings by people of a single island within a larger island nation. Atiu is one of the fifteen islands of the Cook group. A low volcanic island situated in the southern Cooks, the total land area of Atiu is some ten square miles. Approximately twelve hundred people live on Atiu.

Atiu: An Island Community considers many aspects of Atiuan life. The featured writers are seven Atiuans and one Maukean married to an Atiuan. Paiere Mokoroa and Vainerere Tangatapoto, O.B.E., M.P. (ret.), offer the strongest contributions to the book, with seven and five chapters respectively. Of interest would have been a biographical thumbnail sketch of the various Atiuan authors. The I-Kiribati have done this (Bataua et al. 1985), and it is very effective. Some use is made of local-language concepts in Maori in the Atiu text, but the book lacks a glossary of key Maori terms. A six-page index is included, however, and the four-and-a-half-page, eighty-two-item selected bibliography on Atiu is impressive. Atiuans are keeping an eye out for what others write about them. On the other hand, the bibliography seems to serve as an unconnected adjunct to the text rather than an integrated supplement. Text references to the bibliographic entries are not made in any consistent fashion.

One gets the feeling that the Atiuans have produced this book mainly for themselves. Vainerere explains the purpose for writing the book in the foreword: "We have . . . come to realise that our oral method of preserving our traditions and culture is unfortunately inadequate, and something more permanent should be adopted. . . . Today many of our people live in Rarotonga . . . New Zealand, Australia and further abroad. Our children who were born there are brought up with books and live within a Western environment instead of an environment where the older generation can pass on the richness of our traditions by word of mouth. . . ." Indeed, Atiuans at home and abroad can savor the quality of their cultural heritage as they read this book. Tatuava, in discussing Te Enua (the island), includes historical chants and a description of the various ecological zones of Atiu, as well as flora and fauna. Paiere traces Atiuan *raukaanga puapinga* (achievements throughout history), including precontact warfare and the visit of Captain Cook in 1777. In discussing *arataki* (leadership), Paiere's contribution is noteworthy, especially with regard to succession to the chiefly titles of Atiu and tribal structure. I discovered in 1973–1974 (Stephenson 1976) that this information is being lost. Paiere charts, numbers, and names the

ariki, *mataiapo*, and *rangatira* titles for Atiu, including title names and bearers in 1983. He notes: "In total there are 26 mataiapo including the ariki, and 32 rangatira. There is more research to do to complete the list of names for the rangatira, in particular their original title names. So far, the Ngati Paruarangi Tribe is complete." In keeping with the astute observations of Paiere, I urge tribal members of Ngati Te Akatauira and Ngati Nurau to work together to make known the registry of their titles and titleholders. The passing away of distinguished *tumukorero* (those persons possessing knowledge pertaining to tribal matters), Mokoroa in 1985 and Vainerere in 1986, should remind Atiuans that this project cannot be delayed.

Tekura writes of *anau* (childbirth) on Atiu in traditional and contemporary terms. Atiuan parents still bury their child's *enua* (placenta) and then plant a coconut tree, fruit tree, or flowering shrub over it. Vainerere describes *ingoa* (naming customs) in detail, but a follow-up discussion would lend itself well to the matter of adoption and Atiu's *tamariki angai* (feeding children). Ngatupuna and Tane describe *pakoti rouru*, Atiu's hair-cutting ceremony, competently. It should be noted that first-born boys may have their hair cut when they are as old as fourteen, and that the boy being honored might wear an actual dress and not merely a cloak tied around his neck to hide his suit. The custom is so strong that it is observed among many Atiuan residents of New Zealand; I attended an Atiuan haircutting in Auckland in April 1985. The honored guests at the ceremony were the boy's grandparents from Atiu, who had flown to Auckland especially for the occasion.

Vainerere traces the development of *apii* (education) from precontact times through the early 1970s. Brief mention is made of the opening of the Atiu College (high school in the British system, nearly equivalent to grades ten through twelve in the American system) in the late 1970s. But because the impact of the Atiu College has been far-reaching on Atiu, lengthy discussion of it is warranted. The subsequent chapter concerning *tamataora* (games, sports, and pastimes) is comprehensive, especially with regard to more traditional activities—kite flying, disc throwing, string games, and the like. Atiuan children and adults seem to prefer video entertainment (rented from Rarotonga) in the mid-1980s, however. Paiere writes convincingly of a unique feature in the lives of men on Atiu, the *tumu nu* (bush beer school). As Paiere indicates, tidy dress is required when the men come to the *tumu nu*. Cultural knowledge is shared among the men while drinking; prayers and biblical readings have a part in the gathering, and men monitor each other's behavior so that no one gets disorderly. I feel compelled to point

out, though, that problems may emerge out of this social institution. Men may spend untold amounts of time enjoying the bush beer school, neglecting their wives and children: "When he comes home late at night from the Tumu Nu, he's drunk and quarrelsome. I am tired, but that's when he expects me to get up and cook for him. I don't think it's right, I say so, and then we have a row."

Teatu writes of *akaipoipo* (marriage). Distinctively Atiuan customs of courtship and marriage, such as the *akapareauanga* (ritual presentation of wedding gifts) and the *ingoa akaipoipo* (acquisition of marriage names by the bride and groom) are mentioned, as well as a more contemporary development: a classic Western-style wedding cake is now often baked in New Zealand and flown to Atiu for the wedding *umukai* (feast). Tane describes *kakau* (clothing). Her chapter incorporates a discussion of tapa beating and the *nuku* (plays created from Bible stories), which require the donning of traditional forms of dress. The chapters that follow by Paiere summarize the central place of the reef and the sea in the lives of the Atiuan people: customary rights to water and the sea; rituals, taboos, and techniques of fishing; and the catching and distributing of the *maroro* (flying fish).

The closing three chapters concern religion (*mana* and *tabu*), death, and funerals. A highlight of this section is the description by Paiere of the *karakia*, the Atiuan sacred ceremonial chant. It is the invocation used in ceremonial worship, particularly at the investiture of an *ariki*. It can only be recited by Atiuan men of a certain titled family. Normally it would not be written down, but an exception has been made to record the *karakia* in this book "for our future generations." Twice within the memory of elder Atiuans, the *karakia* did not proceed as it should at an investiture, and those *ariki* did not hold their titles long. The mana of the *karakia*, Paiere concludes "is something we believe in and do not regard lightly." Vainerere writes of *pure* (religion) on Atiu, with mention made of the ancestral gods Tangaroa, Rongo, Tane, and Tutavake. John Williams's successful missionization at Atiu resulted in, among other things, the relocation of the Atiu people from scattered house sites in the lowlands near their taro swamps to five villages that lie closely contiguous in the center of the island. Christianity has long been a central force in the lives of the people of Atiu. Funeral rites on Atiu include the *apare* (consolatory service the night before the burial) and sometimes the old custom of *ingoa mate* (taking of a death name by members of the family in remembrance of the deceased). Terepai writes that women, even in the present day, may cut their hair short and wear black for an entire year as a sign of mourning for a close family member.

The book includes four appendices. Appendix A sets forth the historic Statute of Atiu, Mitiaro, and Mauke, dated 22 August 1899, including punishable offenses against the person and offenses against property, signed by W. E. Gudgeon, British resident agent at Rarotonga. Appendix B is a summary of the Atiuan economy, adapted from the Atiu Research Report, 1978, prepared by the Cook Islands Ministry of Planning and External Affairs. Appendix C describes the historical development and principles of the Atiu Island Trust. Appendix D includes a sketch and description of the meaning of the Atiuans' Crest of Identity.

The Atiuans are the first group of Cook Islanders to attempt to write broadly about their social and cultural customs; the result is a fine piece of work. It would be helpful, however, to see more detailed discussion of the Atiuan *kainga tangata* (household) and *kopu tangata* (extended family). There is a need for consideration of the Atiu *mapu* (youth). Who are they, what do they do with their time and energies, what is their place in Atiuan society, and what are their aspirations? Likewise, what is the sociocultural milieu of the *tupuna* (grandparents) of Atiu? The *tutaka* (quarterly inspection of the homes, a long-standing cultural tradition on Atiu) merits mention, as well as the activities of the women's committees. Men and women weave such items as hats, baskets, mats, eel traps, and reef shoes, utilizing pandanus, coconut, and other products. As overseas goods continue to be popular (women like to weave their hats of store-bought materials now, such as ribbon), Atiuans should record for future generations techniques of their weaving and handicrafts, including the making of *tivaevae* (appliqued bedcovers). Atiuans have not dealt with local politics in a rigorous way in this book. It is a touchy topic, but nonetheless one that is worthy of review.

In describing the meaning of the Atiuan Crest of Identity, Vainerere states: "It is our desire today to carry with us our high respect for our 'Ipukarea' (Home-land) Atiu Nui Maruarua, and to make it known to the world wherever we go, that we are Atiuans and we are proud to be so." The Atiuan pride and strength of identity has not been marked for the first time in this book. I have written (Stephenson 1976, 1981, 1986) that Atiuans are different from other Cook Islanders in terms of their community spirit, leadership capabilities, and success strategies. A Rarotongan, in grudging acknowledgment of the public recognition given the Atiu nationwide radio telethon fundraising effort for the Mini Games in February 1985, stated: "Atiu! Atiu! Those people are in the news all of the time! Their new airport that they built themselves. The Atiu Youth Hostel. Winning the Air New Zealand Trophy year after

year in Constitution Celebration competitions. And on and on. I am sick and tired of hearing about the Atiuans and what they do!"

In conversation, Atiuans readily acknowledge their many successful community projects, but they have not addressed the matter particularly in this book. Paiere devotes a mere page in the text to Atiuan motivation and social control. Perhaps to write at length about Atiuan successes would be considered *akaparau* (proud or boastful). Yet, Atiuans visibly stand apart. Not only have they produced *Atiu: An Island Community*; they have also completed another book concerning their legends and tales (Kura et al. 1984). A publication that includes key portions of relevant documents by Europeans about Atiu has likewise been prepared (Campbell 1982). Atiuans are now called upon to attempt to articulate their perceptions of themselves, who they consider themselves to be, and why they feel they work so effectively together as a community. Atiuans pride themselves on their status as Atiu Tumu (real Atiuans). What does this mean? In 1985 in Rarotonga, I observed a robust Atiuan two-year-old divert complete attention to himself while his great-grandfather and a visitor to the household were trying to discuss other matters. The two older men commented indulgently on the tot's precociousness and acknowledged between themselves with satisfaction that the child was clearly "Atiu Tumu." What did they see in the youngster's behavior that they so readily recognized as the Atiuan way?

In their book, Atiuans do not write about a need to conserve their culture, a topic addressed by the I-Kiribati (Bataua et al. 1985). Is it because Atiuans see their culture as alive and well, at least at the present time? Are their preservation concerns mostly directed to Atiuans who continue to live away from their home island: "If you are not going to come home, at least you can read about us"? The issue of Atiuans overseas, in Rarotonga, in Tahiti, in New Zealand and Australia, and elsewhere needs to be mentioned for another reason. The Rotumans take a careful look at their migrant populations residing in Fiji and elsewhere (Fatiaki 1977). If *Atiu: An Island Community* is written for Atiuans overseas, to what extent are these people Atiu Tumu? What, accordingly, are their responsibilities to their home island? To what extent should they send remittances back to Atiu? Make regular return visits? How does the chain migration phenomenon affect those Atiuans, on the other hand, who have no intention of leaving their home island?

Atiu: An Island Community is an important book. If it was written by Atiuans principally for Atiuans, it is of considerable value. Beyond that, the book will be of great interest to any group of Pacific Islanders attempting to write about themselves. Pacific Islanders are encouraged

to address the tougher questions, those of identity, perceptions, and values ("this is who we are, and why"), as well as preparing a general description of their cultural system ("this is what we do"). *Atiu: An Island Community* will also serve as a model for anthropologists and historians who are attempting to receive and report on "the inside view" of Pacific Island peoples and their societies.

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Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History*. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Pp. 448. $30.00.

Reviewed by Noel Jay Kent, University of Hawaii–Manoa

A quarter of a century after the close of the plantation era, it is still curi-
ously present everywhere among us in Hawaii. In our social relations,
ethnic myths and stereotypes, our own conceptual language, and even
our sense of the possible, we find its subtle, yet pervasive presence. Any
real understanding of our contemporary period, then, becomes impossi-
ble without a firmer sense of the dynamics of this recently bygone age.
Thankfully, a cogent historical literature has begun to appear around
plantation themes, one that takes its frame of reference from the grass-
roots actors. Momentum for this development started in the 1970s with
publication of John Reinecke's *Feigned Necessity* and continued with
the work of Franklin Odo and Ronald Takaki. Now, there is Ed Beech-
ert's *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History*. Beechert, professor of history
at the University of Hawaii–Manoa, is one of Hawaii's eminent labor
historians.

"The labor history of Hawaii provides ample evidence of the *poten-
tial* of the working class to see itself as a class," writes Beechert. His con-
cerns are those of a scholar working out of a Marxist tradition. For him,

"class consciousness" is not dependent upon "subjective factors," but rather on "the structure of property relations." However, Beechert's closely documented account avoids the pitfalls of Takaki's romanticization of "contested terrain" in *Pau Hana*. In a planter's society where all the instruments of civil power are mobilized on behalf of the owners, where strikebreaking, cooptation, and divide-and-rule has been finely tuned to a science, the periods when "potential" class consciousness becomes "actualized" can only be limited. Beechert's study is a tribute both to these periods of intense organizing activity and the ongoing thread of everyday resistance.

The way in which the author clearly identifies and explains the "contradiction" at the heart of plantation Hawaii is his outstanding contribution here. From the mid-nineteenth century, right up to the end of World War Two, the dominating planter obsession was access to cheap, hardworking, submissive labor that would do its share to maintain high profit rates. Each succeeding ethnic import—Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Filipinos, etc.—was hailed as the solution to "the labor problem." Of course, from the workers' perspective, such a policy made it imperative to struggle for everything they were being denied: adequate wages and housing, job security, and, above all, stable "community." "Labor problems" in plantation Hawaii, Beechert adroitly tells us, were created in the first instance "by the system of persecution and the ruling class's notions of equity." Ironically, he points out, the planters succeeded in obtaining neither the mixed nationality labor they really desired, nor the immigrant workers of a coolie mentality. So, "they took what labor was available."

Professor Beechert has read deeply in plantation files. He provides some insightful accounts of planter strategies to deal with worker unrest, as well as a sense of the strengths and weaknesses of the plantation position vis-à-vis the workers. As he illustrates, the bottom line tyrannized a fragile industry whose annual dividends were dependent upon filling the sugar quota. Since production was so vital, even preunion workers had some degree of leverage to utilize and could hope to play the plantations off against each other to obtain better conditions.

The study has some major shortcomings. If Takaki overemphasizes the oppression of the plantation environment in his work, then Beechert is often quite confused about the real texture of plantation life and how the workers themselves regarded their lives. In a study that purports to be about "consciousness," we see little of it explained—especially as it evolved between the Filipino strike of 1924 and the ILWU victories in 1944 and 1945. In his conclusion, Beechert states: "Many of the immi-

grant workers found the general situation reasonably satisfactory." How does he know? Because they maintained close relations with their home-land and many stayed on after their initial period of service? This is dubious reasoning and proves little except a lack of viable alternatives. Much of *Working in Hawaii*, in fact, documents the huge numbers of workers who were constantly leaving the plantation: "The fundamental problem of the sugar industry was retaining workers for any period of time." One wonders how Beechert can describe the plantation environ-ment as "tolerable," yet repeat a litany of worker complaints against housing, medical care, wages, and the lack of "reasonable communi-ties."

A related problem is the lack of a sense of working-class *ethnic* dynamics. Beechert argues that the "introduction of a multiethnic workforce did not result in the sharp racial antagonisms evident else-where." He cites "few incidents of ethnic or racial violence" as evidence. Yes, there were no pogroms, but the "projection of racial superiority" he attributes to the ruling class was present among the working class also. There were the white workingmen who saw the Asians as distinct threats and wanted immigration to Hawaii banned. Later, the skilled Japanese plantation workers scorned the Filipino *hoe hana* men. The prevalence of racial strikes against all rhyme or reason right up to Vibora Luviminda in 1937 (which Beechert describes well) is a testa-ment to the powerful element of ethnic estrangement in Hawaii. One might also argue that the Izuka–Ignacio–Kawano rebellions against Jack Hall and Harry Bridges were less directed against "communism" than against mainland *haole* domination of the ILWU. Perhaps, Bee-chert's ideological predilections toward seeing worker unity overcoming ethnic and personal obstacles ("subjective factors") have undermined his clarity of analysis here.

The final section of the study—dealing with the organization of the agribusiness sector by the ILWU—is most disappointing, especially since the author had access to ILWU files and key union officers. What is presented is merely a factual overview that brings little in the way of fresh insights or hard analysis about the union's internal dynamics, its relations with workers, or the vital role played by the Communist party during this period. Beechert inexplicably chooses to ignore the role of the Smith Act trials and federal-local political harrassment in moving the ILWU to a more accommodationist stance in Hawaii and its ulti-mate submergence within a petty-bourgeois–led Democratic Party. Instead of a critical evaluation of the historic role of the ILWU, we receive a glorification (and a superficial one at that). Beechert is cor-

rect; the union did "win a respectable share of the wealth and a mea-
sure of dignity" for its membership, but this was done at the cost of par-
ing the workforce to a handful on the plantations and docks and collab-
oration in changing Hawaii into a tourism society. In the end, the
ILWU proved powerless to deal with the runaway shop strategies of a
Big Five-become-multinational.

This reviewer finds it interesting that Beechert chooses to end his
story in 1958, when the ILWU was still a force to be reckoned with in
Hawaii and before the islands were integrated into global capitalism as
a tourism society. The optimistic perspective offered by the author in his
penultimate chapter—"labor unions now [1958] looked forward to a
period of progressive social legislation and a greater measure of local
control"—is mocked by his own acknowledgment in the conclusion:
"Hawaii like the United States was moving toward a structure of
employment ever more dominated by jobs that were poorly paid,
unchanging and unproductive."

Professor Beechert's study fills an important gap in our understanding
of the plantation era. It is a useful work and should be read. It also dem-
onstrates how much more work there is to do.

E. Victoria Shook, *Ho'oponopono, Contemporary Uses of a Hawaiian
Problem-Solving Process.* Honolulu: East-West Center, University
of Hawaii Press, 1985. Pp. 141. $10.00.

*Reviewed by Kyle L. Pehrson, Brigham Young University–Hawaii
Campus*

In the process of preparing this review, the reading of *Nana I Ke Kumu*,
volume 1 by Kawena Pukui et al. (Honolulu, 1972), seemed a necessity;
that led to volume 2 (Honolulu, 1979). Finally Shook's chapter notes led
me to her *Ho'oponopono: A Discussion Guide for Two Videotapes*
(Honolulu, 1983). These readings formed a foundation to better under-
stand Shook's explanation of the practice of ho'oponopono and her
attempt to apply it to mental health and to clinical practice in partic-
ular.

The author's goal in writing this monograph seems to be along two
veins. First, to describe, in as far as possible, ho'oponopono (setting to
right), the ancient practice for maintaining harmonious relationships
and resolving conflict within the extended family. The author acknowl-
edges the work of Mary Kawena Pukui as a significant influence in the

development of the present volume. Shook artfully traces a process of diffusion for a strain of ho'oponopono based on volume 1 of *Nana I Ke Kumu.* Pukui's explanation of ho'oponopono seems to be the basis not only for this book, but for the entire so-called revival in modern times of this ancient custom traditionally used exclusively in Hawaiian families.

Shook's second goal seems to be to defend ho'oponopono as a legitimate mental health practice by illustrating how individuals have adapted ho'oponopono for use in settings other than the traditional Hawaiian extended family. Shook, obviously a stalwart believer, devotes an entire chapter to legitimizing ho'oponopono as an appropriate treatment approach. Arguments for that acceptance are made by contending that modern mental health practice accepts and encourages culturally relevant practices and is moving toward a philosophy of culturally appropriate services. Shook's positions regarding culture, change, and mental health practices are very well presented. Her use of the professional literature is excellent. She argues that there is a national trend in human services that encourages alternative means to meet the needs of various minority groups. My experience supports that contention; however, in this writer's opinion, that trend does not imply more than an acceptance of such culturally based practices with clients of that culture.

Since ho'oponopono is here being suggested as potentially having much broader application, it is incumbent on its proponents to make the link necessary to show its applicability to other cultures without diluting the cultural significance of the practice. I think this may prove to be a real dilemma with ho'oponopono. As is evident in the work done with ho'oponopono by Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian professionals described in the present volume, there may be a tendency to take pragmatically that which works or is comfortable to the minds of the users and leave that which they don't want or find uncomfortable. I have no problem with allowing that approach to others, but I fear it submits a beautiful, culturally significant practice to the very high risk of what Shook alludes to near the end of chapter four, where she writes, "if the future trend is toward further individualization, then the resulting divergence will destroy the impact of ho'oponopono as a problem-solving process rooted in the Hawaiian cultural experience" (p. 94). By so stating Shook professionally acknowledges this potential, but I hope she and those described in her monograph as true proponents are really ready to accept such proliferation. I hesitate to suggest they are not, but I do see a great deal to be lost in the transition, not the least of which may be the true effectiveness of the approach.

Almost without exception, this divergence has been the fate of newly

espoused theoretical approaches for working with individuals and families. For the most part this has, over time, been a positive evolution, but it is an evolution that will not preserve the truly significant cultural aspects of this uniquely Hawaiian process. Am I implying that open season on the use and application of ho'oponopono by all mental health practitioners will destroy it? No, but Shook's professional justification and defense of the content of this practice as a viable mental health approach contradict her sincere desire to "revive" the practice while preserving its uniquely Hawaiian components.

A resounding strength of Shook's offering is its organization and internal structure. She offers a well-structured history and clearly explicated concepts regarding a most complicated subject and does so effectively in two chapters. Her intent to establish ho'oponopono as a viable mental health practice is well thought-out from a cross-cultural perspective.

Her efforts to establish ho'oponopono as a model of social work practice are less effective. One suggestion of a theoretical basis for this work, though I think more than one could have been used, comes early in chapter two where she alludes to social systems. That foundation, were it as carefully laid out and articulated as her justification for the practice as a culturally valid mental health format, could have been most sound. Her discussion of the balance of etics (universals) and emics (cultural specifics) in therapy may have been an attempt to link the work to theory. I felt it made an excellent sociological link and boded well for an argument that ho'oponopono has elements commonly identified with therapy in Western culture as well as other cultures. However, the discussion draws short of establishing the theory base needed for model building. Without first establishing clearly a theoretical base in accepted social work practice, the author moves into explaining how two social workers formulated and used a form of ho'oponopono. Theory should be the basis for model building in social work practice. A better-explicated theoretical foundation based on clearly articulated social work values and knowledge would have made a much stronger argument for ho'oponopono as a mental health model and, certainly, as a social work model. Therefore, the author presents what is a very sound, culturally consistent model used by two social workers rather than an argument for ho'oponopono as a social work model.

This, however, does not detract from the otherwise high quality of the monograph. Shook's sincere attempt at objectivity (with a subject on which she seems so invested) is admirable. Her conscientious efforts at good research design give great credibility to her work. The book is

well conceptualized and clearly set forth. It is comprehensive in its scope and includes excellent case illustrations. Nine individuals were involved in the research as interviewees and as case examples. Of those nine, she acknowledges that only two continue using ho'oponopono on a regular basis in their practice. Her discussion of that fact, as well as why others trained in its use are not practicing it, is strongly and objectively written.

Overall the work is impressive and well done. In this research new ground is broken in linking a culturally unique Hawaiian problem-solving practice with contemporary thought in the realm of modern mental health, a difficult task at best. Although the author's love and respect for traditional Hawaiian culture come across in the pages of her monograph, she still shows the professional objectivity necessary to carry out a demanding form of social research. For those interested in a better appreciation of a truly Hawaiian expression of what the spirit of aloha may really be about, this volume describing ho'oponopono is excellent. For clinicians in the mental health arena and especially those involved in marriage and family therapy in Hawaii, I recommend this excellently written monograph.

Maslyn Williams and Barrie Macdonald, *The Phosphateers: A History of the British Phosphate Commissioners and the Christmas Island Phosphate Commission*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1985. Pp. xviii, 586, map, photographs, tables, bibliography, index. A$24.00.

Reviewed by James A. Boutilier, Royal Roads Military College, Victoria, British Columbia

During the past decade researchers have contributed significantly to our knowledge of a hitherto little-known dimension of empire in southern Oceania, namely, the workings of large-scale, expatriate commercial enterprise. Fieldhouse's *Unilever Overseas* (1978) with its sections on the Pacific Islands Company and Lever's Pacific Plantations Limited, Buckley and Klugman's two-volume study of Burns, Philp operations in the islands (1981; 1983), Firth's analysis of German firms in the Pacific, and now *The Phosphateers* shed new light on the activities of major companies, the nature of global and regional economies, and the impact of big business on Pacific Island communities.

The Phosphateers explores these and other themes with respect to the

extraction of phosphate rock from Ocean Island and Nauru in the Pacific Ocean and Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean during the period 1900 to 1980. The title derives from those engaged in the industry and the book is dedicated in a valedictory manner to their service. Ironically, the rank and file of the phosphateers and the islanders most affected by their work are, as individuals, rendered almost invisible in this account. Despite its great strengths, this book is in many ways a rather old-fashioned "imperial" history, a vision of the world from the vantage point of boardrooms and ministerial offices.

Williams is a professional writer and Macdonald is a Pacific historian (and the author of the excellent *Cinderellas of the Empire* about the Gilbert and Ellice Islands). They chose to divide the writing task involved in preparing *The Phosphateers* along pre- and post-1945 lines. Williams wrote the first two-thirds of the text dealing with the pioneer days of phosphate extraction and the creation in 1920 of the trigovernmental, nonprofit, administering commission, the British Phosphate Commission (BPC); while Macdonald dealt with the postwar period that encompasses, among other things, Christmas Island's incorporation into Australia, the achievement of Nauruan independence, and the sorry resolution of Banaban (Ocean Islander) claims against the BPC and the United Kingdom government.

Williams's "era" was a simpler, more colorful, more straightforward one in which phosphate extraction was conducted primarily in terms of business efficiency and the achievement of one overriding goal, the provision of cheap fertilizer for the agricultural sectors of the British, Australian, and New Zealand economies. Indeed, it is interesting—not to say tragic—to see how the Banabans were divested of their homeland on the grounds that they were contributing to the greater imperial good, an argument reminiscent of the one employed by the Americans on Bikini in 1946.

Williams is obviously accustomed to writing popular accounts for general audiences and his confident handling of historical materials is everywhere apparent. However, I came away from *The Phosphateers* with the distinct impression that I could see Williams moving from one archival document to the next in his reconstruction of events.

Macdonald's half of the story is less colorful and reflects the way in which the whole extraction process became more political and bureaucratic and less commercial in character. Although Macdonald handles a vast amount of evidence with his customary authority, the postwar portions of *The Phosphateers* are, for the most part, pinstrip grey throughout.

Most students of Pacific history know at least one story about phosphate in the Pacific: how a piece of rock from Nauru used as a doorstop in the Sydney office of a London-based trading firm, the Pacific Islands Company, was discovered in 1899 to contain more than seventy-eight percent phosphate. What happened thereafter is generally less well known and it may be helpful to summarize the story briefly.

Albert Ellis, an employee of the company, went to Ocean Island (or Banaba) in 1900 to undertake test borings and enter into an agreement with the "king" of Banaba to mine phosphate. Shortly thereafter he visited Nauru in an effort to determine the extent of phosphate reserves there. From a political point of view the prospects for mining were uncertain. Mining was commenced on Banaba, despite the fact that the island was not annexed by Great Britain until 1901, and the company was obliged to enter into complex negotiations with the German government to mine phosphate on German-held Nauru. The upshot of these negotiations was the creation in 1907 of a new firm with German representation on the board, the Pacific Phosphate Company (PPC), which undertook to mine Nauru and Ocean Island for ninety-nine years.

Australian forces occupied Nauru during World War I and the German holdings in the PPC were seized by the British government. A series of decisions were taken during the peacemaking process at the end of the war that fundamentally altered the character of the phosphate industry. The British government was awarded Nauru as a League of Nations mandate although it was to be administered on a day-to-day basis by Australia. At the same time, New Zealand Prime Minister Massey recommended, as a compromise solution, the creation of the BPC. Supporting this decision was the 1919 Nauru Agreement that outlined, in a fatally inadequate way, how the BPC was to function.

Paradoxically, there was less and less that was "British" about the BPC. Throughout the sixty-one-year history of the BPC, British farmers purchased only two percent of the 112 milllion tons of phosphate produced. What happened, in fact, was that the phosphate industry became dominated by Australia. Australian propinquity, the availability of Australian shipping, the unabashed imperialism of Australian governments with respect to Nauru and later Christmas Island, the nature of the Australian labor movement, and the character of Australian agriculture all contributed to Australian domination of the industry and the islands involved.

In the postwar period a number of interlocking themes emerged. What to do with the populations of the phosphate islands as those

islands neared the end of their productive life? How to insure some degree of labor peace at the rock face? How to reconcile the political ambitions of the Nauruans (since Nauru was now a United Nations Trust Territory with all of the international scrutiny that that involved) with the continued extraction of phosphate? How to continue mining operations in the face of bureaucratic and political demands antithetical to effective business practices? And how to deal with the nagging problem of Banaban demands for higher royalties and restitution?

The BPC commissioners were faced with three different situations. On Christmas Island there was a quasi-indigenous population whose fate was being decided largely as a result of union political agitation; on Nauru there was an indigenous population that achieved independence and control of the phosphate operation on the island in 1968 with disconcerting skill; and on Banaba there was no indigenous population, the Banabans having been scattered and resettled on the island of Rabi in Fiji.

Macdonald provides a very useful summary of the long and costly Banaban High Court case against the commissioners and the British government in the early 1970s. While he tells the story dispassionately it is difficult not to come away from *The Phosphateers* saddened by the way in which the Banabans were the victims of a colossal and unsavory "smash and grab" disguised over the years by political and bureaucratic dissimulation and insensitivity.

The Phosphateers is a vast, complex, and clearly written history that provides illuminating insights into the interplay between Australian domestic affairs and foreign policy, the nature of the international phosphate market, and the crucial part played by powerful personalities in what amounted to a family firm. Williams and Macdonald are to be commended for bringing their special talents to bear in writing what will no doubt constitute the "definitive" history of the BPC for the foreseeable future. While the economies of publishing and the modest disclaimer at the end of the volume may explain the lack of footnotes and a complete bibliography, it is to be regretted, nevertheless, that those scholarship-supporting mechanisms are not included in view of the very real importance of this book.

John Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion: An Imperial Reckoning.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Melbourne: Heinemann Publishers Australia, 1984. Pp. 163. US$18.95.

Reviewed by James Jupp, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University

John Beasant took an important part in the establishment of an independent Vanuatu from the previous British and French condominium of the New Hebrides. From 1977 to 1980 he served as London representative of the Vanuaaku Pati leader, Father Walter Lini. From 1980 to 1982 he was Lini's press secretary and was a vital link between the independent government that Lini led, the press, the interested powers, and those who were rebelling under the leadership of Jimmy Stevens. He has now moved on to be press secretary to the president of the Maldives, being one of the very last of those generations of Englishmen who served the now-vanished Empire throughout the globe.

Beasant is not, of course, an imperialist despite his taking up the very last remnants of the white man's burden. On the contrary, his devotion to Lini stems from a political position that made him determined to end British and French rule and to frustrate those, like Stevens, who might have substituted neocolonialism for imperial rule. His account of Vanuatu politics is not detached, though like all concerned he obviously has a human sympathy for Jimmy Stevens, who was jailed and his son killed while his sponsors relaxed happily in France and the United States.

The essential story of the last days of the New Hebrides condominium is very familiar to those who took an interest. Unfortunately, much of Beasant's account assumes more widespread knowledge of what was only a small footnote to world history. There is no map of Santo or of Vanuatu from which events could be followed by the interested reader without local knowledge. The text has obviously been reduced by cutting out much background, leaving a book that will be followed with ease by experts but probably create confusion for others. This is a pity, as the story is certainly well worth telling and of general interest in looking at the affairs of small island states in the Pacific or elsewhere.

The essential dilemma of such states is that they have neither the economy, nor the trained personnel, nor the military potential to be anything but pawns in the politics of greater powers. What is fascinating about Beasant's account is the way in which the very small and inexperienced Vanuatu élite was able to manipulate the three most interested powers—France, Britain, and Australia—to their own advantage. The French were unprepared to leave, the British very anxious to liquidate their imperial remnant, and the Australians very worried

about potential violence both in Vanuatu and New Caledonia. While Soviet influence has arguably increased since independence, it was of no significance to the events described by Beasant, although he, like Lini, was regarded by many conservative participants, local and international, as virtually a Soviet agent. Add to this international complexity the intervention of American "libertarians" looking for a free-enterprise paradise, and the wonder is that Vanuatu achieved independence with very little bloodshed and only a minimum of violence.

Vanuatu unity was created by colonialism, but in the bizarre form of the Anglo–French condominium. Joint rule gave nationalists an opportunity to play one power off against another, with Lini appealing to the British and Stevens to the French. While the majority of islanders are Protestant Christians (mostly Presbyterians and Anglicans), there were Catholic, Church of Christ, and non-Christian minorities who could also be recruited for various causes. Rivalry between islands meant that the northern islands (centered upon Santo) and the southern (centered upon Tanna) were unwilling to accept rulers concentrated in the colonial capital of Vila, on the central island of Efate. While the French seemed willing to contemplate the severance of Tanna and Santo, the British, the Australians, and the Vanuatu nationalists all insisted on national unity. Elections held in 1979 confirmed the dominance of the nationalist Vanuaaku Pati, led by Lini, which has held power through elections ever since. But results in Santo and Tanna still encouraged separatists enough for them to leave the democratic road and to take up (very primitive) arms against due constitutional process.

Secessionist rebellion might have worked in certain circumstances. Had the French government in Paris given full support to the local French settlers and administration, then Britain and Australia would have been under great pressure to abandon their Vanuaaku Pati admirers and to have effected a compromise or partition that would have sown the seeds for further dissent. It is not entirely clear from Beasant's account why Paris would not give such support, but clearly the French had more important considerations than retaining a half-share in a small colony that was of benefit to only a few thousand French citizens, many of mixed race. The dissidents in Tanna and Santo had good reason to believe that the local French resident commissioner, Jean-Jacques Robert, was in complete sympathy, but they were naive in assuming that he alone spoke for France. Beasant makes clear that, in the very small expatriate society, personal involvement was often a vital ingredient in policy making, but only up to the point where interna-

tional relations became important, when the politicians and bureau-
crats of Paris and London took over.

The Santo Rebellion will stand as the most authoritative account of
the last days of the New Hebrides. Others have very little interest in
defending their actions and the winning side usually writes history.
Vanuatu has become very quiet in recent years, although its relations
with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya occasionally cause consterna-
tion in New Caledonia or Australia. Internal politics lack the tensions
that Beasant outlines, mainly because there is so very little external
interference in Vanuatu affairs and so many of the defeated have left the
islands. This account must be read as that of a direct participant, even if
much of the "inside story" is the same as the "outside story" cabled by
informed journalists at the time of the 1980 Santo rebellion. It was not
easy to keep secrets in such a small society. In the end the will of the
majority was secured against a variety of forces who wished to dismem-
ber Vanuatu. Beasant tends to be angry with both colonial powers, and
with some justification. But neither had any vital interest in staying on,
and, despite the eventual need for Papua New Guinea military inter-
vention, the situation was resolved in a manner likely to preserve the
future viability of one of the world's smallest sovereign states.

Elena Viktorovna Govor, *Bibliografiia Avstralii, 1710–1983* [A bibliog-
    raphy of Australia, 1710–1983]. Moskva: Nauka, GRVL, 1985. Pp.
    380, tirazh 1050. 4 rubles, 80 kopeks.

Reviewed by Patricia Polansky, Russian Bibliographer, Hamilton
Library, University of Hawaii–Manoa

Assembled by a scholar originally from Minsk, Elena Viktorovna Gov-
or's outstanding bibliography of writings in Russian, Ukrainian, and
Belorussian finally has been published by the Institute of Oriental Stud-
ies in Moscow. After seeing parts of it in manuscript form in 1981, I was
pleased to see the final version in print and to have time to examine it in
depth. The editors of this work are Kim Vladimirovich Malakhovskii,
the director of the Pacific Studies Section of the Institute, and his distin-
guished colleague Alla Savel'evna Petrikovskaia. The foreword by Petri-
kovskaia notes that Australia since World War II has played a leading
role in international affairs, particularly in the Pacific region. The last
twenty years in the Soviet Union has seen a growth in Australian stud-

ies, and likewise there has been a great number of works by Australian writers translated into Russian. Since the first English colonizers arrived on the fifth continent, there has been an interest shown by Russians as witnessed by the first publication in 1710.

Govor notes in her preface that this is the first time works about Australia have been pulled together in one listing. Included are monographs, articles in collections, periodical and newspaper articles, reviews, dissertations, and a variety of miscellaneous materials such as encyclopedia entries, geography textbook descriptions, and reports from conferences. Translated literature is also listed. Short annotations are given if the title does not sufficiently reflect the material's subject matter. Pre-revolutionary publications, especially travel accounts, are more fully annotated. Within each section the material is listed chronologically by date of publication, or in the case of "Personalia" sections, alphabetically by author. The name index includes authors, editors, translators, reviewers, and those books listed by title in the main bibliography. Geographically the areas of Australia, Tasmania, and the islands of Norfolk, Coconut, and Christmas are included. Material about former Australian colonies and territories are included only if they contain observations about the colonial and neocolonial policies of Australia.

The bibliography lists 5,925 items, which Govor notes were almost all seen *de visu*. The Lenin Library in Moscow, the Saltykov–Shchedrin Public Library in Leningrad, the All–Union Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow, and the Lenin State Library of the Belorussian Union Republic were the primary collections in which Govor worked. There are eleven sections, often with numerous subdivisions, as follows: (1) The basic position of Marxism–Leninism about Australia; (2) Reference literature (bibliographies, encyclopedias); (3) General works (conferences, travel essays); (4) Geography (general, geology, climate, soil, plants, animals, discoveries, toponymy); (5) Population (religion); (6) Ethnography (general, exhibitions, ethnogenesis, economic and material culture, social structure, folklore, language, anthropology, the position of the aborigines during colonialism and today); (7) Economics (general, industry, energy, agriculture, forestry, transportation, foreign and domestic trade, finance, foreign capital in Australia); (8) History (general; 1788–1901; Miklukho–Maklai in Australia; 1901–1918; 1918–1983; political parties; domestic policy; workers and trade unions; foreign policy and relations with Britain, America, Asian countries, and the Soviet Union; Australian colonialism); (9) State and Law (armed forces, patent law); (10) Culture (general, philosophy, education, sci-

ence, libraries, the press, art, literature, health, sports); and (11) Australia in world literature.

There is very little to criticize in this bibliography. One can alert users to the following minor notes: the newspaper articles are selected for the postwar period and particularly the last ten years; the section that lists conferences does not list the individual papers presented that pertain to Australia; the names of Westerners are often not rendered into English, but left in the Russian in the voyage section, and throughout other parts; and not all editions of a work are noted, for example, item 1149, Ivashintsov's list of voyages around the world, shows all the variants except the one translated into English (N. A. Ivashintsov, *Russian round-the-world voyages, 1803–1849: with a summary of later voyages to 1867* [Kingston, Ont.: Limestone Press, 1980]). Finally, I am not sure of the reason for listing Ukrainian and Belorussian works as it does not appear that they form any bulk of literature.

As one who has labored for more than twelve years on compiling an annotated bibliography of Russian writings about the South Pacific (including Australia), I have nothing but admiration and praise for this expertly prepared and meticulously presented bibliography. It will become an instant classic reference for both libraries and scholars dealing with Soviet scholarship about Australia.

EDITOR'S NOTE

Articles and reviews in *Pacific Studies* are abstracted or indexed in *Sociological Abstracts, Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts, America: History and Life, Historical Abstracts,* and *PAIS Bulletin.*

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The Kamapuaʻa Literature

DIETRICH VAREZ

The Classical Traditions
of the Hawaiian Pig God
as a Body of Literature

JOHN CHARLOT

In Hawaiian oral and later written tradition, Kamapuaʻa, the Pig God, played an important and ever-expanding role. From tales of an early animal folk god to those of an increasingly humanized deity, this book recounts the legends concerning Kamapuaʻa and explores the intricate connections between the various levels of Hawaiian society and how they shaped and altered the development of a body of literature. This large-scale scholarly treatment of an indigenous Hawaiian god is the first analysis of a formal body of Polynesian literature using the methods of Form and Redaction Criticism. It establishes a paradigm for the analysis of similar bodies of literature, and is a noteworthy text for the study of Hawaiian and Pacific literature.

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